Judicial Review of Tribunal Decisions: Articles 226 and 227, the Division Bench Requirement and the Limits of Supervision

Every tribunal decision in India is reviewable. That was not the design: the Forty-second Amendment contemplated tribunals whose orders would be final subject only to a discretionary appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Administrative Tribunals Act said as much. Since the exclusionary provisions fell, the position has been that a tribunal is a court of first instance and the High Court supervises it. What that supervision consists of is a distinct question, because the High Court reviewing a tribunal is not hearing an appeal: it does not reappreciate evidence, does not substitute its own conclusion, and interferes only on the recognised grounds. This topic sets out the route of challenge, the difference between Articles 226 and 227 in this context, and the boundaries of the supervisory power.

1. The Route of Challenge

The position established by L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997) 3 SCC 261 has four elements. A tribunal is a court of first instance in its assigned field, and a litigant must go to it rather than directly to the High Court. Every decision of a tribunal is subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose territorial jurisdiction the tribunal falls. A litigant may not bypass the High Court by moving the Supreme Court directly under Article 136. And a tribunal may test the vires of subordinate legislation but not of its parent statute, a challenge to which must go to the High Court.

Where a statute provides a statutory appeal from a tribunal, that appeal must ordinarily be exhausted before the writ jurisdiction is invoked, on the usual principle of alternative remedy. Some statutes provide an appeal to the High Court, others to an appellate tribunal, and a few to the Supreme Court directly; where the appeal lies to the Supreme Court alone, the High Court's supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 nonetheless survives, since it cannot be excluded.

2. Article 226 and Article 227 in This Context

📖 Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath, (2015) 5 SCC 423

Facts: A three-Judge Bench had to decide whether judicial orders of civil courts are amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, an earlier decision in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Chander Rai, (2003) 6 SCC 675 having held that they were.

Held: The Court held that judicial orders of civil courts are not amenable to a writ of certiorari under Article 226, and overruled Surya Dev Rai to that extent. It held that certiorari is directed at bodies exercising legal authority in the nature of a quasi-judicial or statutory power, and that a civil court, being part of the ordinary judicial hierarchy, is subject to the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 and to the statutory remedies of appeal and revision rather than to a writ. The Court distinguished the two jurisdictions: Article 226 is exercised to issue a writ to a person or authority, while Article 227 is a power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within the High Court's territory, exercised to keep them within the bounds of their authority. The distinction matters because a proceeding under Article 227 is not an original proceeding in the same sense and carries different procedural consequences.

Ratio: Certiorari does not lie against judicial orders of civil courts; the remedy is Article 227 or a statutory appeal or revision. The distinction between Article 226 and Article 227 is one of the nature of the jurisdiction, not merely of form.

For tribunals as distinct from civil courts, both Articles remain available and are in practice invoked together, a petition being filed under Articles 226 and 227 and the High Court applying whichever is apt. Article 226 supplies the writ of certiorari and the ability to quash; Article 227 supplies the power of superintendence, which extends to keeping the tribunal within its jurisdiction and to correcting a grave dereliction of duty or a flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law.

Basis	Article 226	Article 227
Nature	Original jurisdiction to issue writs and orders	Power of superintendence over courts and tribunals
Against whom	Any person or authority	All courts and tribunals within the High Court's territory
Civil court orders	Certiorari does not lie (Radhey Shyam)	Available
Tribunal orders	Available	Available
How exercised	On a petition, with the tribunal ordinarily a party	On a petition, and also suo motu
Relief	Quashing, mandamus, directions	Correction, direction to proceed lawfully, transfer
Scope	The recognised grounds of review	Keeping the subordinate body within its authority

3. The Limits of Supervision

📖 Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329

Facts: The Supreme Court took the occasion of an appeal against an order passed by a High Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to restate comprehensively the principles governing the exercise of power under Article 227, the High Courts having exercised it in varying and sometimes expansive ways.

Held: The Court laid down the governing principles. The power under Article 227 is discretionary and is to be exercised sparingly, and it is a power of judicial superintendence, not an appellate power: the High Court cannot, under Article 227, convert itself into a court of appeal and reappreciate evidence or substitute its own findings of fact. The power is exercised to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the bounds of their authority, to see that they obey the law and the rules of natural justice, and to correct a grave dereliction of duty or a flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice; it is not to be exercised merely because the High Court takes a different view of the facts or the law. The Court added that a petition under Article 227 should be styled as such and not as a writ petition, that the subordinate court or tribunal need not ordinarily be made a party, and that the High Court should avoid interference in the middle of a proceeding except in exceptional cases.

Ratio: The supervisory jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and never as an appeal. It corrects want of jurisdiction, disobedience of law, breach of natural justice and grave dereliction, and not errors of appreciation.

4. The Grounds on Which a Tribunal Order Is Interfered With

Want or excess of jurisdiction, including the assumption of jurisdiction on a non-existent jurisdictional fact.
Failure to exercise jurisdiction that the tribunal possessed, or a refusal to decide.
Breach of natural justice, including denial of notice, of disclosure of material, of hearing or of cross-examination where due, and bias.
Error of law apparent on the face of the record, self-evident rather than established by elaborate reasoning.
A finding based on no evidence, or on conjecture and surmise, which is treated as an error of law.
Perversity, a conclusion no reasonable person could reach on the material.
Non-compliance with a mandatory statutory procedure prescribed for the tribunal.
Failure to give reasons, where the order is one that prejudicially affects a person.
Contravention of a binding precedent of the High Court or the Supreme Court.

What the High Court will not do is reappreciate the evidence, assess its adequacy or reliability, correct an error of fact however grave, prefer one of two possible views, or interfere with the quantum of a penalty unless it is shockingly disproportionate. Those limits mirror the ones stated for disciplinary proceedings in Union of India v. P. Gunasekaran, (2015) 2 SCC 610, and they apply with equal force to the review of a tribunal.

5. Procedural Points

Division Bench, not single Judge. A challenge to a tribunal order under the L. Chandra Kumar dispensation lies before a Division Bench, and a single Judge cannot entertain it.
Territorial jurisdiction follows the bench of the tribunal whose order is impugned, a point that matters where a tribunal has benches in several States.
Alternative remedy within the tribunal structure, such as an appeal to an appellate tribunal, must ordinarily be exhausted first.
Delay and laches apply as in any writ proceeding, and a belated challenge to a tribunal order may be refused.
Relief is ordinarily remission. The High Court quashes and sends the matter back to the tribunal rather than deciding it, because the tribunal is the forum the statute chose.
No direct appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 bypassing the High Court, though the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over the High Court's order remains.

⚠ Supervision of a tribunal is thinner than supervision of an administrator

It is worth noticing that a High Court reviewing a tribunal is often more restrained than when it reviews an administrative authority directly. The reason is structural. When the court reviews an administrator, it is supplying the only judicial scrutiny the decision will receive. When it reviews a tribunal, a judicial body with judicial members has already examined the administrative decision on the merits, applied the law and given reasons, so the court is reviewing an adjudication rather than an administrative act. That is why arguments about the appreciation of evidence, which occasionally succeed against an administrator on the no-evidence rule, almost never succeed against a tribunal that has considered the material and given reasons for its view.

6. The Position in Summary

A tribunal is a court of first instance, and every decision is subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court, with no direct route to the Supreme Court (L. Chandra Kumar).
Both Articles 226 and 227 are available against a tribunal; certiorari does not lie against judicial orders of civil courts, for which Article 227 and the statutory remedies apply (Radhey Shyam).
The supervisory jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and is never appellate: the High Court does not reappreciate evidence or substitute its own findings (Shalini Shyam Shetty).
Interference is confined to jurisdiction, failure to exercise it, natural justice, error of law apparent on the record, no evidence, perversity, mandatory procedure, absence of reasons and disregard of binding precedent.
Relief is ordinarily remission to the tribunal, and the usual discretionary bars of alternative remedy, delay and conduct apply.

7. Related Topics and Provisions

Central Administrative Tribunal (Topic 127) and Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (Topic 126).
Constitutional Provisions on Tribunals (Topic 125): the exclusionary clauses struck down.
Writ of Certiorari (Topic 109) and Grounds of Judicial Review (Topic 90): the grounds applied.
Judicial Review of Disciplinary Proceedings (Topic 99): the same limits in the service field.
Alternative Remedy (Topics 117 and 118) and Delay and Laches (Topic 119): the discretionary bars.
Constitution of India: Articles 32, 136, 226, 227, 323A and 323B.