Competition Act, 2002
Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction: Section 32
Competition harm does not respect borders. A cartel among foreign suppliers of a raw material raises the price Indian manufacturers pay; a merger between two foreign firms may reduce the suppliers available to Indian buyers from three to two; a foreign platform may abuse a position held in India without having any establishment here. Section 32 answers all three by adopting the effects doctrine: what matters is not where the conduct occurred but whether it has or is likely to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition in a relevant market in India.
1. The Provision
Section 32, Competition Act, 2002 The Commission shall, notwithstanding that an agreement referred to in section 3 has been entered into outside India, or any party to such agreement is outside India, or any enterprise abusing the dominant position is outside India, or a combination has taken place outside India, or any party to combination is outside India, or any other matter or practice or action arising out of such agreement or dominant position or combination is outside India, have power to inquire, in accordance with the provisions contained in sections 19, 20, 26, 29 and 30 of the Act, into such agreement or abuse of dominant position or combination if such agreement or dominant position or combination has, or is likely to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition in the relevant market in India, and pass such orders as it may deem fit in accordance with the provisions of this Act. |
Three features of the drafting should be noted. The section lists six situations, covering agreements made abroad, foreign parties, foreign dominant enterprises, foreign combinations, foreign parties to a combination, and any matter arising outside India, so no gap is left. The connecting factor is effect in India, and nothing else: presence, incorporation, an establishment or a subsidiary are unnecessary. And the Commission is directed to proceed in accordance with the ordinary procedural sections, so a foreign party is dealt with in the same way as an Indian one.
2. The Effects Doctrine
The doctrine holds that a State may apply its law to conduct abroad which produces effects within its territory. It developed in United States antitrust law and has been adopted, in varying formulations, in the European Union and elsewhere. Its justification is practical: a competition law that could reach only domestic conduct would be useless in an open economy, because the harm would simply be organised abroad.
- The Indian formulation is statutory, which distinguishes it from systems where the doctrine was developed by courts. Section 32 states the test in terms.
- The threshold is an appreciable adverse effect in a relevant market in India. A remote or incidental effect will not do, and the market affected must be an Indian one.
- The effect may be actual or likely, which matters in merger cases, where the assessment is necessarily predictive.
- Comity. The exercise of the power takes account of the fact that other authorities may be examining the same conduct, which is why cooperation arrangements and coordinated timing have become part of practice.
3. The Three Situations in Practice
- Foreign cartels. An agreement among foreign producers fixing the price of a component or a raw material supplied to Indian industry has an effect in India whether or not any member is present here. Such cases typically come to light through the leniency programmes of other jurisdictions, and the Commission's difficulty is evidentiary rather than jurisdictional: documents, witnesses and the parties themselves are abroad.
- Foreign abuse of dominance. An enterprise dominant in a market in India, whose conduct is decided and implemented abroad, is within Section 4 read with Section 32. The digital cases are of this kind: the relevant market is in India, the users are in India, and the conduct complained of is a global policy on licensing, ranking or data.
- Foreign combinations. A transaction between two foreign enterprises is notifiable where the thresholds in Section 5 are met, since those thresholds include Indian assets and turnover, and after 2023 where the deal value threshold applies and the target has substantial business operations in India. Section 32 supplies the power to inquire into a combination that takes place outside India and to pass orders in respect of it.
4. The Practical Difficulties
- Service and appearance. Notices must reach parties abroad, and a party that does not appear may be proceeded against ex parte, but an order against an absent foreign enterprise is only as good as the means of enforcing it.
- Evidence. The Commission has no power to search premises abroad or to compel a foreign witness, and must rely on material held by Indian subsidiaries or customers, on documents produced voluntarily, and on cooperation with other authorities.
- Enforcement of penalty. Recovery against an enterprise with no assets in India is the central weakness, and it is why the Commission's orders frequently run against the Indian subsidiary as well as the foreign parent.
- Conflicting outcomes. The same merger may be permitted in one jurisdiction on conditions that another will not accept, and the same conduct may be lawful abroad and abusive here.
5. International Cooperation
Section 18 permits the Commission, for the purpose of discharging its duties, to enter into any memorandum or arrangement with the prior approval of the Central Government with any agency of any foreign country. Cooperation under such arrangements takes four forms.
- Exchange of non-confidential information about market conditions, methodology and the progress of parallel investigations.
- Waivers. In merger cases the parties commonly give the authorities written waivers of confidentiality so that they may discuss the case with each other, which is the principal mechanism by which remedies in multi-jurisdictional transactions are coordinated.
- Coordination of timing, so that remedies are agreed and orders passed in a sequence that does not leave the parties with inconsistent obligations.
- Technical cooperation and capacity building, including participation in the international networks of competition authorities.
⚠ What cooperation cannot do There is no treaty obligation on a foreign authority to gather evidence for the Commission, no mechanism for the compulsory taking of evidence abroad in competition matters, and no arrangement for the mutual enforcement of competition penalties. Cooperation is voluntary and largely informational. The practical consequence is that the Commission's effective reach over foreign conduct depends on the presence of assets or of a group entity in India, which is why proceedings are so often directed at the Indian subsidiary of a foreign group. |
6. Related Topics and Provisions
Topic or provision | Connection |
|---|---|
Competition Law and Globalisation | Why an open economy requires extraterritorial reach |
Regulation of Combinations: Sections 5 and 6 | Foreign transactions and the Indian leg of the thresholds |
Horizontal Agreements and Cartels | International cartels and the evidentiary problem |
Sovereign and State Immunity in Enforcement | Enforcement against foreign entities more generally |
Sections 18, 19, 20, 26, 29, 30 and 32, Competition Act, 2002 | Cooperation, inquiry and the extraterritorial power |