The MakeMyTrip, Goibibo and OYO Case, Competition Commission of India, 2022

The leading Indian order on online travel platforms, and the first to deal squarely with price parity and with exclusive arrangements between a platform and a large supplier. Informations filed by a hotel industry association and by a budget hotel chain led to an order of 19 October 2022 finding that the merged travel platform had abused its dominant position by imposing price parity obligations and by denying market access to competing budget hotel chains, and that its arrangement with a large hotel aggregator contravened Section 3(4). Penalties of about two hundred and twenty-three crore rupees and one hundred and sixty-eight crore rupees respectively were imposed.

1. The Relevant Market and Dominance

The Commission defined the relevant market as the market for online intermediation services for booking hotels in India. Dominance was established from the platform's share of online bookings following the merger of the two travel portals, the network effects arising from the interdependence of hotels and travellers, the data advantage accumulated from transactions, the cost to a hotel of being absent from the leading platform, and the barriers facing a new entrant seeking to assemble both sides of the market simultaneously.

2. The Conduct Found

1. Price and room parity. Hotels listing on the platform were required not to offer lower prices or better availability on other channels. The objection is that such an obligation removes the principal means by which a rival platform can enter, namely charging a lower commission and allowing the hotel to pass the saving to travellers, so commissions do not fall and prices across platforms move together. This was examined as the imposition of unfair conditions under Section 4(2)(a)(i).
2. Denial of market access. Competing budget hotel chains were delisted from, or not listed on, the platform, which for a chain dependent on online bookings amounts to exclusion from a substantial part of the market. This was examined under Section 4(2)(c).
3. The arrangement with the aggregator. An agreement between the platform and a large hotel aggregator, under which the aggregator received preferential treatment and commitments of room nights while competing chains were excluded, was examined under Section 3(4) as an exclusive arrangement causing an appreciable adverse effect.

3. The Order

• Penalties on the travel platform and on the aggregator, computed on their relevant turnover.
• Directions to cease and desist from the conduct found.
• Directions of a remedial character, including that the platform should not impose parity obligations and should apply transparent, fair and non-discriminatory criteria for the listing and delisting of hotels.

The order was appealed, and its later history should be checked before the case is cited for the final outcome or for the quantum of penalty. Its value as the Indian authority on parity clauses and on platform exclusivity is unaffected.

4. Why the Case Matters

1. Parity clauses. The first Indian treatment of the wide and narrow distinction, which is the standard analytical tool in platform cases everywhere.
2. Delisting as exclusion. It establishes that removing a supplier from a dominant platform may be denial of market access, which is the theory later invoked in app store and marketplace cases.
3. Section 3(4) and Section 4 together. The same commercial relationship was examined as a vertical agreement and as an abuse, which is the pattern in most platform matters.
4. Merger consequences. The dominance found rested substantially on a position created by the merger of two travel portals, which is the practical illustration of why merger control in digital markets matters.

5. Related Topics and Provisions