The Google Android TV Settlement, Competition Commission of India, 21 April 2025

The first order made under the settlement mechanism introduced by the amendment of 2023, and the best available illustration of how Section 48A works in practice. The matter concerned the terms on which the Android operating system and the associated application store were licensed to manufacturers of smart televisions. After the Director General reported adverse findings on abuse of dominance, the enterprise applied to settle rather than contest, offered a revised licensing framework, and the Commission accepted the proposal by majority, fixing the settlement amount at twenty crore twenty-four lakh rupees after a discount of fifteen per cent.

1. The Case

Information was filed in 2020 alleging that the television app distribution agreement and the android compatibility commitments, entered into with manufacturers of smart televisions, imposed unfair conditions: the manufacturer had to pre-install a bundle of applications in order to obtain the store, and had to undertake not to manufacture or distribute devices running modified or incompatible versions of the operating system. The Director General reported that the arrangements abused a dominant position in the market for licensable smart television device operating systems in India and in the market for the app store for that operating system. The allegation under Section 3(4) was not substantiated.

2. The Settlement

1. The application. Rather than contest the report, the enterprise applied under Section 48A within the period the Settlement Regulations allow after receipt of the report.
2. The proposal. A revised licensing framework for India under which the application store and the associated services would be licensed on a standalone basis for Android smart televisions, without an obligation to pre-install the bundle; the requirement of a valid compatibility commitment would be waived for devices shipped without the enterprise's applications; and the terms would be maintained for a stated period with annual reporting on compliance.
3. Consultation. The Commission invited objections and suggestions, and a substantial number of stakeholders were consulted before the terms were settled, which is the mechanism by which a remedy negotiated with one party is tested against the market it affects.
4. The settlement amount. Fixed at twenty crore twenty-four lakh rupees, after applying a discount of fifteen per cent under the Settlement Regulations.
5. The order. Made by majority, with one Member dissenting, recording the settlement, the amount and the terms, together with the implementation and reporting obligations. An order under Section 48A is not appealable.

3. What the Case Shows about the Mechanism

• Speed. A change in licensing terms was obtained within about a year of the investigation report. A contested proceeding on the same facts would have produced an order years later, an appeal after that, and very possibly a penalty without any change in conduct.
• The remedy is the point. The value of the outcome lies in the revised licensing framework rather than in the money. Settlement is a market correction mechanism, which is why it is available for abuse of dominance and vertical agreements and not for cartels, where deterrence is the object.
• Stakeholder consultation matters. Because the terms are negotiated rather than imposed, the only check on their adequacy is the views of those who must live with them, which is why the Regulations provide for consultation and why the Commission used it here.
• Dissent is possible and instructive. One Member did not agree, and a dissent in a settlement order is a useful indication of the arguments against accepting the proposal on the terms offered.

4. Related Topics and Provisions