Meaning of Words in Statutes

Most disputes about a statute come down to the meaning of a single word or phrase. Courts approach that question with a set of working rules: words carry their ordinary sense unless they are technical, the same word means the same thing throughout an Act, every word must be given effect, qualifying words attach to what is nearest, and 'and' and 'or' are read as written unless that defeats the obvious intent. All of these yield to context. This note sets out each rule and its limits.

1. The Working Rules

Figure 1: Six rules for the meaning of words

2. Ordinary and Popular Meaning

• Ordinary sense. Words are given their natural and ordinary meaning, the sense in which people ordinarily use them (Topic 3)
• Popular over dictionary. In statutes dealing with everyday matters, especially taxing statutes, a word bears the meaning those dealing with the subject commonly give it. In Ramavtar Budhaiprasad v Assistant Sales Tax Officer (1961) betel leaves were held not to be vegetables, since in common parlance vegetables are those grown in a kitchen garden and used for the table.
• Commercial sense. Words describing goods in fiscal laws are read in the sense understood in trade and commerce.

3. Technical and Legal Meaning

• Technical terms. Words of a science, art or trade bear the meaning they have in that field where the statute deals with it.
• Legal terms. Words with an established legal meaning, such as 'lease', 'mortgage' or 'offer for sale', are presumed to carry that meaning, as Fisher v Bell shows (Topic 3)
• Context decides. If the context shows the legislature used a technical word in its popular sense, the popular sense prevails.

4. Consistency and No Surplusage

• Same word, same meaning. A word used in several places in one Act is presumed to bear the same meaning throughout.
• The presumption yields. It gives way where the context of a particular provision shows a different meaning was intended.
• No surplusage. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh v Arabinda Bose (1952) the Supreme Court held that it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words as surplusage if they can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivably within the contemplation of the statute.
• Different words, different meanings. Where the legislature uses different words in the same Act, it is presumed to intend different meanings.

5. Grammar: Last Antecedent and 'And' and 'Or'

• Rule of last antecedent. Relative and qualifying words ordinarily attach to the nearest antecedent, not to everything that precedes them.
• Its limit. It yields where the context or punctuation shows the qualifying words apply to all the preceding items (Topic 12)
• 'And' and 'or'. 'And' is ordinarily conjunctive and 'or' disjunctive; the court will read one as the other only where the literal reading leads to absurdity or plainly defeats the clear intention of the statute.

6. Words in Context and Over Time

No word has a fixed meaning independent of its setting. In Reserve Bank of India v Peerless General Finance (1987) the Supreme Court said that no word of a statute can be construed in isolation, and that if the text is the texture, context is what gives the colour. Context also includes time: general words in a statute that is always speaking extend to new things within their meaning, as with the telegraph line in Laxmi Narayan Chopra (Topic 6).

7. Frequently Asked Questions

Do statutory words bear their dictionary meaning?

Not necessarily. Words are given their ordinary meaning, and a dictionary is a useful guide to it, but where a statute deals with everyday matters, especially in taxation, the court prefers the popular or commercial sense in which the word is commonly used. In Ramavtar Budhaiprasad (1961) betel leaves were held not to be vegetables because in common parlance they are not so regarded.

Can a court treat words in a statute as surplus?

Ordinarily not. The legislature is presumed not to use words without purpose. In Aswini Kumar Ghosh v Arabinda Bose (1952) the Supreme Court held that words should not be brushed aside as surplusage if they can have appropriate application in circumstances within the contemplation of the statute.

Can 'and' be read as 'or'?

Only exceptionally. 'And' is normally conjunctive and 'or' disjunctive, and courts give them that meaning. They read one as the other only where the literal reading would produce an absurd result or plainly defeat the clear intention of the legislature, as shown by the statute as a whole.

8. Related Topics

• Topic 15: Ejusdem Generis and Noscitur a Sociis. Meaning from associated words.
• Topic 18: Mandatory and Directory Provisions. The meaning of 'may' and 'shall'.