33(1)

DIRECT COGNIZANCE: the Special Court may take cognizance without committal, on a complaint or a police report

33(2)

QUESTIONS THROUGH THE COURT: the prosecutor or defence counsel communicates the questions to the Special Court, which puts them to the child

33(3)

FREQUENT BREAKS: the court may permit frequent breaks for the child during the trial

33(4)

A CHILD-FRIENDLY ATMOSPHERE: a family member, guardian, friend or relative the child trusts may be present

33(5)

NOT CALLED REPEATEDLY: the court shall ensure that the child is not called repeatedly to testify

33(6)

NO AGGRESSIVE QUESTIONING OR CHARACTER ASSASSINATION, and the child's dignity maintained at all times

33(7)

IDENTITY NOT DISCLOSED at any time during investigation or trial, save where the court permits it in the child's interest; identity includes family, school, relatives, neighbourhood or any other information

33(8)

COMPENSATION, in addition to punishment, for physical or mental trauma or for immediate rehabilitation

33(9)

The Special Court has all the POWERS OF A COURT OF SESSION and follows the Sessions trial procedure, subject to the Act

§ Questions to the child through the Special Court

Section 33(2) reshapes cross-examination. Counsel for either side communicates the questions to the court, and the court puts them to the child. The child is not questioned directly by the advocates.

The court controls form and tone. A question may be rephrased in simple language, and one that is confusing, repetitive or intimidating may be disallowed.

The accused's right is preserved. The questions are still asked; the change is in the manner of asking. This follows the directions the Supreme Court gave in Sakshi v. Union of India, (2004) 5 SCC 518, that questions in cross-examination be given in writing to the presiding officer and put to the child in a form that is not aggressive.

§ The protections in sub-sections (3) to (7)

• Frequent breaks, s. 33(3). A child's capacity to concentrate and to endure distressing questioning is limited, and the court may pause as often as the child needs.

• A trusted adult, s. 33(4). The presence of a familiar person makes the courtroom less frightening.

• Not called repeatedly, s. 33(5). The child's evidence is taken in as few sittings as possible, and the child is not summoned again without real necessity.

• No aggressive questioning, no character assassination, s. 33(6). The child's past, character and conduct are not put on trial, and the court must maintain the child's dignity throughout.

• Identity, s. 33(7). The court itself must keep the child's identity from disclosure, including in its orders and judgment. The Explanation makes clear that identity reaches the family, school, relatives and neighbourhood.

§ How compensation is awarded

The power. In appropriate cases, the Special Court may, in addition to the punishment, direct payment of compensation to the child for physical or mental trauma or for immediate rehabilitation.

Interim and final. Under Rule 9 of the POCSO Rules, 2020, interim compensation may be ordered at any stage after the FIR, and final compensation on disposal, including where the accused is acquitted or not traced.

The factors. Rule 9 lists them: the severity of the offence, physical and mental harm, medical expenses, loss of education or employment, the relationship with the offender, repetition, pregnancy or disease, and the child's financial condition.

Payment. The State pays from the victim compensation fund within a fixed period, applying the scheme framed under what is now Section 396 of the BNSS.

§ Section 34 (in substance)

(1) Where any offence under this Act is committed by a child, such child shall be dealt with under the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act.

(2) If any question arises in any proceeding before the Special Court whether a person is a child or not, such question shall be determined by the Special Court after satisfying itself about the age of such person, and it shall record in writing its reasons.

(3) No order made by the Special Court shall be deemed to be invalid merely by any subsequent proof that the age of a person as determined by it was not the correct age.

§ Age disputes in POCSO proceedings

• Age is decisive twice over. It decides whether the victim is a child, and so whether the Act applies at all; and it decides whether the accused is a child, and so which forum deals with him.

• The documentary hierarchy. Under Section 94 of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015: first the date of birth certificate from the school, or the matriculation or equivalent certificate; then the birth certificate issued by a corporation, municipal authority or panchayat; and only in the absence of both, an ossification test or other latest medical age determination test.

• The same hierarchy for the victim. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Supreme Court held that the procedure for determining the age of a child in conflict with law applies equally to a child victim.

• Medical age determination gives a range, not an exact age, and is resorted to only where the documents are not available.

§ Section 35 (in substance)

(1) The evidence of the child shall be recorded within a period of thirty days of the Special Court taking cognizance of the offence, and reasons for delay, if any, shall be recorded by the Special Court.

(2) The Special Court shall complete the trial, as far as possible, within a period of one year from the date of taking cognizance of the offence.

§ Speedy trial under POCSO

• Why thirty days. A child's memory fades and changes quickly, and every month of waiting prolongs the trauma. Recording the child's evidence early preserves it and releases the child from the process.

• The time limits are directory, as the words as far as possible in sub-section (2) show, but delay must be explained by recorded reasons under sub-section (1).

• The Supreme Court has pressed for compliance. In Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India (2018), it directed High Courts to ensure that POCSO cases are tried by Special Courts with the timelines observed; and in In Re: Alarming Rise in the Number of Reported Child Rape Incidents (2019), it directed a dedicated court in every district with more than a hundred POCSO cases.

§ Section 36 (in substance)

(1) The Special Court shall ensure that the child is not exposed in any way to the accused at the time of recording of the evidence, while at the same time ensuring that the accused is in a position to hear the statement of the child and communicate with his advocate.

(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), the Special Court may record the statement of a child through video conferencing or by utilising single visibility mirrors or curtains or any other device.

The balance struck. The child is shielded from the sight of the accused; the accused hears everything and can instruct his advocate. Neither right is sacrificed to the other.

§ Section 37 (in substance)

The Special Court shall try cases in camera and in the presence of the parents of the child or any other person in whom the child has trust or confidence:

Provided that where the Special Court is of the opinion that the child needs to be examined at a place other than the court, it shall proceed to issue a commission in accordance with the Code.

The public is excluded, and the child's trusted adult is present. Where the child cannot come to court, because of illness, disability or trauma, the evidence may be taken where the child is.

§ Section 38 (in substance)

(1) Wherever necessary, the court may take the assistance of a translator or interpreter having such qualifications and experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, while recording the evidence of the child.

(2) If a child has a mental or physical disability, the Special Court may take the assistance of a special educator or any person familiar with the manner of communication of the child or an expert in that field, having such qualifications and experience and on payment of such fees as may be prescribed, to record the evidence of the child.

A child with a speech, hearing, intellectual or other disability may communicate through signs, gestures, pictures or assistive devices. Without Section 38, such a child might be unable to give evidence at all, and the offence would go unpunished precisely because the victim was most vulnerable.

§ What the chapter adds up to

• Secondary victimisation is harm done to the child by the process itself: repeated questioning, confrontation with the accused, public exposure, hostile cross-examination, and delay.

• Every provision of Chapter VIII answers one of these harms. Questions through the court; the screen; the closed court; the trusted adult; breaks; no repeated appearances; no character assassination; fixed time limits.

• Trauma-informed adjudication means the court understands that a traumatised child may give an account that is fragmented, inconsistent in detail, or delayed, and does not treat those features, by themselves, as signs of untruth.

📖 Sheetal Vasant Thakur v. Chirag Arora, 2026 INSC 638, decided 11 June 2026

The context. In a bitterly contested custody dispute, with allegations under the POCSO Act pending against the father, the Bombay High Court had directed that the child, then about ten, be psychologically evaluated, and had later substituted a panel of experts for a single expert. The mother appealed.

The decision. A Bench of Justice Sanjay Karol and Justice N. Kotiswar Singh, in a judgment by Justice Kotiswar Singh, modified the High Court's orders, holding that a multi-layered evaluation process risked re-traumatisation and secondary victimisation of a child who was an alleged victim of sexual abuse.

The principles. The welfare and psychological well-being of the child are paramount, overriding the claims of either parent. Evaluation should be ordered only where necessary, with reasons recorded as to its purpose, relevance and why less intrusive means will not do. It should ordinarily be done by one independent expert appointed by the court, a panel being the exception. Courts should consider assessing the parents before subjecting the child to extensive evaluation. The child's disclosures, recordings and notes must be kept confidential, and experts must not pronounce on guilt. Existing therapy should be continued where appropriate, and the court must retain ongoing supervision of the process.

The POCSO connection. The Court read these principles with Sections 24, 33(5), 36 and 39 of the POCSO Act, and with Sakshi v. Union of India, treating minimum intrusion and minimum exposure as the governing standard.

The court's own duty. As parens patriae, the court cannot hand its responsibility for the child to experts or to the litigating parents.