Administrative Law
Judicial Review vs Judicial Activism: The Line between Enforcing the Law and Making It
Judicial review asks whether an authority acted within its powers. Judicial activism goes further: the court itself directs what should be done, supplies a rule where the legislature has not, monitors administration over years, or takes on tasks the Constitution assigned to other branches. The two shade into one another, and the same judgment is often described as a landmark by those who welcome the result and as overreach by those who do not. What can be stated with some precision is the difference in function, the circumstances in which Indian courts have moved from the first to the second, the techniques they have used, and the limits the Supreme Court has itself laid down when warning against judicial overreach. This topic sets out that account.
1. The Distinction
Basis | Judicial review | Judicial activism |
|---|---|---|
Function | Testing the legality of action already taken | Prescribing what should be done, or supplying a norm |
Trigger | A challenge by a person aggrieved, or in public interest | Perceived inaction or failure by the other branches |
Standard applied | Existing law: the Constitution, the statute, the settled grounds | Constitutional principle or directive policy, applied to fill a gap |
Outcome | Quashing, prohibiting, commanding, declaring; ordinarily remission | Guidelines, continuing directions, monitoring, structural orders |
Duration | The matter ends with the order | May continue for years through a supervised process |
Constitutional basis | Articles 13, 32, 226, 227 and 136 | Articles 32, 142 and 226, read with Parts III and IV |
Risk | Under-enforcement of rights where the court is too deferential | Displacement of the political branches and of institutional competence |
A useful way to put the difference is that review answers the question was this lawful, while activism answers the question what ought to be done. The first is unambiguously the judicial function; the second belongs to the judiciary only where the Constitution or a right requires it and no other organ has acted.
2. Why Activism Developed in India
- Directive Principles. Part IV sets goals the State is to pursue but makes them non-justiciable, and the courts have read many of them into Article 21, converting aspirations into enforceable rights.
- Legislative and executive inaction. Where a right exists but no machinery has been created to protect it, the courts have supplied interim arrangements pending legislation.
- Relaxation of locus standi. Public interest litigation permitted any public-spirited person to move the court on behalf of those unable to do so, greatly widening the matters reaching the court.
- Procedural innovation. Epistolary jurisdiction, commissions of inquiry appointed by the court, amicus curiae and continuing mandamus turned the writ court into a supervisory institution.
- Article 142. The power to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice gave the Supreme Court a remedial flexibility no other court possesses.
- Institutional confidence. After the Emergency, the Court's reassertion of its role, beginning with Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248, produced an expansive reading of rights that activism then enforced.
3. Activism at Its Strongest: Filling a Legislative Vacuum
📖 Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan, (1997) 6 SCC 241 Facts: A social worker in Rajasthan was gang-raped in the course of her work to prevent child marriage. A petition was filed in the public interest seeking the enforcement of the fundamental rights of working women, there being at the time no legislation dealing with sexual harassment at the workplace. Held: The Supreme Court held that sexual harassment at the workplace violates the rights to equality under Articles 14 and 15, the right to practise any profession under Article 19(1)(g) and the right to life with dignity under Article 21. In the absence of enacted law occupying the field, the Court laid down binding guidelines defining sexual harassment and prescribing preventive steps, complaints machinery and employer obligations, drawing on India's obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. The guidelines were declared to be law under Article 141 and to be binding until suitable legislation is enacted. Ratio: Where a fundamental right is unprotected and the legislature has not acted, the Court may lay down binding norms to fill the vacuum, expressly on an interim basis until Parliament legislates. The guidelines were in due course replaced by the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013. |
Other well-known instances follow the same pattern. In Vineet Narain v. Union of India, (1998) 1 SCC 226, the Court used continuing mandamus, keeping the petition pending and supervising an investigation that had stalled, and laid down directions on the functioning of the investigating agencies. In D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416, it prescribed requirements for arrest and detention. In the environmental cases, it developed the polluter pays and precautionary principles and created monitoring mechanisms. In each, the court moved from testing an act to prescribing a regime.
4. The Court's Own Warning
📖 Divisional Manager, Aravali Golf Club v. Chander Hass, (2008) 1 SCC 683 Facts: Employees engaged as tractor drivers claimed regularisation against the post of tractor driver, a post which the employer had not created and which did not exist on the sanctioned strength. The High Court had directed that they be treated as holding that post. Held: The Supreme Court set aside the direction, holding that the creation of a post is a matter for the employer and that a court cannot create posts or direct absorption against posts that do not exist. The judgment went further and delivered a general caution against judicial overreach: judges must exercise judicial restraint, must not encroach into the domain of the legislature or the executive, and must know their limits, since the theory of separation of powers is a basic feature of the Constitution. The Court observed that if the judiciary does not exercise restraint and overstretches its limits there is bound to be a reaction, and that the other organs may step in to curtail its powers. Ratio: The leading modern caution against judicial overreach. Judicial restraint is a constitutional discipline, and the court must not assume functions of policy, appointment, or resource allocation that the Constitution assigns elsewhere. |
The caution is not an isolated one. The courts have repeatedly held that they cannot direct the legislature to enact a law, cannot compel the executive to adopt a particular policy, cannot create posts or sanction expenditure, and cannot take over the administration of an institution. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. A Parent of a Student of Medical College, (1985) 3 SCC 169, the Court held that it could not direct the legislature to enact legislation to curb ragging, however desirable, since that is a matter for the legislature alone.
5. The Arguments on Each Side
In favour of activism | Against activism |
|---|---|
Rights without remedies are illusory; the court must act where other organs fail | Unelected judges are not accountable for policy choices made in a democracy |
It has protected the poor, the unrepresented and the environment | Courts lack the information, expertise and resources to design or administer policy |
It has given content to Part IV by reading it into Article 21 | It blurs the separation of powers, a basic feature of the Constitution |
Article 142 expressly contemplates orders for complete justice | Continuing supervision diverts judicial time from ordinary adjudication and swells arrears |
Legislative vacuums leave rights unprotected, as Vishaka shows | Orders made without adversarial testing may be impracticable or counterproductive |
Judicial norms are expressly interim, yielding to legislation when enacted | Judicial law-making tends to persist long after the vacuum is filled |
6. Where the Line Is Drawn in Practice
- Enforcing an existing right against inaction is review, not activism, even where the direction is detailed.
- Filling a vacuum on an interim basis, expressly until the legislature acts, is accepted, on the Vishaka model.
- Directing the legislature to legislate is beyond the judicial function.
- Choosing among competing policies is for the executive; the court tests the chosen policy for legality and arbitrariness only.
- Creating posts, sanctioning expenditure or directing appointments intrudes on executive and financial functions (Aravali Golf Club).
- Continuing supervision is accepted in narrow classes of case, and is expected to end when the failure that justified it is remedied.
⚠ Activism and restraint are not opposed positions but a calibration It is tempting to treat judicial activism and judicial restraint as rival philosophies, with judges belonging to one camp or the other. The Indian case law does not bear that out. The same Court that laid down binding guidelines in Vishaka warned against overreach in Aravali Golf Club, and often the same bench will intervene strongly on a question of rights and decline firmly on a question of policy. What distinguishes the two situations is not judicial temperament but the subject matter: where a constitutional right is at stake and no other organ has acted, intervention is a duty; where the question is one of policy, priority or resources, restraint is a constitutional obligation of the same order. |
7. The Position in Summary
- Judicial review tests the legality of action taken; judicial activism prescribes what should be done or supplies a norm where none exists.
- Activism developed in India through the Directive Principles, legislative and executive inaction, relaxed locus standi, procedural innovation and Article 142.
- Its strongest form is the filling of a legislative vacuum on an expressly interim basis, as in Vishaka, together with continuing mandamus and structural directions.
- The Supreme Court has itself cautioned against judicial overreach, holding that judicial restraint is a constitutional discipline and that judges must know their limits (Aravali Golf Club).
- The line is drawn by subject matter rather than temperament: intervention where a right is unprotected and no organ has acted, restraint where the question is one of policy, priority or resources.
8. Related Topics and Provisions
- Judicial Review of Administrative Action (Topic 88): the jurisdiction from which activism departs.
- Separation of Powers (Topic 10) and Checks and Balances (Topic 11): the constitutional framework in issue.
- Public Interest Litigation: the procedural vehicle through which activism operates.
- Doctrine of Proportionality (Topic 53) and Wednesbury (Topic 52): the standards that mark the limits of review.
- Public Interest and Administrative Discretion (Topic 57): what the courts will and will not examine in policy matters.
- Constitution of India: Articles 13, 14, 21, 32, 37, 141, 142, 226 and 227; Part IV.