Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS)
Basic Principles of Criminal Liability
Structured Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) notes for Judiciary (PCS-J / HJS), AIBE, CLAT and LLB preparation โ free to read.
1. Meaning and Elements of Crime
A crime is an act or omission which the state has forbidden, which is punishable by the state, and for which the state itself, and not the victim alone, prosecutes the offender. Blackstone described it as a public wrong. Salmond called it an act deemed by law to be harmful to society in general. Whichever definition you prefer, the operative idea is that a crime is a wrong done to society, prosecuted by the state, and answered by punishment.
| The four elements of a crimeFor an act to be a crime and for a person to be criminally liable, four elements must be present.A human being under a legal obligation to act in a particular way, and a fit subject for punishment.An evil intention, mens rea, on the part of that human being.An act or omission, actus reus, done in pursuance of that evil intention.An injury to another human being or to society at large. | | --- |
Kenny's classical formula reduces this to two: a physical element and a mental element. Both must be present. Both must coincide in time. The Latin maxim that captures this fusion is:
actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.
The act does not make a person guilty, unless the mind is also guilty. This is the foundational maxim of criminal liability. It runs like a thread through the BNS, the IPC before it, and every common law jurisdiction. Learn it, write it, quote it.
| ๐ Cross linkThe maxim is quoted in Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881, and again in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722. In the first, it was applied with full force. In the second, it was said to yield to a public welfare statute. Keep both cases together in memory. They are the yin and yang of mens rea in Indian law. | | --- |
2. Actus Reus
Actus reus is the physical or external element of a crime. It is the conduct or the omission or the state of affairs that the criminal law forbids. Kenny defined it as the result of human conduct which the law seeks to prevent. Russell called it the physical result of human conduct.
Components of actus reus
**i.**A human act or omission. The conduct must be voluntary. Involuntary movements such as a reflex or a spasm are not acts in the criminal sense.
**ii.**The result. In result crimes such as murder, the death of the victim is the actus reus. Firing the gun is the conduct. The death is the result. The two together complete the actus.
**iii.**Attendant circumstances. Some offences require a specific setting. Trespass requires the absence of consent to entry. Rape requires the absence of consent to intercourse. These circumstantial elements are also part of the actus reus.
| ๐ Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC 1782The accused starved his wife over months and confined her, causing near death from starvation. The Supreme Court held that the actus reus of attempt to murder was made out through a course of omissions, because the accused had a legal duty as a husband to feed his wife. Rule: an omission, where there is a legal duty to act, is actus reus. | | --- |
Forms of actus reus
- Positive act. The most common form. Stabbing, striking, firing, taking away property.
- Omission. Failure to act where there is a legal duty. Duty may arise from statute, from contract, from a relationship such as parent and child, or from having voluntarily assumed a caretaker role.
- State of affairs. Some offences are complete on a state of affairs, such as being found in possession of stolen property or of a prohibited article.
The reus in actus reus
Reus means forbidden. It is not enough that an act occurred and caused harm. The act must be one that the criminal law forbids. If A fires at B, misses, and the bullet kills a rabbit, there is no murder because the actus reus of murder, the death of a human being, has not been caused. If a hangman lawfully executes a condemned prisoner, there is death caused by a human act, but the act is not reus, because it is authorised. Both elements matter.
3. Mens Rea
Mens rea is the mental element of a crime. It is the guilty mind that must accompany the guilty act. The phrase does not translate to a single English concept. It is an umbrella that shelters four narrower ideas: intention, knowledge, recklessness and negligence. Each is a form of mens rea, and each corresponds to a different degree of moral blameworthiness.
| A hierarchy of mental statesIntention is the highest, followed by knowledge, then recklessness or rashness, and finally negligence. As you descend the hierarchy, the accused's moral responsibility falls, but so, in most cases, does the severity of punishment. | | --- |
Mens rea in Indian criminal law
The IPC did not use the words mens rea. Instead, the drafters preferred concrete terms: intentionally, knowingly, voluntarily, dishonestly, fraudulently, negligently, rashly. The BNS follows the same technique. The reason is Macaulay's suspicion of Latin abstractions and his preference for words the ordinary reader could understand.
| ๐ Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1965 SC 881The Supreme Court held that the maxim actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea is not applied to the extent of holding that mens rea must be proved for every offence. Where the statute expressly excludes mens rea, or where the necessary implication of the statute excludes it, the act itself is punishable. Rule: mens rea is presumed unless clearly excluded. | | --- | | ๐ State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722A German national on a plane that touched down at Bombay was found carrying gold in violation of a Reserve Bank notification. He argued he did not know of the notification. The Supreme Court held that the statutory scheme was a public welfare regulation and that mens rea was not a requirement. Rule: where a statute deals with acts endangering public safety or welfare, mens rea can be dispensed with by necessary implication. |
4. Intention
Intention is the highest form of mens rea. It is a purposive state of mind. The accused desires the prohibited result and directs conduct towards bringing it about. In the language the Supreme Court prefers, intention is a conscious state in which the mental faculties are aroused into activity and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving the conceived end.
| ๐ Jai Prakash v. State (Delhi Administration), 1991 (2) SCC 32The Supreme Court explained intention as a conscious state in which the mental faculties are aroused into activity and summoned into action for the purpose of achieving a conceived end. It means shaping one's conduct so as to bring about a certain event. Intention is goal oriented and purposive. | | --- |
How intention is proved
The mind cannot be dissected. Intention is inferred from external facts. The Supreme Court has repeatedly listed the factors that guide inference:
- The nature of the weapon used.
- The part of the body where the injury was inflicted.
- The force and severity of the blow.
- The conduct of the accused before, during and after the act.
- The presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts.
| ๐ Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1958 SC 465The classic authority on inferring intention in a murder case. The four factors the court laid down for distinguishing murder from culpable homicide, the nature of injury, the nature of the weapon, the part of the body targeted, and the force applied, remain the operative test to this day. | | --- |
5. Knowledge
Knowledge is the second rung of the mens rea ladder. It is the awareness that a particular consequence is likely, or virtually certain, to follow from the accused's act. It differs from intention in that the accused does not desire the consequence. He simply knows it will follow, or is highly likely to, and acts anyway.
| ๐ Basdev v. State of Pepsu, AIR 1956 SC 488The Supreme Court distinguished motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is what prompts a person to form an intention. Knowledge is awareness of the consequences of the act. Intention and knowledge often merge, and intention can be presumed from knowledge, but the line is real. When a statute uses knowledge, the prosecution need not prove desire. It is enough to prove awareness. | | --- |
The difference in practice
Compare culpable homicide (Section 100 BNS, formerly Section 299 IPC) with murder (Section 103 BNS, formerly Section 300 IPC). Culpable homicide includes causing death with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death. Murder demands intention or a knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death, and the act is done without any excuse for taking the risk. The verbal distance from likely to must in all probability is where the line runs.
6. Recklessness and Negligence
Recklessness, called rashness in Indian statutes, and negligence sit at the lower end of the mens rea hierarchy. They involve the taking of a risk that a reasonable person would not have taken. The distinction between the two turns on awareness.
| Rashness vs negligenceRashness (conscious risk taking). The accused was aware of the risk but nevertheless took it, believing or hoping that the harm would not occur. Section 106 of the BNS on causing death by negligence and rash acts falls here.Negligence (a failure of care). The accused did not intend the harm and did not advert to the risk, but he failed to exercise the care that a reasonable person would have. There is no advertence, only a departure from the standard of care. | | --- | | ๐ Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab, 2005 (6) SCC 1The Supreme Court laid down the standard for medical negligence in a criminal frame. The negligence must be gross, of a very high degree, before criminal liability attaches. Simple negligence, of the kind that founds a civil suit, is not enough. This case is the anchor for every question on Section 106 BNS involving a doctor. |
7. Motive vs Intention
Students routinely confuse motive with intention. In an answer sheet, the confusion costs marks. Here is the distinction in one line and then in a table.
Motive is why the act was done. Intention is what the actor set out to do.
| Distinction | Motive | Intention | | --- | --- | --- | | Meaning | The ulterior reason that prompts a person to form an intention. | The immediate object the person aims to achieve by an act. | | Location in time | Sits before the intention. It is the impulse. | Sits with the act. It shapes the doing. | | Relevance to guilt | Not an essential element of most crimes. Even a good motive does not excuse a criminal intention. | An essential element wherever the offence requires a particular state of mind. | | Emotional character | Often emotional (love, jealousy, revenge, hunger, greed). | Rational and directed. | | Proof | Helpful evidence, especially in circumstantial cases. Rarely decisive. | Must be proved wherever the definition of the offence requires it. | | ๐ Emperor v. Raghu Nath Rai, ILR (1893) 15 All 22A Hindu took a Muslim's calf from his premises without consent, meaning to save it from slaughter. His motive was pious. His intention was to take the calf away without consent. He was convicted of theft and rioting. A pure motive does not clean a criminal intention. | | | | ๐ Nathuni Yadav v. State of Bihar, AIR 1997 SC 1808Motive can be a valuable link in the chain of circumstantial evidence, but the absence of motive does not necessarily lead to acquittal where direct evidence is strong. Motive is a clue, not a condition. | | |
8. Mistake of Fact vs Mistake of Law
The general exceptions in Chapter III of the Sanhita include two provisions that turn on mistake, Sections 14 and 17. Both correspond to the older Sections 76 and 79 IPC, and both continue the rule that mistakes of fact can excuse, while mistakes of law cannot.
Section 14 BNS (formerly Section 76 IPC)
Nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be, bound by law to do it. The classic illustrations are a soldier who fires on a mob in obedience to lawful command, and a court officer who arrests the wrong person after due enquiry, honestly believing him to be the person named in the warrant.
Section 17 BNS (formerly Section 79 IPC)
Nothing is an offence which is done by any person who is justified by law, or who by reason of a mistake of fact and not by reason of a mistake of law in good faith believes himself to be justified by law, in doing it. The distinction between bound by law (Section 14) and justified by law (Section 17) is thin but real. Bound means legally obliged to act. Justified means legally permitted to act.
| ๐ State of Orissa v. Bhagaban Barik, AIR 1987 SC 1265The Supreme Court reiterated the rule ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia juris non excusat. Ignorance of fact excuses. Ignorance of law does not. The reason is practical: if ignorance of law were a defence, every accused would plead it, and criminal law would collapse. | | --- | | ๐ Chirangi v. State of Nagpur, ILR (1952) Nag 282The accused, in a state of delusion caused by fever, mistook his own son for a tiger and killed him with an axe. The court held that he was protected by mistake of fact in good faith. The mistake was as to the identity of the object, and not as to the law forbidding homicide. | | ๐ R. v. Prince, (1875) LR 2 CCR 154The accused took an unmarried girl below sixteen out of her father's possession, honestly believing her to be above sixteen. English common law held him guilty on a strict reading of the statute. The case is a warning that a mistake of fact does not excuse where the statute imposes strict liability on a particular element. | | โ The good faith filterThe key words in Sections 14 and 17 are good faith. Section 2(11) BNS defines good faith as an act done with due care and attention. A careless mistake, however honest, will not qualify. Every mistake question should be tested against three filters: was it a mistake of fact, was it in good faith, and was there due care. |
9. Strict Liability
Strict liability is a form of criminal responsibility that arises without proof of mens rea. The prosecution must still prove the actus reus, but it need not prove intention, knowledge, recklessness or negligence. The rule departs from the mens rea maxim in the interest of a stronger regulatory objective, usually public health, public safety or economic order.
Foundational case in tort
The idea, in its civil form, was born in Rylands v. Fletcher, (1868) LR 3 HL 330. A mill owner constructed a reservoir on his land. Water broke through into disused mine shafts and flooded the plaintiff's mine. The House of Lords held the defendant liable without proof of negligence, on the basis that anyone who brings on to his land something likely to do mischief if it escapes must keep it at his peril.
| The Rylands rule has defencesAct of God.Act of a stranger or third party.Plaintiff's own fault or consent.Statutory authority.The escape must be from a non natural use of land. | | --- |
Strict liability in criminal statutes
Indian courts have accepted strict liability in a narrow band of regulatory offences. The classic modern statement is by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George. Statutes on food adulteration, drugs, foreign exchange, weights and measures, environment pollution and motor vehicles routinely dispense with proof of mens rea for specific violations.
| ๐ Nathulal v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1966 SC 43The accused was prosecuted for storing food grains without a licence. He had applied for a licence and honestly believed it would be granted. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that mens rea, in the form of guilty knowledge, was still a component of the offence. The case is a caution: strict liability is not automatic from the statute's silence. The court must examine the object of the statute and the language of the section. | | --- |
10. Absolute Liability
Absolute liability is a stricter version of strict liability. It applies to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. It admits no defence. It was crafted by the Supreme Court of India as a distinct doctrine, breaking from the English common law tradition.
| **๐ M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (Oleum Gas Leak case)**Oleum gas leaked from a plant belonging to Shriram Foods and Fertilizers in Delhi. Chief Justice P. N. Bhagwati refused to apply the Rylands rule with its list of defences. He held that an enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry which results in harm owes an absolute and non delegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results. The measure of compensation must correlate to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise, so that the compensation has a deterrent effect. This is absolute liability. | | | --- | --- | | **๐ Union Carbide Corporation v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 273 (Bhopal Gas case)**The catastrophic leak of methyl isocyanate at Bhopal in December 1984 killed thousands and injured lakhs. The doctrine of absolute liability, developed in M. C. Mehta, was invoked to secure compensation. The case is India's clearest institutional statement that ultra hazardous activity carries a non delegable, non defensible duty of safety. | | | Strict liability | Absolute liability | | Origin: Rylands v. Fletcher, 1868. | Origin: M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987. | | Applies to a wider range of actors, including individuals. | Applies only to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. | | Defences available: act of God, third party act, plaintiff's fault, statutory authority. | No defences available. Duty is absolute. | | Requires an escape from the defendant's land. | No escape requirement. Harm within the premises is covered. | | Damages compensatory and calibrated to the actual harm. | Damages calibrated to the magnitude and capacity of the enterprise, for deterrence. |
11. Vicarious Criminal Liability
Vicarious liability is liability of one person for the wrongful act of another. In tort, it is a household doctrine, best illustrated by an employer's responsibility for an employee's act done in the course of employment. In criminal law, the rule is different. The general principle is that criminal responsibility is personal.
| The general ruleThere is no vicarious criminal liability in Indian law, save where the statute expressly so provides. A master is not, ordinarily, criminally answerable for the acts of his servant, nor a principal for those of his agent, unless the master or principal has himself abetted or conspired in the act. | | --- |
Exceptions where statutes impose it
- Public nuisance. R. v. Stephens, (1866) LR 1 QB 702. An owner of a quarry was held criminally liable for the nuisance caused by his workmen dumping rubble into a river, though he had ordered them not to. Public welfare offences of this kind attract vicarious criminal liability.
- Company officers under special statutes. Under statutes such as the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the Essential Commodities Act, the Negotiable Instruments Act (Section 141), and the Companies Act, the person in charge of the affairs of the company at the time of the offence, along with the company, is deemed to be guilty. The idea is not classical vicarious liability. It is a statutory deeming provision that identifies the natural persons behind a legal person.
- The Sanhita does not create general vicarious liability. Its punishment provisions target the person who commits, abets or conspires.
| ๐ S. M. S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Neeta Bhalla, 2005 (8) SCC 89For prosecuting a director under Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complaint must specifically aver that the director was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the time of the offence. A bare invocation of the section is not enough. Rule: statutory vicarious liability must be pleaded and proved with specificity. | | --- |
12. Stages of a Crime
A completed crime has a life cycle. The doctrine, drawn from English common law and applied through the IPC and now the BNS, recognises four stages. Understanding the stages tells you when criminal liability attaches and when it does not.
The four stages
**i.**Intention. The mental formation of a design to commit an offence.
**ii.**Preparation. Arranging the means and methods to give effect to the intention.
**iii.**Attempt. A direct movement towards the commission of the offence after preparations are complete.
**iv.**Commission. The actual accomplishment of the offence.
| The general ruleIntention alone is not punishable. Preparation is not punishable. Attempt is punishable. Commission is punishable. Criminal law does not enter the mind. It waits at the door of preparation and enters the room at attempt. | | --- |
Stage 1 Intention
The formation of a design is a mental event. The state cannot see into a mind and cannot punish an unspoken thought. Even a fully formed intention to kill remains, at this stage, morally wrong but legally invisible.
Stage 2 Preparation
Preparation is the collection of the means to carry out the intention. Buying a knife, mixing a poison, reconnoitring the victim's house. As a rule, preparation is not punished. There is still room for the offender to draw back.
| Exceptions where preparation itself is punishableSection 148 BNS: preparing to wage war against the Government of India (formerly Section 122 IPC).Section 149 BNS: collecting arms with an intention of waging war against the Government of India.Section 310(4) BNS: making preparation to commit dacoity (formerly Section 399 IPC).Section 178 BNS: counterfeiting coin (criminalises preparatory acts of making instruments and materials). | | --- | | ๐ Malkiat Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 SC 713The accused was stopped in a truck loaded with paddy, sixteen miles from the Punjab border. He was prosecuted for attempt to export paddy in violation of the Essential Commodities notification. The Supreme Court held that this was preparation, not attempt. Until the truck reached the border and attempted crossing, no direct step towards the commission of the offence had been taken. The test the court used, and which you must quote, is the locus poenitentiae test: at the stage of preparation, the accused still has an opportunity to repent and turn back. |
Stage 3 Attempt
Attempt is the direct movement towards the commission of the crime, made after preparation. It is punishable in three ways under the Sanhita: some sections define both the offence and its attempt (attempt to murder is Section 109 BNS, formerly Section 307 IPC); some define attempt as an independent offence (waging war against the state); and a residual provision punishes attempt for offences where no express provision is made (Section 62 BNS, formerly Section 511 IPC).
| Ingredients of an attemptThree ingredients must be established.Intention to commit the specific offence.Preparation completed towards its commission.A direct act, more than mere preparation, done in the course of the commission of the offence. | | --- |
Judicial tests for distinguishing attempt from preparation
- Last step or proximity test. The act must be so close to the commission of the offence that, if not interrupted, it would in the ordinary course lead to it. Best associated with R. v. Eagleton, (1855) Dears CC 515.
- Locus poenitentiae test (repentance test). If the accused, at the point in question, still had the choice to draw back without committing the offence, he is at preparation. Once that room to repent is gone, he is at attempt. Malkiat Singh's case is the leading Indian authority.
- Substantial step test. Any act which is more than merely preparatory, and which shows a firm intention to commit the offence, is an attempt. This is the broader test that Indian courts have used in Abhayanand Mishra.
- Impossibility test. Whether an attempt to do an impossible act is punishable. Indian law follows Abhayanand Mishra and R. v. Ring on this: an attempt is punishable even where completion was impossible due to circumstances unknown to the accused.
| ๐ Abhayanand Mishra v. State of Bihar, AIR 1961 SC 1698The accused applied for admission to an M. A. examination at Patna University by forging documents that showed him as a graduate and as a teacher of experience. The forgery was discovered before he could sit the examination. The Supreme Court held that he had committed the attempt to cheat, and not merely preparation. The moment he despatched the application, he had done an act during the course of committing the offence. The test the court applied: the accused (i) intended the offence and (ii) had, after preparation and with intent, done an act towards its commission. | | --- | | State of Maharashtra v. Mohd. Yakub, AIR 1980 SC 1111The accused, near a creek, were caught with silver bars in a jeep, with the sound of a mechanised sea craft in the background. The Supreme Court held this was attempt to smuggle silver out of India, not preparation. Once the act done is deliberate and unequivocally referable to the commission of the offence, attempt is made out. | | ๐ R. v. Ring, (1892) 17 Cox CC 491The accused put his hand into a woman's empty pocket, meaning to steal. The English court held it was attempt to steal, even though there was nothing to steal. Impossibility of completion does not prevent an attempt from being made out. |
Stage 4 Commission
Commission is the completed offence. Punishment follows directly from the substantive section. Nothing further need be said, except to note that a crime is not always crystallised at commission. In some offences, the harm continues after the act (kidnapping, wrongful confinement), and each day of continuation is treated as a fresh commission for the