Administrative Law
Central Administrative Tribunal: Jurisdiction, Procedure, Independence of Tribunals and the Problem of Tribunalisation
The Central Administrative Tribunal has been deciding the service disputes of Union employees since 1985, and the State Administrative Tribunals do the same in the States that have asked for them. Their jurisdiction and procedure are straightforward enough. What has occupied the Supreme Court for four decades is a different question: whether a body that decides disputes against the Government, while depending on the Government for its members' appointment, tenure, pay and even its premises, can be independent enough to be trusted with jurisdiction taken from the High Courts. That question produced a long line of decisions, a legislative response, further litigation, and in 2026 a new statute. This topic covers the tribunals themselves and that continuing argument.
1. Constitution and Composition
The Central Administrative Tribunal was established in 1985 with a Principal Bench at Delhi and benches in other cities, exercising jurisdiction over the service matters of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union, including All India Services and certain public sector undertakings notified under the Act.
State Administrative Tribunals are established under section 4 of the same Act, but only on a request by the State Government made to the Central Government; a State is not obliged to have one, and several States have never asked for one or have had theirs abolished. A Joint Administrative Tribunal may be constituted for two or more States. The substantive and procedural provisions are the same, the difference being only in the service to which the disputes relate.
A bench ordinarily consists of a Judicial Member and an Administrative Member, the first drawn from those who have been or are qualified to be a High Court Judge or have held judicial office, and the second from senior civil servants. The Chairman heads the Tribunal. That mixed composition was intended to combine legal competence with administrative experience, and it is also the source of much of the criticism, since the Administrative Member comes from the very service whose decisions are under challenge.
2. Jurisdiction and Powers
Matter | Position |
|---|---|
Service disputes of Union employees | Exclusive original jurisdiction under section 14 |
Service disputes of State employees | State Administrative Tribunal under section 15, where one exists |
Recruitment, seniority, promotion, transfer, pay | Within jurisdiction |
Disciplinary proceedings, dismissal, compulsory retirement | Within jurisdiction |
Pension and retiral benefits | Within jurisdiction |
Validity of service rules and regulations | Within jurisdiction (J.B. Chopra) |
Validity of the Administrative Tribunals Act itself | Outside; goes to the High Court |
Members of the armed forces | Excluded; the Armed Forces Tribunal has jurisdiction |
Interim relief | Available under section 24, subject to the conditions there prescribed |
Contempt | Powers of a High Court in relation to contempt, in respect of its own proceedings |
The Tribunal has the powers of a civil court in respect of summoning and enforcing attendance, requiring the discovery and production of documents, receiving evidence on affidavits, requisitioning public records, issuing commissions and reviewing its decisions. Its proceedings are deemed judicial proceedings, and its orders are executable as decrees.
3. Procedure before the Tribunal
- Application, not petition. A proceeding is commenced by an application under section 19 in the prescribed form with the prescribed fee, which is modest.
- Exhaustion of departmental remedies. Section 20 requires the applicant to have availed of the remedies under the service rules, unless none exists or the authority has not decided within six months.
- Limitation. Section 21 prescribes ordinarily one year, with power to condone delay on sufficient cause.
- Freedom from the Code. Section 22 provides that the Tribunal is not bound by the Code of Civil Procedure but is guided by the principles of natural justice, and may regulate its own procedure.
- Appearance in person. An applicant may appear in person or through a legal practitioner, and the Government may be represented by a presenting officer or a legal practitioner.
- Evidence on affidavit. Disputes are ordinarily decided on affidavits and documents, oral evidence being rare.
- Reasoned order. The Tribunal must give reasons, since its order is subject to judicial review and a non-speaking order cannot be reviewed.
- Challenge. A writ petition before a Division Bench of the High Court having territorial jurisdiction over the bench concerned; no direct recourse to the Supreme Court.
4. Independence: Appointment and Tenure
The requirement that a tribunal replacing a court must match it in independence has been stated repeatedly and, as repeatedly, has had to be enforced. The line runs from S.P. Sampath Kumar, (1987) 1 SCC 124, which required the tribunal to be an effective substitute for the High Court, through Union of India v. R. Gandhi, (2010) 11 SCC 1, which held that when the jurisdiction of a court is transferred the tribunal must possess the same independence, security and competence, that the judiciary must have a decisive voice in appointments, and that the tribunal should not be administered by the department that litigates before it.
📖 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India, (2021) 7 SCC 369 Facts: The Tribunals Reforms (Rationalisation and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2021 prescribed a four-year term for the Chairpersons and Members of a range of tribunals, a minimum age of fifty years for appointment, and a requirement that the search-cum-selection committee recommend a panel of two names for each post, with the Government to decide preferably within three months. The Ordinance reintroduced provisions that had been held bad in earlier rounds of litigation. Held: The Supreme Court struck down the offending provisions by majority. It held that a four-year tenure is too short to attract competent persons and creates insecurity, leaving members dependent on the executive for reappointment; a minimum age of fifty years is arbitrary and excludes younger members of the Bar, defeating the object of drawing talent to tribunals; and the requirement of a panel of two names dilutes the primacy of the selection committee and enlarges executive choice, the committee's recommendation being ordinarily binding. The Court reiterated its earlier directions that the tenure should be five years, that appointments be made within a binding time limit, and that service conditions be at parity with the office the tribunal replaces. Ratio: Short and renewable tenure, a high minimum age and executive choice from a panel are incompatible with the independence a tribunal must possess when it exercises jurisdiction taken from the courts. |
5. The Recent Developments
Parliament responded to the 2021 decision by enacting the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which re-enacted the four-year tenure, the minimum age of fifty and the panel requirement that the Court had just held bad. That statute was challenged in turn.
📖 Madras Bar Association v. Union of India (Supreme Court, November 2025) Facts: Sections 3 to 7 of the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 reproduced the provisions on eligibility, selection, tenure and service conditions that had been struck down in the 2020 and 2021 decisions, without addressing the defects the Court had identified. The Act was challenged as an impermissible legislative override. Held: The Supreme Court struck down the core provisions. It held that by re-enacting provisions already declared unconstitutional, without curing the defects, Parliament had attempted a legislative override rather than a valid removal of the basis of the earlier judgments, offending constitutional supremacy, the separation of powers and the binding effect of precedent. The provisions permitting the Government to equate tribunal members with civil servants, the four-year tenure with eligibility for reappointment in place of the minimum five years the Court had directed, the minimum age of fifty, and the arrangements leaving tribunals dependent on the litigating ministries for funds and infrastructure, were all held invalid. The Court directed the Union to establish a National Tribunals Commission within four months as a structural safeguard for independence, transparency and uniformity in appointments and administration. Ratio: A legislature cannot re-enact provisions struck down for unconstitutionality without curing the defect. Institutional independence of tribunals requires secure tenure, competent and judicially dominated selection, and freedom from administrative dependence on the litigating department. |
Parliament then enacted the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, which received assent on 13 August 2026. It repeals the 2021 Act, establishes the National Tribunals Commission to conduct selections, review the performance of tribunals, oversee inquiries into complaints against members and maintain a National Tribunals Data Grid, restores a five-year term, and provides for search-cum-selection committees headed by the Commission's Chairperson or a judicial member, with the Chief Justice of India to be consulted on the appointment of the Commission's Chairperson and judicial members. In the meantime the Supreme Court has passed interim orders extending the tenure of sitting Chairpersons and Members so that benches do not become defunct while the new framework is put in place. This area is moving quickly and the position should be checked against the current notifications.
6. Tribunalisation of Justice
The case for tribunalisation | The case against |
|---|---|
Relieves courts of large volumes of specialised litigation | Fragments the justice system into dozens of separate forums |
Expertise in technical fields | Executive control over appointments and administration compromises independence |
Speed and lower cost for the litigant | Adds a tier: tribunal, then High Court under Articles 226 and 227, then Supreme Court |
Procedure suited to the subject | Quality and consistency vary widely between tribunals |
Continuous supervision of a scheme or market | Vacancies and inadequate infrastructure leave benches non-functional |
Uniformity within a field | The Government is the largest litigant before tribunals it also administers |
Access for litigants who could not afford a High Court | Repeated legislative attempts to dilute independence generate litigation of their own |
The reform proposals that recur are the ones the recent decisions have taken up: a single nodal agency for tribunal administration, removing the parent ministry from the picture, which L. Chandra Kumar recommended as early as 1997; an independent commission for selection and oversight, now embodied in the National Tribunals Commission; uniform service conditions across tribunals; and timely filling of vacancies.
⚠ The recurring problem is structural, not accidental It would be easy to read the sequence of decisions from 1987 to 2025 as a series of drafting failures corrected one by one. The pattern suggests something more basic. Tribunals decide disputes in which the Government is almost always one party, and until 2026 the Government controlled who was appointed to them, for how long, on what terms and with what infrastructure. Every provision struck down, whether short tenure, a high minimum age, selection from a panel or administrative dependence on the parent ministry, is a version of the same conflict of interest. That is why the courts moved from correcting individual provisions towards requiring an independent commission: the defect lay in the structure rather than in any particular clause. |
7. The Position in Summary
- The Central Administrative Tribunal has exclusive original jurisdiction over Union service matters; State Administrative Tribunals are constituted only on a State's request, and benches ordinarily comprise a Judicial and an Administrative Member.
- Procedure is by application under section 19, subject to exhaustion of departmental remedies and a one-year limitation, free of the Code of Civil Procedure but bound by natural justice, with challenge lying to a Division Bench of the High Court.
- Independence is a constitutional condition: a tribunal replacing a court must match it in competence, security of tenure and mode of appointment, with the judiciary having a decisive voice (S.P. Sampath Kumar; R. Gandhi).
- Four-year tenure, a minimum age of fifty and selection from a panel were struck down in 2021, and their re-enactment in the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 was struck down in November 2025 as a legislative override, with a direction to create a National Tribunals Commission.
- The Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026, assented to on 13 August 2026, repeals the 2021 Act, establishes the National Tribunals Commission and a National Tribunals Data Grid, and restores a five-year term.
8. Related Topics and Provisions
- Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Topic 126) and Constitutional Provisions on Tribunals (Topic 125).
- Administrative Tribunals (Topic 124): the concept and its comparison with courts.
- Judicial Review of Disciplinary Proceedings (Topic 99): the substantive law the Tribunal applies.
- Natural Justice in Disciplinary Proceedings (Topic 81): the procedural requirements it enforces.
- Separation of Powers (Topic 10) and Judicial Review (Topic 88): the constitutional questions tribunalisation raises.
- Constitution of India: Articles 32, 136, 226, 227, 309, 311, 323A and 323B; Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985; Tribunals Reforms Act, 2026.