All NotesCivil LawNegotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

Presumptions Under Sections 139 and 140: Reverse Onus and Rebuttal

In an ordinary criminal trial, the prosecution must prove every element beyond reasonable doubt. Section 139 departs from that pattern. Once the accused's cheque and signature are established, the law presumes that it was issued for a debt, and the accused must rebut the presumption. Section 140 closes another escape route. This note explains both sections, the leading Supreme Court cases on the scope of the presumption, and how it can be rebutted.

1. The Provisions

Section 139, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability.

Section 140, Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

It shall not be a defence in a prosecution for an offence under section 138 that the drawer had no reason to believe when he issued the cheque that the cheque may be dishonoured on presentment for the reasons stated in that section.

Section 139 works alongside the general presumption of consideration in Section 118(a) (Topic 38). Section 140 means the drawer cannot escape by saying he honestly expected the cheque to be honoured, for example because he expected funds to arrive.

2. Scope of the Presumption

📖 Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (Supreme Court, three judges, 2010)

Held: The presumption in Section 139 includes the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. To the extent that Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) held otherwise, it was incorrect. Section 139 is a reverse onus clause, but the accused need only raise a probable defence; the standard of proof for rebuttal is a preponderance of probabilities, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.

  • Foundational facts: the presumption arises once the complainant proves, or the accused admits, that the cheque was drawn by the accused and bears his signature, and that it was delivered to the complainant.
  • Mandatory: "shall be presumed" makes it a presumption of law that the court must draw.
  • Two stages: the complainant first establishes the foundational facts; the evidential burden then shifts to the accused to rebut the presumption; if he succeeds, the burden returns to the complainant to prove the debt (Rajesh Jain v. Ajay Singh, Supreme Court, 2023).

3. How the Presumption Is Rebutted

  • Standard: a preponderance of probabilities. The accused need not prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt, and need not always enter the witness box (Rangappa).
  • Material relied on: the accused may rely on his own evidence, on circumstances, and on the complainant's own evidence and documents (Basalingappa v. Mudibasappa, 2019).
  • Financial capacity: where the accused raises a plausible doubt about the complainant's capacity to lend the amount, the complainant may need to show his source of funds (Basalingappa). But merely questioning financial capacity, without more, does not rebut the presumption (Sanjabij Tari, 2025).
  • Bare denial insufficient: a mere denial of the debt is not enough; the accused must bring material on record that makes the non-existence of the debt probable (Kumar Exports v. Sharma Carpets, 2009).
  • Blank or security cheques: the presumption applies even if the accused signed a blank cheque and someone else completed it (Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, 2019; Topic 43).

4. Presumption at the Threshold

📖 Renuka v. State of Maharashtra (Supreme Court, 2026)

Held: Once the ingredients of Section 138 appear from the complaint, the Section 139 presumption operates, and it can be rebutted only at trial. A defence that there was no legally enforceable debt cannot be used to quash the complaint at the stage of issuing process.

The same approach governs revision: in Sanjabij Tari (2025), the Supreme Court criticised a High Court for re-appreciating evidence in revision to overturn concurrent findings that the presumption had not been rebutted.

5. Constitutionality of the Reverse Onus

The Supreme Court has treated Section 139 as a permissible legislative device in a regulatory offence that is largely compensatory in character. Because the accused's burden is light, only a preponderance of probabilities, and he may rely on the prosecution's own material, the presumption is not considered inconsistent with a fair trial (Rangappa).

⚠ Key point

Under Section 139, once the cheque and signature are established, it is presumed that the cheque was received for a legally enforceable debt (Rangappa, 2010, overruling Krishna Janardhan Bhat on this point). The presumption is mandatory but rebuttable on a preponderance of probabilities, using the accused's own evidence, circumstances or the complainant's material (Basalingappa, 2019), but not by bare denial (Kumar Exports, 2009) or mere doubts about financial capacity (Sanjabij Tari, 2025). The burden shifts in two stages (Rajesh Jain, 2023), and the presumption cannot be displaced at the process stage (Renuka, 2026). Under Section 140, it is no defence that the drawer did not expect the cheque to be dishonoured.

6. Related Topics and Provisions

  • Presumptions and estoppels under Section 118 (Topic 38)
  • Legally enforceable debt (Topic 43)
  • Landmark judgments (Topic 58)