Administrative and Quasi-Judicial Functions Compared: The Duty to Act Judicially and Why the Distinction Has Narrowed

For much of the twentieth century the classification of a function as administrative or quasi-judicial decided whether the person affected was entitled to be heard. A quasi-judicial function carried a duty to act judicially and attracted natural justice; an administrative function did not, and an authority could decide as it pleased. Enormous effort went into the classification, and the results were unsatisfactory, since an order ruining a man's livelihood attracted no hearing if it happened to be labelled administrative. Indian law resolved this in 1969 by holding that the duty to act fairly attaches to administrative action affecting rights as much as to quasi-judicial action. The classification survives, but it no longer decides the question it was devised to decide. This topic sets out the distinction and what now turns on it.

1. The Traditional Test

📖 Province of Bombay v. Kusaldas S. Advani, AIR 1950 SC 222

Facts: Premises were requisitioned by the Government under emergency legislation for a public purpose. The order was challenged by certiorari, which at that time lay only against a body acting judicially or quasi-judicially. The question was whether the requisitioning authority, in deciding that the premises were needed for a public purpose, exercised a quasi-judicial function so as to be amenable to that writ.

Held: The Supreme Court held by majority that the function was administrative and that certiorari did not lie. It laid down the test that governed for the next two decades: a body is required to act judicially where two conditions are satisfied. First, it must be empowered to determine questions affecting the rights of subjects. Secondly, it must be under a duty to act judicially, and such a duty is not to be inferred from the mere fact that rights are affected; it arises where the statute expressly or by necessary implication imposes it, as where there is a lis inter partes, a duty to hear both sides, or a requirement to decide on evidence. The Court held that the requisitioning authority was simply forming an administrative opinion that the premises were needed, with no contest between parties before it, so no duty to act judicially arose.

Ratio: The traditional test: a duty to act judicially arises only where the statute expressly or impliedly imposes it, and is not to be inferred merely from the fact that rights are affected. This test was displaced in India by the later authorities.

The unsatisfactory consequence was that natural justice depended on a label. That was reversed in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262, which held that the dividing line between administrative and quasi-judicial functions is thin and gradually being obliterated, and that the requirement of acting fairly applies to administrative action affecting rights. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 completed the movement by locating fairness in Article 21.

2. When an Authority Acts Quasi-Judicially Today

📖 Indian National Congress (I) v. Institute of Social Welfare, (2002) 5 SCC 685

Facts: The question was whether the Election Commission, in registering or deregistering a political party under the Representation of the People Act, exercises a quasi-judicial function, and whether it possesses a power of review over its own orders. The answer depended on the character of the function performed.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the Commission acts quasi-judicially when deciding on registration, and set out the tests for determining the character of a statutory function. It held that a statutory authority exercises a quasi-judicial function where: the statute requires it to decide a lis between contesting parties; or, although there is no contest between parties, it is required to act judicially and decide the rights of a person on the basis of an objective determination of facts, after hearing that person; or where the statute provides an appeal or a hearing before the order is made. By contrast, an authority acts administratively where the statute requires it to act on its subjective satisfaction or on grounds of policy or expediency, without any requirement of determining facts objectively. The Court held that registration involved determining whether prescribed conditions were satisfied, which is an objective determination affecting rights, and was therefore quasi-judicial.

Ratio: An authority acts quasi-judicially where it decides a lis, or determines rights on an objective determination of facts after hearing the person, or where the statute requires a hearing. It acts administratively where it proceeds on subjective satisfaction or on policy.

3. The Comparison

Basis	Administrative function	Quasi-judicial function
Basis of decision	Policy, expediency, subjective satisfaction	Objective determination of facts
Presence of a lis	Not required; often absent	Ordinarily present, or a person whose rights are determined
Evidence	Material of any kind, including reports and inspection	Evidence taken in the presence of the person affected
Hearing	Fairness in the circumstances; not necessarily an oral hearing	A hearing of the person affected, with disclosure of material
Reasons	Required where rights are affected	Required as a matter of course
Bias	Applies, though departmental bias is more readily tolerated	Applies fully
Power of review	May be revoked or modified unless rights have accrued	Functus officio after the decision, unless the statute permits review
Effect of precedent	Earlier decisions not binding, though consistency is required	Judicial discipline within the hierarchy applies
Direction by a superior	Permissible as to policy	Not permissible at all
Remedy	Article 226 on the ordinary grounds	Certiorari historically, and Article 226 generally

4. What Still Turns on the Classification

The content of the hearing. Both attract fairness, but a quasi-judicial function ordinarily requires evidence, cross-examination and a formal opportunity, while an administrative function may require no more than notice and a chance to represent.
Directions from a superior. A quasi-judicial function cannot be controlled by directions at all; an administrative function may be guided by lawful policy directions.
Power to revoke or review. An authority that has decided quasi-judicially is ordinarily functus officio; an administrative decision may be revisited unless rights have accrued.
Recording and disclosure of material, which is stricter where the function is quasi-judicial.
Reasons, required as a matter of course in quasi-judicial decisions and where rights are affected in administrative ones.
Judicial discipline, which applies within a quasi-judicial hierarchy so that appellate orders bind subordinate authorities.
Not the availability of natural justice, which was the original purpose of the distinction and no longer depends on it.

5. Illustrations

Function	Classification
Assessment of tax after hearing the assessee	Quasi-judicial
Deciding a departmental appeal or revision	Quasi-judicial
Registration or cancellation of registration on prescribed conditions	Quasi-judicial (Institute of Social Welfare)
Grant or refusal of a licence on stated criteria after objections	Quasi-judicial
Requisition or acquisition of property for a public purpose	Administrative
Framing a scheme, fixing a price or making a policy	Administrative
Preventive detention on subjective satisfaction	Administrative, but with constitutional safeguards
Selection for appointment by a selection committee	Administrative, subject to fairness and the rule against bias
Blacklisting a contractor	Administrative with civil consequences; full natural justice applies
Preliminary or fact-finding inquiry	Administrative; decides nothing

⚠ The classification survives; the consequence it once carried does not

The natural question is why the distinction is still studied if natural justice no longer depends on it. The answer is that the classification was doing two jobs, and only one of them has been taken away. It decided whether a hearing was required at all, and that is now settled by asking whether the action affects rights or carries civil consequences, whatever the label. But it continues to determine the content of the procedure, whether the authority may be directed by a superior, whether it may reopen its own decision, and whether appellate orders bind it. A modern argument about classification is therefore not about whether the person gets a hearing, which he does, but about how much process he gets and how far the decision-maker stands apart from the administrative hierarchy.

6. The Position in Summary

Under the traditional test a duty to act judicially arose only where the statute expressly or impliedly imposed it, and not merely because rights were affected (Kusaldas Advani).
That test was displaced by Kraipak and Maneka Gandhi, which held the dividing line thin and applied the duty of fairness to administrative action affecting rights.
An authority acts quasi-judicially where it decides a lis, determines rights on an objective determination of facts after hearing the person, or is required by statute to give a hearing; and administratively where it acts on subjective satisfaction or on policy (Institute of Social Welfare).
What still turns on the classification is the content of the hearing, amenability to directions, the power to reopen, the strictness of disclosure and reasons, and the application of judicial discipline.
What no longer turns on it is the availability of natural justice itself, which now depends on whether rights or civil consequences are affected.

7. Related Topics and Provisions

Administrative vs Judicial Action (Topic 17) and Quasi-Judicial Functions (Topic 18).
Judicial vs Quasi-Judicial Function (Topic 195): the comparison from the other side.
Principles of Natural Justice (Topics 58 and 59) and A.K. Kraipak (landmark case note).
Acting under Dictation (Topic 183): why quasi-judicial functions cannot be directed.
Precedent in Administrative Decision-Making (Topic 191): judicial discipline within the hierarchy.
Constitution of India: Articles 14, 21, 32, 226 and 227.