Consideration under Section 2(d) and Sections 23 to 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872: Consideration Distinguished from Motive and Object, Real and Illusory Consideration, and a Map of the Whole Doctrine

Consideration is the largest single doctrine in the general part of the Indian Contract Act, and it is spread across Section 2(d), Sections 23 and 24 and Section 25. This topic serves two purposes. It gives a complete treatment of the three distinctions that do not have a home elsewhere in the series: consideration and motive, consideration and object, and real consideration as against illusory consideration. It then maps the doctrine as a whole, so that any question about consideration can be placed against the provision that answers it and the topic that develops it.

1. Consideration Distinguished from Motive

Motive is the reason that induces a person to make a promise. Consideration is what he asks for and receives in return for it. The two are frequently the same event viewed from different angles, and they are frequently not, but the law attends only to the second. A promise made from the best of motives is unenforceable if nothing moved at the promisor's desire, and a promise made from a discreditable motive is enforceable if something did.

📖 Thomas v. Thomas, (1842) 2 QB 851

Facts: A testator expressed a wish shortly before his death that his widow should have the house in which they lived for the rest of her life. The executors, reciting that wish, agreed to convey the house to her for so long as she remained a widow, on her paying one pound a year towards the ground rent and keeping the house in repair. A surviving executor later sought possession, contending that the arrangement was gratuitous.

Held: The agreement was enforceable. The testator's expressed wish was the motive for the promise and was not consideration at all. The consideration was the widow's undertaking to pay the annual sum and to keep the house in repair. Patteson J stated the distinction shortly: motive is not the same thing with consideration; consideration means something which is of some value in the eye of the law, moving from the plaintiff.

Ratio: A pious or affectionate reason for making a promise is motive and not consideration. What supports the promise is the thing of value the promisee gives in return, however small.

1.1 Why the distinction matters in India

A recital of motive does not save an agreement. A document reciting love, gratitude or moral obligation as the reason for a promise is still an agreement without consideration unless something moved at the promisor's desire, or the agreement falls within Section 25(1).
Section 23 is directed at object, not motive. An agreement is not unlawful because a party's private motive was discreditable; the question is what the transaction sets out to achieve.
Inadequacy is not the same as absence. A nominal sum is consideration, as the one pound in Thomas v. Thomas was, and Explanation 2 to Section 25 makes adequacy irrelevant. What is fatal is that nothing moved at all.

2. Consideration Distinguished from Object

Section 23 uses both words and treats them separately, and the distinction is structural. The consideration is what moves in return for the promise. The object is the purpose the agreement is designed to achieve. The same agreement may be tested against each, and it is void if either is unlawful.

	Consideration	Object	Motive
What it is	What moves from one party in return for the other's promise	The purpose the transaction is designed to achieve	The private reason inducing a party to promise
Is it an essential of a valid contract?	Yes, under Section 10, unless the case falls within Section 25	Yes, in the sense that it must be lawful under Section 23	No
Must it be lawful?	Yes, under Section 23	Yes, under Section 23	Irrelevant; the law does not inquire into it
Must it be adequate?	No, by Explanation 2 to Section 25	Not applicable	Not applicable
Effect if absent or unlawful	Absent: void under Section 25 unless within an exception. Unlawful: void under Section 23	Unlawful: void under Section 23	None

The practical use of the distinction is in analysing a transaction where one element is objectionable. A loan advanced to enable the borrower to do a forbidden act has a lawful consideration, the money, and an unlawful object; the agreement is void under Section 23 on the object limb. A payment made in return for a promise to procure a favour from a public official has an unlawful consideration, the promise to procure, whatever the ostensible object of the arrangement. Identifying which limb is affected also determines whether severance under Section 24 is arguable at all.

3. Real and Illusory Consideration

Explanation 2 to Section 25 makes adequacy irrelevant, but it does not dispense with reality. Consideration must be something of value in the eye of the law, and four kinds of purported consideration fail that test.

Physically impossible. A promise to do something that cannot be done. Section 56 in any event makes an agreement to do an impossible act void.
Legally impossible or unlawful. A promise to do what the law forbids, which engages Section 23.
Uncertain or vague. A promise so indefinite that the court cannot determine what was undertaken, which engages Section 29.
Illusory. A promise which, on its terms, leaves the promisor free to perform or not as he chooses. He has committed himself to nothing, and an undertaking that binds no one is not something of value.

📖 White v. Bluett, (1853) 23 LJ Ex 36

Facts: A son had given his father a promissory note. He alleged that the father had promised to discharge him from liability on it if he would stop complaining about the way in which the father had distributed his property among the children. The father's executor sued on the note and the son set up the alleged agreement.

Held: The defence failed. The son had no right to complain in the first place, so abstaining from doing so cost him nothing and conferred nothing of value on the father that the law could recognise. Pollock CB observed that the son had no right to complain, and that a promise to abstain from doing what one had no right to do could not be consideration.

Ratio: An abstinence from doing something one has no right to do is not consideration. The law will not weigh adequacy, but it will ask whether anything of legal value moved at all.

3.1 Performance of an existing obligation

The same reasoning excludes performance of a duty the promisor was already bound to render, because the promisee receives nothing he was not already entitled to. The rule applies to a public duty, as where a public servant claims a reward for doing what his office required, which was the second ground of decision in Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Datt; and to a contractual duty already owed to the same promisor, so that a promise of extra payment for doing what one had already contracted to do is unsupported. Where the promisee does something beyond the existing duty, that excess is good consideration.

⚠ Illusory consideration and inadequate consideration are different objections

Explanation 2 to Section 25 forecloses an argument that the consideration was too small; it does not foreclose an argument that there was no consideration at all. A promise to pay a rupee is adequate enough and will support any promise. A promise to pay such sum as the promisor may think fit is illusory, because he has bound himself to nothing. The first is a question of amount, which the court will not examine; the second is a question of legal substance, which it must.

4. A Map of the Doctrine

The whole of the law of consideration can be set out as a sequence of questions, each answered by a provision and developed in a topic of this series.

Question	Provision	Where it is developed
What is consideration, and what are its essentials?	Section 2(d)	Consideration under the Indian Contract Act
Must it move from the person suing?	Section 2(d), 'or any other person'	Doctrine of Privity of Consideration
May it be past, present or future?	The three tenses in Section 2(d)	Past, Present and Future Consideration
Must it be adequate?	Explanation 2 to Section 25	This topic, and the consideration topic
Must it be real?	Section 2(d), with Sections 29 and 56	This topic
Is it distinct from motive and from object?	Section 23, which names object and not motive	This topic
Must it be lawful?	Sections 23 and 24	Lawful and Unlawful Consideration
What if there is none at all?	Section 25	No Consideration, No Contract under Section 25
When does a promise bind without it?	Section 25(1) to (3), Explanation 1, and Sections 63, 127 and 185	Exceptions to the Rule of No Consideration
May a person who is not a party sue?	Judicial doctrine; the Act is silent	Privity of Contract

5. The Position Stated Shortly

Motive is the reason for a promise; consideration is what moves in return for it, and only the second is required.
Thomas v. Thomas: a testator's expressed wish was motive; the widow's undertaking to pay and repair was the consideration.
A recital of gratitude or moral obligation does not supply consideration, and Section 23 is directed at object rather than motive.
Consideration and object are distinct, and an agreement is void under Section 23 if either is unlawful.
Consideration must be real though it need not be adequate; physically impossible, legally impossible, uncertain and illusory promises are insufficient.
White v. Bluett: abstaining from doing what one has no right to do is not consideration.
Performance of an existing public or contractual duty is not consideration, though performance beyond that duty is.
Explanation 2 to Section 25 forecloses an argument about amount, not an argument that nothing of legal value moved.

6. Related Topics and Provisions

Topic or provision	Connection
Consideration under the Indian Contract Act	Section 2(d), its essentials and the Indian departures from English law
Past, Present and Future Consideration	The three tenses in Section 2(d)
Lawful and Unlawful Consideration	Sections 23 and 24 in full
No Consideration, No Contract under Section 25	The rule and its consequences
Exceptions to the Rule of No Consideration	The six situations in which a promise binds without consideration
Doctrine of Privity of Consideration	Whether a stranger to the consideration may sue
Privity of Contract	Whether a stranger to the contract may sue
Section 2(d), Indian Contract Act	The definition
Section 10, Indian Contract Act	Lawful consideration as a condition of enforceability
Sections 29 and 56, Indian Contract Act	Uncertainty, and agreements to do impossible acts