📖 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248 (seven Judges)

Facts: The passport of the petitioner was impounded without her being given an opportunity of being heard, and the question was whether a law depriving a person of personal liberty satisfies Article 21 merely by prescribing some procedure, or whether the procedure must satisfy a further standard.

Held: The Bench of seven Judges held that the procedure established by law within the meaning of Article 21 must be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied. The Court held that Articles 14, 19 and 21 are not mutually exclusive but constitute a single scheme, so that a law depriving a person of personal liberty must satisfy the test of reasonableness and must not be arbitrary. It followed that a law is not saved merely because it prescribes some procedure: the procedure itself is examinable, and where it is unfair or unreasonable the deprivation is unconstitutional. The Court also held that the principles of natural justice are implicit in the requirement, so that a person affected is ordinarily entitled to be heard before being deprived of his liberty.

Ratio: The procedure established by law under Article 21 must be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive. Articles 14, 19 and 21 form a single scheme, and a law is not saved merely because it prescribes some procedure.

📖 Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713

Facts: An accused under a special statute containing a stringent restriction on the grant of bail had been in custody for over five years without his trial being concluded, a large number of witnesses remaining to be examined. Bail having been granted by the High Court, the State contended that the statutory restriction barred it.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the statutory restrictions on bail in a special statute and the powers of a constitutional court to grant bail on the ground of violation of Part III are not antithetical, and that such restrictions do not oust the ability of constitutional courts to grant bail where a fundamental right has been infringed. The Court held that prolonged incarceration without trial engages Article 21, and that where there is no likelihood of the trial being completed within a reasonable time and the accused has already suffered a significant period of custody, it would ordinarily be appropriate to release him on bail — the more so where the period undergone is substantial in relation to the sentence he might receive. It reasoned that a statutory restriction is intended to prevent bail being granted lightly, not to sanction indefinite detention caused by the State’s own inability to bring the case to trial, and that reading it otherwise would make the provision itself constitutionally vulnerable. The Court upheld the release, subject to stringent conditions.

Ratio: Statutory restrictions on bail and the constitutional court’s power to grant bail for violation of Part III are not antithetical. Prolonged incarceration without trial engages Article 21, and where the trial will not conclude within a reasonable time release is ordinarily appropriate.

⚠ How the argument is made in practice

Identify the period already undergone, and set it against the maximum sentence for the offence and against the period the trial is still likely to take.

Show that the delay is not the accused’s own. The Explanation to section 479 makes the point statutorily — delay caused by the accused is excluded — and the same reasoning applies constitutionally.

Show the stage of the trial: how many witnesses are cited, how many have been examined, what dates have been fixed and what has happened on them. A general assertion of delay is worth little; a schedule is worth a great deal.

And where a statutory restriction is relied on, meet it on both footings — that the constitutional court’s power survives it, and, if necessary, that the restriction itself does not satisfy Articles 14 and 21.

The position stated shortly

1. Article 21 requires that the procedure depriving a person of personal liberty be right, just and fair, and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive: Maneka Gandhi.

2. Articles 14, 19 and 21 form a single scheme. A law is not saved merely because it prescribes some procedure.

3. Pre-trial detention is not punishment. It can be justified only by the need to secure appearance and to prevent the trial being defeated.

4. Speedy trial is an ingredient of Article 21. A trial which does not proceed converts detention into punishment without conviction.

5. Where the State cannot bring the case to trial within a reasonable time, it cannot resist release by pointing to the gravity of the accusation.

6. Statutory restrictions on bail and the constitutional court’s power are not antithetical: such restrictions do not oust the power to grant bail where Part III has been infringed: K.A. Najeeb.

7. Prolonged incarceration without trial engages Article 21 however grave the accusation, and where the trial will not conclude within a reasonable time, release is ordinarily appropriate — on stringent conditions if necessary.

8. A statutory restriction exists to prevent bail being granted lightly, not to sanction indefinite detention caused by the State’s own delay.

9. Article 21 does not confer a right to bail in every case, does not make gravity irrelevant, and does not assist where the delay is the accused’s own.

10. And the statutory restriction must itself satisfy Articles 14 and 21: where the classification it makes bears no rational relation to its object, it is manifestly arbitrary.