Triviality as a General Exception: Section 33 BNS and De Minimis Non Curat Lex

The criminal law is a heavy machine. It exists to punish serious wrongs, not to fuss over petty ones. A push in a crowded railway compartment, a bump on the street, a small water splash from a passing vehicle, a fleeting insult in traffic: these are the small frictions of daily life, and no one benefits from criminalising them. Section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, gives statutory shape to this common sense. It codifies the ancient Roman maxim de minimis non curat lex: the law does not concern itself with trifles. This module walks through the section, its historical origin, and the leading Indian authorities on where the line is drawn.

1. Meaning and Concept

The maxim: de minimis non curat lex

De minimis non curat lex.

The Latin maxim, drawn from Roman law and formalised by the classical jurists, is the doctrinal shorthand for Section 33 BNS. It expresses a proposition of legal common sense: the law does not concern itself with trifles. The heavy machinery of the criminal courts, the prosecution, the trial, the verdict, the sentence, should not be set in motion over a matter so slight that no ordinary person would take it to court.

Why the law does not concern itself with trifles

The four reasons Section 33 exists

Proportionality. The criminal law is a weighty response. It should be reserved for weighty wrongs.
Judicial economy. Court time and public resources should not be spent on trifles. Every case adjudicated is a case that could have been settled through good manners.
Social peace. Ordinary friction between citizens is a normal fact of shared life. Treating every push, every raised voice, and every casual remark as an offence would breed hostility, not peace.
Deterrence has no role. A person who causes trifling harm without intending any harm cannot usefully be deterred. The criminal law achieves nothing by intervening.

The proportionality principle

Section 33 gives statutory expression to a broader principle of proportionality that runs through the criminal law. Even where the elements of an offence are technically satisfied, the law asks whether the harm is significant enough to warrant criminal prosecution. Where the answer is no, the section provides a complete defence. This is a check on the overreach of technical criminality and a reminder that the criminal law is a response to serious wrong, not a substitute for civility.

2. Historical Origin

Roman and canon law

Roman law contained the maxim de minimis non curat praetor: the praetor does not concern himself with trifles. The praetor was the judicial magistrate in Roman society, and the maxim expressed the idea that even a busy magistrate should not spend his time on trivial matters. The canon law of the medieval church took over the maxim and generalised it to the whole legal system, giving it the modern form: de minimis non curat lex.

Reception into English common law

English common law absorbed the maxim from an early date. Coke, in the Institutes, treated it as a general principle. Blackstone, in the Commentaries (1765), used it to explain a number of judicial decisions. The English courts applied it to petty assaults, trivial trespasses, minor libels, and small breaches of contract, treating each as too small to warrant judicial notice.

Reception into the Indian Penal Code

Macaulay codified the maxim in Section 95 IPC, using concrete rather than Latin language: harm so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita retains the section, unchanged in substance, as Section 33. The concrete language is characteristic of Macaulay's drafting approach and makes the section directly usable by trial courts without recourse to Latin scholarship.

3. Statutory Provision

Section 33 BNS (formerly Section 95 IPC)

Section 33 BNS

Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or that it is intended to cause, or that it is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of such harm.

Text and structural analysis

The section is short but carefully constructed. Its structure:

Nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, or is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause, any harm.
If that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it.

The section covers all three possible mens rea configurations: harm actually caused, harm intended, and harm known to be likely. Whichever configuration is alleged, the same slightness test applies. The critical question is not what the accused thought or intended, but what the harm actually was, judged by the objective standard of the ordinary person.

4. Ingredients of Section 33

The three elements

The three cumulative elements

There must be an act that would otherwise be an offence.
The act must cause, or be intended to cause, or be known to be likely to cause, harm.
The harm must be so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it.

Harm that is caused, intended, or known to be likely

The section applies whichever of the three mens rea configurations is present. A person who actually causes slight harm without intending it, a person who intends slight harm, and a person who knows that slight harm is the likely consequence of his act are all within the section. The section is not restricted to accidental cases; it applies to intentional trivialities as well.

So slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain

The core requirement is the slightness of the harm. The test is objective: not what the actual victim thought, but what a person of ordinary sense and temper would have thought. An unusually sensitive victim who complains of a bump that most people would not notice cannot invoke the criminal law. A stoic victim who does not complain of what most people would complain of cannot deprive the state of the ability to prosecute. The reference is to the ordinary person, in the ordinary sense of that phrase.

5. The Objective Test

The person of ordinary sense and temper

The person of ordinary sense and temper is a legal construct, similar to the reasonable person of the law of tort. He is neither unusually sensitive nor unusually thick skinned. He has ordinary human dignity and ordinary human tolerance. He is not offended by trivial slights but does resent significant ones. The court steps into his shoes when applying Section 33 BNS.

Not an eggshell victim, not a stoic

Ordinary Person	Eggshell Victim	Stoic Victim
Ordinary person of average sensitivity.	Person unusually sensitive to physical or emotional harm.	Person unusually tolerant of physical or emotional harm.
The reference point of Section 33 BNS.	Not the reference point. The eggshell victim's complaint of trivial harm does not qualify the trifle as an offence.	Not the reference point. A stoic victim's failure to complain does not turn an actionable offence into a trifle.
Would complain of a hard shove but not of an accidental brush.	Would complain of an accidental brush.	Would not complain even of a hard shove.
Section 33 BNS applies where such a person would not complain.	Section 33 BNS still applies. The eggshell victim's protest is disregarded.	Section 33 BNS does not apply. The stoic victim's silence does not deprive the state of the power to prosecute.

How the court applies the test

The court examines the objective facts: the nature of the physical or verbal act, the context (whether it was in public, in private, in a crowd, in a workplace), the relationship between the parties, the resulting harm (bruise, torn clothing, hurt feelings, financial loss), and any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. On the basis of this examination, the court asks whether the ordinary person in the position of the victim would have complained. If the answer is no, Section 33 applies. If yes, it does not.

6. Illustrations of Slight Harm

Casual bumps and jostles

The classical illustration is the casual bump. In a crowded railway carriage, a passenger's bag brushes another. In a busy market, one shopper bumps into another. On a crowded street, a jogger accidentally shoulders a pedestrian. Each of these might technically be an assault or a hurt, but the harm is so slight that Section 33 protects the actor.

Petty verbal exchanges

A raised voice, a sharp word, a minor rebuke in the workplace, a passing insult in traffic: each might, in strict analysis, be an insult or a threat under the Sanhita. But Section 33 protects the speaker where the harm to the recipient is slight. The section is often invoked in complaints of alleged verbal abuse where the alleged words are trivial.

Minor trespass

Walking across another's land to reach a public path, stepping onto a neighbour's driveway to fetch a fallen object, using a corner of another's property to avoid an obstacle: each is technically a trespass, but the harm is so slight that Section 33 applies.

Small property damage

Accidental scratches to another's property, small dents to a parked car from a bicycle brushing past, minor damage from ordinary neighbourly conduct: each is technically mischief or damage, but Section 33 protects the actor where the loss is trifling.

7. When Section 33 Does Not Apply

Where the harm is not slight

The section does not apply where the harm is substantial. A push that causes a fall, a slap that causes a bruise, a verbal exchange that damages the recipient's reputation in the eyes of others, all cross the line into the criminal domain. The slightness must be objective, not just relative to the actor's intention.

Where the offence protects a specific interest

Some offences protect specific interests that cannot be measured on the slightness scale. Bribery, however small the amount, corrupts the public service. Perjury, however trivial the point testified to, undermines the judicial process. Fabrication of evidence, however slight, subverts the trial. In these cases, the specific interest protected excludes the operation of Section 33.

Where the injury is to dignity of a woman

📖 Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K. P. S. Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194

The Supreme Court considered a complaint against a senior police officer for slapping a senior woman civil servant on her buttocks at a social gathering. The accused invoked Section 95 IPC (now Section 33 BNS), arguing that the slap was trivial and that no person of ordinary sense would complain. The Supreme Court rejected the argument. Justice K. Ramaswamy held that the act was an outrage of the modesty of a woman under Section 354 IPC (now Sections 74 and 79 BNS), and such an act could never be treated as trivial. Rule: outrage of the modesty of a woman is not a matter for Section 33 BNS. The specific interest protected by the offence puts it beyond the reach of the triviality exception.

8. Judicial Elaboration

Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan

📖 Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1773

The accused had thrown a file at the complainant, which struck her on the elbow and caused a scratch. The Supreme Court considered whether the harm was slight enough to fall within Section 95 IPC. The Court held that the section requires an objective assessment of the harm. In this case, the harm was minor but the act was intentional and hostile. On the facts, the Court held that Section 95 did apply, and the acquittal was upheld. Rule: the section applies to minor physical harm resulting from what is essentially a petty quarrel.

Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K. P. S. Gill

Discussed above. The section does not apply to conduct that outrages the modesty of a woman, however slight the physical harm.

Ghouse Khan v. State of Karnataka

📖 Ghouse Khan v. State of Karnataka, (2010) SCC OnLine Kar 4823

The Karnataka High Court considered a case of trivial mischief involving damage to a small quantity of property. The Court held that Section 95 IPC applied, and the case was properly kept out of the criminal domain. Rule: property damage that is truly trivial is within the section, provided no aggravating factor takes it out.

Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh

📖 Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1

Though primarily concerned with fundamental rights and hate speech, the Supreme Court's five judge Constitution Bench observed that the boundary between trivial and significant harm in verbal exchanges is a critical question for the criminal law. Casual bad language may fall within Section 95 IPC (now Section 33 BNS), but not deliberate hate speech or speech that outrages any protected interest. Rule: the slightness test is context sensitive.

9. Consolidated Landmark Judgments

Mrs. Veeda Menezes v. Yusuf Khan Haji Ibrahim Khan, AIR 1966 SC 1773. Objective assessment of the harm. Petty quarrel resulting in scratch was within Section 95 IPC.
Rupan Deol Bajaj v. K. P. S. Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194. Outrage of modesty of a woman is not a matter for Section 95 IPC (now Section 33 BNS).
Ghouse Khan v. State of Karnataka, (2010) SCC OnLine Kar 4823. Trivial property damage. Section 95 IPC applied.
Kaushal Kishor v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2023) 4 SCC 1. Context sensitive application of the slightness test.
Emperor v. Jagmohan Singh, AIR 1932 All 165. Trivial verbal exchanges within Section 95 IPC. Petty rebuke by a superior did not attract criminal liability.
Helsham v. Blackwood, (1851) 11 CB 111. Foundational English case on the de minimis principle in criminal law.
The State of Assam v. Krishnaram Baruah, AIR 1953 Assam 130. Petty official misconduct held to be within Section 95 IPC where the harm was slight and the intent unproven.
Union of India v. Duli Chand, (1998) 8 SCC 630. Application of Section 95 IPC in a service matter. Section applied to minor procedural irregularity.
State of Karnataka v. Praveen Bhai Thogadia, (2004) 4 SCC 684. Boundary of the section in the context of communal speech. Section not available for provocative speech.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Section 33 BNS?

Section 33 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 95 IPC), provides that nothing is an offence by reason that it causes, is intended to cause, or is known to be likely to cause, any harm, if that harm is so slight that no person of ordinary sense and temper would complain of it. The section codifies the Roman maxim de minimis non curat lex.

What does de minimis non curat lex mean?

The Latin maxim, drawn from Roman law, translates as the law does not concern itself with trifles. It expresses the idea that the heavy machinery of the criminal courts should not be set in motion over matters so slight that no ordinary person would take them to court. Section 33 BNS gives statutory shape to the maxim.

What is the test under Section 33 BNS?

The test is objective: would a person of ordinary sense and temper have complained of the harm? Not whether the actual victim complained, and not whether the accused thought it was trivial. The court applies the standard of the ordinary person, examining the nature of the act, the context, the relationship between the parties, and the resulting harm.

Can outraging a woman's modesty be treated as trivial under Section 33 BNS?

No. In Rupan Deol Bajaj v K. P. S. Gill, (1995) 6 SCC 194, the Supreme Court held that outrage of the modesty of a woman is not a matter for Section 95 IPC (now Section 33 BNS). The specific interest protected by the offence excludes the operation of the triviality exception.

Does Section 33 BNS apply to bribery, however small the amount?

No. Some offences protect specific interests that cannot be measured on the slightness scale. Bribery, however small the amount, corrupts the public service. Perjury, however trivial the point, undermines the judicial process. These offences are outside the reach of Section 33.

What are the classical illustrations of trivial harm?

Casual bumps in a crowd, petty verbal exchanges, minor accidental damage to another's property, brief trespass across a corner of land, and small water splashes from a passing vehicle are typical illustrations. Each is technically an offence but is protected by Section 33 because a person of ordinary sense and temper would not complain of it.

Triviality Section 33 BNS