Collective Security: Security Council, Veto and Peacekeeping

Collective security is the idea that the international community acts together against a threat to any of its members. The League of Nations failed to make it work, and the UN Charter gave the Security Council stronger powers, including the power to bind all members and to authorise force. This note covers the Council's structure and voting, enforcement under Chapter VII, the limits of its powers, peacekeeping, and India's role.

1. The Security Council

• Background. The League's collective security failed against Japan in Manchuria (1931) and Italy in Abyssinia (1935), for lack of binding powers and great power support.
• Primary responsibility, Article 24. Members confer on the Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and agree that it acts on their behalf.
• Binding decisions, Article 25. Members agree to accept and carry out the Council's decisions; in the Namibia opinion (1971), this was held to apply to decisions generally, not only those under Chapter VII.
• Article 103. Charter obligations, including Council decisions, prevail over conflicting treaty obligations (Lockerbie, 1992)
• Enlargement. Non-permanent seats rose from six to ten in 1965; non-permanent members serve two years and cannot be immediately re-elected; India has served eight terms, most recently 2021 to 2022.

Figure 1: Composition and voting

• Uniting for Peace, 1950. General Assembly resolution 377 (V) allows the Assembly to recommend collective measures when the Council fails to act because of a lack of unanimity among permanent members; used in emergency special sessions such as Suez (1956) and Ukraine (2022)
• Veto initiative, 2022. General Assembly resolution 76/262 requires the Assembly to meet within ten working days after a veto to debate the situation.

2. Chapter VII

Figure 2: Escalating powers under Chapter VII

• Article 39. The Council determines the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression; it has broad discretion, and has treated internal conflicts, terrorism and humanitarian crises as threats to the peace.
• Article 41 sanctions. The first mandatory sanctions were imposed on Southern Rhodesia in 1966; Iraq was subjected to comprehensive sanctions in 1990; targeted sanctions, such as those on Al-Qaida and the Taliban under resolution 1267 (1999), freeze assets and ban travel of listed persons.
• Tribunals under Article 41. The Council created the ICTY (resolution 827, 1993) and the ICTR (resolution 955, 1994); in Tadić (1995), the ICTY Appeals Chamber upheld its own establishment as a measure under Article 41.
• Article 42 in practice. The special agreements under Article 43 to place national forces at the Council's disposal were never concluded, so the Council authorises states to use force, as in Korea (1950), against Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait (resolution 678, 1990, all necessary means) and Libya (resolution 1973, 2011)
• Limits. The Council must act in accordance with the purposes and principles of the UN (Article 24(2)); whether courts can review its decisions, and whether it is bound by jus cogens, remain debated.

Figure 3: Key moments in collective security

3. Peacekeeping

• Origins. Not mentioned in the Charter; Dag Hammarskjöld described it as Chapter six and a half; early observer missions included UNTSO (1948) and UNMOGIP (1949) in Jammu and Kashmir, and the first armed force was UNEF in Suez (1956)
• Principles. Consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate.
• Development. From observing ceasefires to multidimensional missions protecting civilians and supporting state building; reforms followed An Agenda for Peace (1992) and the Brahimi Report (2000)
• Certain Expenses (1962). The costs of UNEF and the Congo operation were expenses of the Organization that members had to bear.
• India's role. India is among the largest contributors of troops to UN peacekeeping in history; it regards UNMOGIP as having outlived its relevance after the Simla Agreement, 1972.

Figure 4: Peacekeeping and enforcement

4. Regional Arrangements and Reform

• Chapter VIII. Regional arrangements may deal with local disputes (Article 52), but no enforcement action may be taken under them without Council authorisation (Article 53)
• Reform. Proposals to expand the Council have been discussed in intergovernmental negotiations; India, with Brazil, Germany and Japan (the G4), seeks permanent membership.

5. Frequently Asked Questions

Does a permanent member's abstention block a resolution?

No. Under consistent practice accepted by the ICJ in the Namibia opinion (1971), a voluntary abstention by a permanent member does not prevent the adoption of a resolution; only a negative vote is a veto.

Can the General Assembly act if the Security Council is blocked by a veto?

Under the Uniting for Peace resolution (1950), it can consider the matter and recommend collective measures, but its recommendations are not binding in the way Chapter VII decisions of the Council are.

6. Related Topics

• Topic 50: Use of Force and Self-Defence. Articles 2(4) and 51.
• Topic 52: Intervention and R2P. Libya and the responsibility to protect.
• Topic 56: United Nations. The other principal organs.