Criminal Procedure: Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 / Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)
Inherent Powers of the High Court Section 528
Inherent Powers of the High Court: Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023, Quashing an FIR or a Criminal Proceeding, Quashing on a Settlement, and Section 528 Compared with Article 226
Section 528 is the provision on which every application to quash a criminal proceeding rests: nothing in this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.
Three things about it are settled and constantly overlooked. The power is saved, not conferred — the section creates nothing and gives the High Court no jurisdiction it would not otherwise have. It belongs to the High Court alone, not to a Court of Session or a Magistrate. And it cannot be used to do what an express provision forbids.
1. The Section
Figure 1: The three limbs of section 528
The limb | What it permits |
|---|---|
To give effect to any order under this Sanhita | A consequential direction which no express provision supplies. This limb is ancillary — it completes what the Sanhita has already decided rather than deciding anything new |
To prevent abuse of the process of any Court | Where the criminal process is being used for a purpose it was not designed to serve — to settle a civil score, to coerce a settlement, to harass, or to pursue a case the material cannot sustain. The words are any Court, not merely a subordinate one |
Or otherwise to secure the ends of justice | The residuary limb, and the widest. But it is not a licence to do whatever seems just: it is confined to what is necessary, and is unavailable where the Sanhita has dealt with the matter by an express provision |
The categories in which a criminal proceeding may properly be quashed have been settled since R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab: where there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceeding, such as the absence of a required sanction; where the allegations, even taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; and where they do, but there is no legal evidence in support, or the evidence manifestly fails to prove the charge. In exercising the power the High Court cannot enquire whether the evidence is reliable, that being the function of the trial court.
⚠ What the High Court must not do Weigh the evidence as at a trial, or assess the reliability of a witness. Consider the defence the accused may have. That belongs to the trial, where it can be tested. Interfere with a lawful investigation. The police have a statutory right and duty to investigate a cognizable offence, and a court should ordinarily not interfere with it. Pass an order of “no coercive steps” while declining to quash. Such an order is neither one thing nor the other: it stalls the investigation while deciding nothing. If a case for quashing is made out the Court should quash; if not, it should dismiss and let the investigation proceed. Or do indirectly what an express provision forbids — section 438(2), barring revision against an interlocutory order, being the clearest instance. |
2. Quashing on a Settlement
Figure 2: The settled position
The foundation is Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, where a Bench of three Judges held that quashing on a settlement is not compounding and is not controlled by the bar in section 359(9): the High Court exercises a power to prevent abuse of process and to secure the ends of justice, which no statutory bar on compounding touches. But the Court held that the power turns on the nature of the offence — offences overwhelmingly and predominantly civil in flavour may be quashed on a genuine settlement, while heinous and serious offences, and those with a serious impact on society, may not, whatever the victim has agreed.
📖 Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 Facts: A prosecution for an offence causing grievous injury was sought to be quashed on the footing that the parties, who were related and lived in the same locality, had settled the matter. The Court was asked to lay down guidelines for the exercise of the power where a settlement is relied on. Held: The Supreme Court restated the principles and added guidance on when the power should be exercised. It held that the power is to be used to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process, and not merely because the parties have settled; that in heinous and serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape and dacoity, the power is not to be exercised, such offences not being private in character; but that where the offence is predominantly civil in flavour, or arises from a commercial, matrimonial or family dispute, quashing may properly follow a genuine compromise. The Court held that the timing of the settlement is material: where the compromise is arrived at immediately after the incident, or while the matter is still at the investigation stage, the Court may act more readily; where it comes after the trial is concluded or after conviction, the discretion is far narrower, a full adjudication having already taken place. It added that the Court must satisfy itself that the settlement is voluntary and not the product of pressure or inducement, and that where the offence is grave the antecedents of the accused and the impact on society must be weighed. Ratio: Quashing on a settlement is directed to securing the ends of justice, not to giving effect to a compromise. It is unavailable for heinous offences; and the timing of the settlement is material, the discretion narrowing sharply once the trial is concluded. |
📖 State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688 Facts: A prosecution for an offence of attempting to cause death was quashed by the High Court on the basis of a compromise between the parties. The State appealed, and the Supreme Court was required to restate the principles governing quashing on a settlement, particularly where the offence is non-compoundable and grave. Held: The Supreme Court restated the position in a set of propositions. The power under the inherent jurisdiction is to be exercised to quash on a settlement only where the offence is predominantly private in nature and civil in flavour, typically arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or matrimonial relationships. It is not to be exercised where the offence is heinous or serious, nor for offences under special statutes such as those dealing with corruption, nor for offences committed by a public servant while acting in that capacity — those not being private in character, whatever the parties have agreed. The Court held that where the offence charged is one of a grave nature but the injury is essentially personal and the parties have settled, the High Court must examine the nature and gravity of the act, the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the antecedents of the accused and whether the settlement is genuine, and may quash only where it is satisfied that the proceeding would be an abuse of process or that its continuance would serve no purpose. It emphasised that quashing is not a matter of right upon settlement, and that the Court must record its reasons. Ratio: Quashing on a settlement is confined to offences predominantly private and civil in flavour. It is unavailable for heinous offences, for offences under special statutes, and for offences by a public servant acting as such — and is never a matter of right upon settlement. |
3. Section 528 and Article 226
Section 528, BNSS | Article 226 | |
|---|---|---|
Source | The Sanhita — which saves an inherent power rather than conferring one | The Constitution. It cannot be taken away or abridged by ordinary legislation |
Which court | The High Court alone | The High Court — but with a wider territorial reach, extending to any authority within its territories or where part of the cause of action arises |
Against whom | Directed at proceedings in a Court, and at the process of a Court | Directed at any person or authority, including the State and its officers |
What may be challenged | A criminal proceeding, a process, or an order of a Court | Any executive action, including an arrest, a detention, or the conduct of an investigation — and also a proceeding |
Relief available | Orders necessary to give effect to an order, prevent abuse, or secure the ends of justice | The writs — habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari — and any direction or order |
Limits | Cannot do what an express provision of the Sanhita forbids | Not fettered by the Sanhita, but exercised with self-imposed restraint where an alternative statutory remedy exists |
⚠ Two further points The two are frequently invoked together, and properly so: a petition may seek quashing under section 528 and, in the alternative, relief under Article 226 in respect of executive action which the Sanhita does not reach. But Article 226 is not a route around section 528’s limits. Where the Sanhita has dealt with a matter expressly, a High Court will not ordinarily use its constitutional jurisdiction to reach a result the statute excludes — the restraint being self-imposed rather than jurisdictional, but no less real. Section 529 should be read alongside. It imposes a duty on every High Court to exercise continuous superintendence over the Courts of Judicial Magistrates subordinate to it, so as to ensure the expeditious and proper disposal of cases. That is a supervisory power over the courts as a class. Section 528 is a judicial power exercised in a particular case. The two are often confused, and they do quite different work. |
4. Key Takeaways
The position stated shortly 1. Section 528 saves the inherent power to make orders necessary to give effect to an order under the Sanhita, to prevent abuse of the process of any Court, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 2. The power is saved, not conferred; belongs to the High Court alone; and cannot do what an express provision forbids. 3. Quashing is proper where there is a legal bar; where the allegations taken at face value do not constitute the offence; or where there is no legal evidence in support: R.P. Kapur. 4. The Court may not weigh the evidence, assess reliability, or consider the defence — and should not interfere with a lawful investigation. 5. A court declining to quash should not order “no coercive steps”: it should either quash or dismiss and let the investigation proceed. 6. Quashing on a settlement is not compounding and is not controlled by section 359(9), but turns on the nature of the offence: Gian Singh. 7. It is available for offences predominantly civil in flavour — commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership and matrimonial — and not for heinous or serious offences. 8. The timing of the settlement is material: the discretion narrows sharply once the trial is concluded or a conviction recorded: Narinder Singh. 9. It is unavailable for offences under special statutes such as those dealing with corruption, and for offences committed by a public servant acting as such — and is never a matter of right upon settlement: Laxmi Narayan. 10. Section 528 and Article 226 overlap but differ: the first is directed at the process of a Court and is limited by the Sanhita; the second reaches any authority and is not — though a High Court exercises self-imposed restraint where a statutory remedy exists. |
5. Frequently Asked Questions
Does section 528 confer a power?
No. It saves an inherent power the High Court already possesses and gives it no jurisdiction it would not otherwise have. That is why the power belongs to the High Court alone, and not to a Court of Session or a Magistrate.
When may an FIR or a criminal proceeding be quashed?
Where there is a legal bar to its institution or continuance; where the allegations, taken at face value and accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offence alleged; or where there is no legal evidence in support, or the evidence manifestly fails to prove the charge.
Can a proceeding be quashed because the parties have settled?
Only where the offence is predominantly private in nature and civil in flavour — commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or matrimonial. Heinous and serious offences, offences under special statutes such as those dealing with corruption, and offences by a public servant acting as such may not be quashed on a settlement.
Does the timing of the settlement matter?
Yes, considerably. Where the compromise is reached immediately after the incident or at the investigation stage, the Court may act more readily. Once the trial is concluded or a conviction recorded, the discretion is far narrower: Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab.
Is quashing a matter of right once the parties settle?
No. The Court must examine the nature and gravity of the act, the weapon used, the part of the body injured, the antecedents of the accused and the genuineness of the settlement, and must record its reasons: State of M.P. v. Laxmi Narayan.
How does section 528 differ from Article 226?
Section 528 is directed at proceedings and the process of a Court and cannot do what an express provision of the Sanhita forbids. Article 226 is a constitutional jurisdiction reaching any person or authority and is not fettered by the Sanhita — though a High Court exercises self-imposed restraint where a statutory remedy exists.
Related Topics
- Miscellaneous Provisions: Sections 520 to 531, BNSS
- Withdrawal from Prosecution and Compounding Compared
- Compounding of Offences under the BNSS, 2023: Section 359
- Judgment and Order Distinguished
- Reference and Revision: Sections 436 to 445, BNSS
- Electronic Trials and Proceedings: Section 530, BNSS