The Google Android Case, Competition Commission of India, 2022

The most significant Indian digital competition order to date. By order of 20 October 2022 the Commission found that the licensing arrangements for the Android mobile operating system abused a dominant position in several connected markets, imposed a penalty of about one thousand three hundred and thirty-seven crore rupees, and issued ten directions altering the terms on which the operating system and the application store are licensed to device manufacturers. The appellate tribunal upheld the core findings and the penalty in March 2023 while setting aside four of the directions.

1. The Markets

The Commission defined five relevant markets, and the layered definition is the analytical key to the case: the market for licensable operating systems for smart mobile devices in India; the market for app stores for Android smart mobile operating systems in India; the market for general web search services in India; the market for non-operating system specific mobile web browsers in India; and the market for online video hosting platforms in India. Dominance was found in the first two, which are the layers on which everything else depends.

2. The Agreements Examined

1. The mobile application distribution agreement. A manufacturer wishing to license the application store had to pre-install a suite of the enterprise's applications, and to place certain of them in prominent default positions on the device. Since the store is indispensable to an Android device, the requirement was examined as the imposition of supplementary obligations under Section 4(2)(d) and as leveraging under Section 4(2)(e).
2. The anti-fragmentation and compatibility commitments. A manufacturer signing the distribution agreement undertook not to manufacture or distribute devices running modified or incompatible versions of the operating system, known as forks. The effect was to prevent the emergence of alternative versions of the operating system, and it was examined as denial of market access under Section 4(2)(c) and as restricting technical or scientific development under Section 4(2)(b).
3. Revenue sharing arrangements, under which manufacturers received a share of advertising revenue in return for exclusivity of the search service on their devices.
4. Default placement of search, browser and video services, which was examined as the use of the position in the operating system and store markets to protect positions in the adjacent markets.

3. The Directions

• Manufacturers should not be required to pre-install a bundle of applications as a condition of licensing the application store, and pre-installation should not be compelled by default placement obligations.
• Licensing of the application store should not be linked to the licensing of the search service, the browser or other applications.
• Manufacturers should be free to develop and distribute devices running modified versions of the operating system, without losing access to the store for their compliant devices.
• Users should be able to choose their default search engine and to uninstall pre-installed applications.
• Access to the store and to the associated services should be on fair, transparent and non-discriminatory terms.

4. The Appellate Decision and After

The National Company Law Appellate Tribunal delivered its judgment on 29 March 2023. It upheld the principal findings of dominance and abuse and the penalty, while setting aside four of the ten directions as going beyond what the findings supported. The Supreme Court had earlier declined to stay the order in January 2023 and had directed the appellate tribunal to decide the appeal. The matter has been carried further, and the current position should be checked before the case is cited for the final outcome.

5. Why the Case Matters

1. Tying and bundling in a digital ecosystem. The clearest Indian application of Section 4(2)(d) to pre-installation requirements, and of Section 4(2)(e) to the use of a position in one layer to protect another.
2. Anti-fragmentation as foreclosure. The treatment of a restriction on developing alternative versions of an operating system as denial of market access and as a restriction on technical development.
3. Layered market definition. The method that has since been applied to app stores, marketplaces and travel platforms.
4. Remedies. The directions are the model of behavioural relief in digital markets, and the difficulty of monitoring them is one reason the settlement and commitment routes introduced in 2023, and used in the Android television matter in 2025, have become attractive to both sides.

6. Related Topics and Provisions