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Jurisprudence

Custom as a Source of Law

At a Glance

▪ Custom is the oldest source of law: a practice followed so long and so generally by a community that it comes to be felt as binding. Salmond calls it the embodiment of principles that have commended themselves to the national conscience as principles of justice and public utility.

▪ Salmond's scheme: legal custom (binding of its own force), which is either general or local, versus conventional custom or usage (binding only because the parties have agreed to it).

▪ Austin treated custom as mere positive morality until adopted by the courts or the sovereign; the historical school (Savigny, Puchta) treated it as the truest source of law.

▪ Requisites: antiquity, continuity, peaceable enjoyment, certainty, reasonableness, conformity with statute and public policy, consistency, compulsory observance. English law fixes legal memory at 1189; Indian law requires long usage but not time immemorial.

▪ In India custom lives on in personal law: Section 3(a) and 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act; but the Shariat Act 1937 abrogated custom contrary to Muslim personal law, and Article 13(3)(a) subjects custom to fundamental rights.

Think of a footpath across a college lawn. Nobody planned it and no rule created it. Students found it the shortest way, others followed, the grass wore away, and in time the path became so settled that the gardener stopped fighting it and laid bricks along it. Custom grows the same way. A practice is found convenient, it is repeated, it hardens into habit, and in time the habit is felt as a duty that the courts will enforce. Long before there were legislatures to enact law or courts to declare it, human societies were governed by such settled practices. Even today, when legislation and precedent dominate, custom retains real force in India, above all in the personal laws of the communities and in tribal and agrarian life.

Figure: The pillars of a valid custom: antiquity, continuity, certainty, reasonableness, peaceable enjoyment as of right, and consistency with statute and morality, resting on long community practice

1. Meaning and Definitions

A custom is a rule of conduct which, having been followed by a community for a long time, has come to be regarded as obligatory. It has two elements: a material element, the long and uniform practice, and a psychological element, the conviction that the practice is binding (sometimes called opinio necessitatis). A mere habit, such as taking tea in the evening, lacks the second element and is not a custom in the legal sense. Customary law is the body of such customs recognised and enforced by the courts.

Classic Definitions

▪ Salmond (Jurisprudence): 'Custom is the embodiment of those principles which have commended themselves to the national conscience as principles of justice and public utility.'

▪ Holland (Elements of Jurisprudence): custom is a generally observed course of conduct.

▪ Carter (Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function): custom is the uniformity of conduct of all persons under like circumstances.

▪ Allen (Law in the Making): custom is law that grows from below, out of the practice of the people, rather than being imposed from above by a sovereign.

▪ Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, Section 3(a): 'custom' and 'usage' signify any rule which, having been continuously and uniformly observed for a long time, has obtained the force of law among Hindus in any local area, tribe, community, group or family, provided that the rule is certain and not unreasonable or opposed to public policy, and, for a family custom, that it has not been discontinued by the family.

2. How Custom Becomes Law: The Theories

Austin: custom is positive morality until adopted

For Austin, law is the command of the sovereign. A custom, however old, is not a command, and so in itself it is only positive morality. It becomes law only when the courts enforce it or the sovereign adopts it by statute. When the judges enforce a custom, it becomes law by the tacit command of the sovereign, who permits the judges to enforce it; what the sovereign permits, he commands. Custom, on this view, is a source of law only in the historical sense: the courts, not the custom, give it legal force.

The historical school: custom as the true source

For Savigny and his pupil Puchta, custom is the truest source of law. Law, like language, grows out of the common consciousness of the people (the Volksgeist). Custom is its direct expression; legislation should only follow and formulate the custom that already lives among the people. Custom does not derive its validity from the sovereign; it is prior to and independent of both legislation and judicial recognition. On this view the judge who enforces a custom finds law; he does not make it.

Allen: custom grows from below

Allen rejected Austin's view that custom is law only when the courts adopt it. Custom is law in itself: it grows from below, out of the conduct of the people, and the courts merely recognise it by applying tests to see whether it is valid. Allen is also associated with the rule on reasonableness discussed in Section 4: the court does not ask the party setting up a custom to prove it reasonable; it enforces the custom unless the challenger shows it to be unreasonable.

Maine: custom follows themistes

Maine, in Ancient Law (1861), traced the order in which law appeared in early societies. First came themistes, the judgments of the king, believed to be divinely inspired (from Themis, the Greek goddess of justice). From the repetition of these judgments arose custom, held in the memory of a privileged class such as priests or an aristocracy. Then came the codes, such as the Twelve Tables, when writing made the customs public. So for Maine custom follows themistes; it is not the very first stage of law.

3. The Kinds of Custom: Salmond's Scheme

Salmond's classification is a single scheme, not two unrelated lists. At the top, custom is divided into legal and conventional. Legal custom is then subdivided into general and local.

Kind

Meaning

Binding force

Legal custom

A custom whose authority is absolute: it binds of its own force as a rule of law

Binds whether or not the parties agreed to it

General custom (a legal custom)

Prevails throughout the country or a whole community

In England it has largely merged into the common law

Local custom (a legal custom)

Prevails in a particular locality; in India also of a caste, tribe, community or family

Must satisfy the requisites; derogates from the general law in that area

Conventional custom (usage)

An established practice, often of a trade or market, that the parties are taken to have incorporated into their agreement

Binds only through agreement, express or implied; excluded if the contract says otherwise

The difference between legal custom and usage is one of the most tested points. A legal custom operates as law, independently of anyone's agreement. A usage operates only as an implied term of a contract: a trade usage that goods are delivered on credit binds the buyer and seller only because they are taken to have contracted with reference to it, and an express term to the contrary excludes it. Distinguish also custom from prescription. Custom creates a general rule for a locality or class; prescription creates a personal right in a particular person through long enjoyment, such as a right of way acquired by twenty years' use under the Limitation Act and the Easements Act.

4. The Requisites of a Valid Custom

Not every practice is enforced as law. The party who sets up a custom must show that it satisfies the following tests, and the failure of any one is fatal.

Requisites of a valid custom

▪ Antiquity. The custom must be ancient. In English law it must have existed since time immemorial, fixed by the Statute of Westminster I (1275) as the beginning of the reign of Richard I in 1189; a custom shown to have arisen after 1189 fails. Indian law requires long usage but does not require proof from time immemorial or from any fixed date.

▪ Continuity. It must have been observed without interruption. A custom that has been abandoned cannot be revived. Interruption of the right, not merely of its exercise, is what breaks it.

▪ Peaceable enjoyment. It must have been enjoyed peaceably and openly, as of right: not by force, not secretly and not by permission (nec vi, nec clam, nec precario).

▪ Certainty. It must be certain and definite as to its content, the persons it governs and the area to which it applies. A vague custom cannot be enforced.

▪ Reasonableness. It must not be unreasonable, that is, absurd, oppressive or contrary to justice. The test works negatively: a custom is valid unless shown to be unreasonable, and the burden lies on the challenger (the rule associated with Allen). Reasonableness is judged by the conditions when the custom began, not by modern taste alone.

▪ Conformity with statute and public policy. A custom cannot override a statute; statute abrogates inconsistent custom. It must not be immoral or opposed to public policy.

▪ Consistency. It must be consistent with other established customs of the same place; two contradictory customs cannot both be valid.

▪ Compulsory observance. It must be observed as obligatory, as a matter of right and duty, not as an optional or voluntary practice.

Collector of Madura v Moottoo Ramalinga Sathupathy Privy Council, 1868

The question was whether a widow in the Dravida country could adopt with the consent of her husband's kinsmen. The Privy Council held that 'under the Hindu system of law, clear proof of usage will outweigh the written text of the law'. Established custom could prevail even over the texts of the smritis.

5. Proof of Custom

Because a custom is a departure from or addition to the general law, the party who relies on it must plead and prove it by clear evidence of its long, continuous and obligatory observance, usually through instances and the testimony of persons familiar with it. Under the Indian Evidence Act, Section 13 made relevant the facts showing how a right or custom was created, claimed, recognised or exercised, and Section 48 made relevant the opinions of persons likely to know of the existence of a general custom or right. These provisions are now carried into the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, which replaced the Evidence Act from 1 July 2024. Once a custom has been repeatedly proved and recognised by the courts, it becomes part of the law of the land and the courts may take judicial notice of it without fresh proof. Custom thus moves from a question of fact into a question of law.

6. Custom in Indian Personal Law

Custom has special and continuing importance in the Indian family law. The Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 defines custom and usage in Section 3(a) (Section 1 above), and gives custom real work: a marriage within the prohibited degrees or between sapindas is void unless the custom or usage governing both parties permits it, and a marriage may be solemnised according to the customary rites and ceremonies of either party (Section 7). Section 29(2) saves any right recognised by custom to obtain a customary divorce, so that communities that traditionally allowed divorce outside the courts may still do so. The Hindu Succession Act and the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, by contrast, override custom except where they expressly save it.

Muslim law took the opposite course. The Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act, 1937, by Section 2, provides that notwithstanding any custom or usage to the contrary, in matters such as intestate succession, marriage, dissolution of marriage, maintenance, dower, guardianship, gifts, trusts and wakfs, the rule of decision where the parties are Muslims shall be the Muslim personal law (Shariat). Its purpose was to abrogate customs, followed by some communities, that departed from the Shariat, especially customs excluding women from inheritance. Tribal communities, finally, are governed largely by their own customs, many of them expressly protected by the Constitution and by tenancy laws.

7. Custom and the Constitution

Article 13(3)(a) defines 'law' to include any ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India. Under Article 13(1), pre-Constitution laws, including customs, are void to the extent they are inconsistent with the fundamental rights. Custom is therefore subject to constitutional review. Whether personal law itself falls within Article 13 has been more controversial.

State of Bombay v Narasu Appa Mali Bombay High Court, 1952

Upholding the Bombay law prohibiting Hindu bigamous marriages, the court held that personal laws are not 'laws in force' within Article 13 and so cannot be tested against fundamental rights, although custom and usage having the force of law are within Article 13. The reasoning was later doubted in Indian Young Lawyers Association v State of Kerala (Supreme Court, 2018, the Sabarimala case), where it was said that customs and practices cannot claim immunity from constitutional scrutiny merely by being described as personal law.

Madhu Kishwar v State of Bihar Supreme Court of India, 1996

Tribal women challenged customary rules under the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act excluding them from succession to land. The majority declined to strike down the custom wholesale, fearing disruption of tribal society, but held that the male heirs' exclusive right must remain in suspension so long as the women depend on the land for their livelihood. The case shows the court balancing respect for custom against equality and the right to livelihood under Article 21.

Shayara Bano v Union of India Supreme Court of India, 2017 (5 judges, 3:2)

The majority set aside the practice of instant triple talaq (talaq-e-biddat). Nariman J (for himself and Lalit J) held that the Shariat Act 1937, having been enacted to replace custom with Muslim personal law, is a 'law in force' under Article 13, so the form of talaq it recognised could be tested under Article 14, and was manifestly arbitrary. Kurian Joseph J held that the practice was not part of the Quran and so had no legal sanction. The case shows that a practice resting on custom or personal law can no longer shelter from the Constitution.

8. Custom Compared with Legislation and Precedent

Basis

Custom

Legislation

Precedent

How it arises

Spontaneously, from long practice

Deliberately, by enactment

Incidentally, in deciding disputes

Age

The oldest source

The dominant modern source

Grows with the courts

Form

Unwritten until recorded by courts

Written and promulgated

Written in judgments

On conflict

Yields to statute

Overrides custom and precedent

Yields to statute; applies valid custom

Theorists who favour it

Savigny, Puchta, Allen

Bentham, Austin

Blackstone, Gray, the realists

Custom has declined as a source of law for three reasons. Modern life changes too fast for practices that take generations to form; legislation is more certain and can reform; and many old customs have been found inconsistent with equality. Yet custom remains alive in international law, where Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice lists international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, among the sources the Court applies. The contrast between law and custom as concepts is treated in Note 53.

Memory Aid

▪ Analogy: custom is the footpath worn across the lawn. Usage is a path you may use only because the owner's contract with you allows it.

▪ Requisites mnemonic: 'A CPC RSCC' (read as 'A CPC Rule Says Custom Counts'): Antiquity, Continuity, Peaceable enjoyment, Certainty, Reasonableness, Statute and public policy conformity, Consistency, Compulsory observance.

▪ Date hook: 'Richard's Reign Ruled the Record': 1189, the accession of Richard I, fixed by the Statute of Westminster I (1275). Not Magna Carta (1215).

▪ Theory hook: Austin says custom waits at the court's door; Savigny says it is the people's voice; Allen says it grows from below; Maine says it follows themistes.

Exam Corner: Likely Questions

▪ 'Custom is the embodiment of those principles which have commended themselves to the national conscience as principles of justice and public utility.' Explain, and state the requisites of a valid custom.

▪ Discuss the views of Austin, Savigny, Allen and Maine on custom as a source of law.

▪ Distinguish legal custom from conventional custom, and custom from prescription.

▪ Examine the place of custom in Indian personal law in the light of Article 13 and Shayara Bano.

Exam Corner: MCQ Traps

▪ The limit of legal memory, 1189, is the accession of Richard I, fixed by the Statute of Westminster I (1275). It is not Magna Carta (1215).

▪ A usage (conventional custom) binds only through agreement; a legal custom binds of its own force.

▪ The burden of showing unreasonableness lies on the challenger (associated with Allen); the custom need not be proved reasonable.

▪ In India, custom need not be from time immemorial.

▪ Article 13(3)(a) expressly includes custom or usage in 'law'.

9. Frequently Asked Questions

Q. What is the difference between a legal custom and a conventional custom?
A.
A legal custom binds of its own force once its requisites are met, whether or not the parties agreed to it; it may be general or local. A conventional custom, or usage, binds only because the parties are taken to have incorporated it into their agreement, and an express term can exclude it.

Q. Must a custom in India be immemorial?
A.
No. English law requires a custom to date from 1189, but Indian courts require only that it be ancient, of long and uniform usage, without fixing any date. Section 3(a) of the Hindu Marriage Act speaks of a rule continuously and uniformly observed for a long time.

Q. How does Austin's view of custom differ from Savigny's?
A.
Austin held that custom is only positive morality until the courts or the sovereign adopt it, when it becomes law by the sovereign's tacit command. Savigny held that custom is the truest source of law, the direct expression of the people's consciousness, and valid independently of the sovereign.

Q. Can a custom override a statute or a fundamental right?
A.
No. Statute prevails over inconsistent custom, and under Article 13(3)(a) a custom having the force of law is void to the extent it violates fundamental rights. The Shariat Act 1937 expressly abrogated customs contrary to Muslim personal law.

See also: Note 53 (law versus custom), Note 13 (historical school), Note 22 (sources of law), Note 23 (legislation), Note 24 (precedent).

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