Jurisprudence
Property: Concept and Theories
At a Glance ▪ Salmond traces narrowing senses of property: all legal rights; proprietary rights as distinct from personal rights; and, narrowest, corporeal ownership of material things. ▪ The theories: natural rights and labour (Locke, 1690); occupancy (Grotius, Pufendorf, Blackstone); historical (Maine); psychological (Bentham: property and law are born together and die together); metaphysical (Kant, Hegel); sociological (Pound, Duguit); Marxist; Gandhi's trusteeship. ▪ 'Property is theft' is Proudhon (What is Property?, 1840), not Marx. ▪ The 44th Amendment Act, 1978 omitted Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31 with effect from 20 June 1979 and inserted Art. 300A in Part XII: property is now a constitutional, not a fundamental, right. ▪ Recent law: Kolkata Municipal Corporation v Bimal Kumar Shah (2024) read seven sub-rights into Art. 300A; Property Owners Association (2024, 9 judges) narrowed 'material resources of the community' in Art. 39(b). |
Imagine an old mango orchard at the edge of a village. Who should own the mangoes? The man who planted and watered the trees says they are his because of his labour. The first person to climb the trees and pick them says first come, first served. The elders say the orchard has always belonged to the family as a whole. The lawyer says they belong to whoever the law says owns them, and nobody else. The panchayat says the owner must share them in a famine because property carries social duties. A revolutionary says private ownership of orchards is itself the problem. And an old Gandhian says the owner may keep the orchard, but only as a trustee for the village. Each of these voices is one of the theories of property explained in this note, which also covers the concept and kinds of property and the long constitutional story of the right to property in India.
Figure: The theories of property on one axis: from those that justify property by the individual (natural rights, Locke's labour theory, Hegel's personality theory) to those that subject it to society (utilitarian, social function and Marxist theories)
1. The Concept of Property
Salmond points out that the word property has been used in several senses, each narrower than the last. In the widest sense it includes all the legal rights of a person, of whatever description: this is the sense in which Locke spoke of men's 'lives, liberties and estates, which I call by the general name, property'. In a narrower sense it means only a person's proprietary rights, his estate, as distinct from his personal rights, his status and personal condition: his land, goods and debts are property; his reputation and liberty are not. In the narrowest sense it means corporeal property: the right of ownership in material things. Lawyers usually use the second or the third sense, and the context shows which is meant.
Property should be distinguished from ownership (Note 31). Ownership is the relation between a person and a right; property is the object of that relation in the popular sense (the thing owned), or, in the legal sense, the aggregate of proprietary rights a person has. Property may consist of rights in things (land, goods) or rights in rights (a debt, a share, a patent).
Classic Definitions ▪ Salmond: in one of its senses, property means the proprietary rights of a person, which together make up his estate, as distinguished from his personal rights, which make up his status. ▪ Locke (Second Treatise of Government, 1690): property includes men's 'lives, liberties and estates'; property in things arises when a man mixes his labour with what nature has left in common. ▪ Blackstone (Commentaries on the Laws of England): the right of property is 'that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe'. ▪ Bentham (Theory of Legislation): property is nothing but a basis of expectation. 'Property and law are born together and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws and property ceases.' ▪ Proudhon (What is Property?, 1840): 'Property is theft.' |
2. The Kinds of Property
Kind | Meaning | Examples and notes |
|---|---|---|
Corporeal and incorporeal | Rights of ownership in material things; all other proprietary rights | Land, a car; a patent, a debt, an easement (incorporeal rights in re propria and in re aliena) |
Movable and immovable | Things that can be moved; land and things attached to or permanently fastened to the earth | s.3(26) General Clauses Act 1897; the Transfer of Property Act excludes standing timber, growing crops and grass from immovable property |
Real and personal | English categories: land (recoverable by a real action) and other things (chattels) | Freehold land is real property; a leasehold was treated as personal property (a chattel real) |
Public and private | Vested in the State or the public; vested in private persons | Highways, rivers; a person's house |
Intellectual property is the fastest-growing class of incorporeal property: rights in the products of the mind. Most IP rights last for a limited time: a patent for twenty years, copyright generally for the author's life plus sixty years, a registered design for ten years extendable by five. But a trade mark registered under the Trade Marks Act 1999 lasts for ten years and can be renewed indefinitely for successive periods of ten years. It is therefore wrong to say that all intellectual property is protected only for a limited time. The difference has a reason: a patent rewards invention and must eventually be freed for public use, while a trade mark protects consumers from confusion for as long as the mark is used.
3. The Theories of Property
The theories answer a single question: what justifies private property? Some find the answer in the individual (his nature, labour, will), some in history, some in law and utility, and some in society. Several also explain the origin of property. Learn each with its author and one sentence.
Natural rights and labour: Locke
In the Second Treatise of Government (1690), John Locke argued that God gave the earth to mankind in common, but every man has a property in his own person and therefore in the labour of his body. When he mixes his labour with something taken from the common, he annexes something of his own to it and makes it his property. The acorns a man gathers become his by his gathering. Locke added two limits, now called the Lockean provisos: a man may appropriate only where there is enough and as good left for others, and only as much as he can use before it spoils. The theory treats property as a natural right prior to the State, which government exists to protect. Critics ask why mixing labour gains the thing rather than wasting the labour, and note that the provisos cannot hold once land is scarce.
Occupancy or first possession: Grotius, Pufendorf, Blackstone
The occupancy theory holds that property began with the first taking of things that belonged to no one (res nullius). Grotius and Pufendorf explained that the original community of goods was divided by agreement, express or tacit, and by occupation. Blackstone traced property in land and goods to the first occupant's possession. The theory explains the Roman and common-law rules on wild animals and abandoned things, but it justifies only the first taker, not the vast later distribution of property, and it rewards speed rather than merit.
The historical theory: Maine
Maine, in Ancient Law (1861), showed that property did not begin as individual ownership at all. In early societies property was collective, held by the family or the village community; individual ownership emerged slowly as the individual was separated from the family, part of the movement from status to contract (Note 13). The Hindu joint family and coparcenary gave Maine much of his evidence. The theory explains origins but offers no justification.
The psychological or expectation theory: Bentham
Bentham denied that property is natural. Property is simply a basis of expectation: the expectation of deriving certain advantages from a thing, which only the law can secure. Hence his famous words: 'Property and law are born together and die together. Before laws were made there was no property; take away laws and property ceases.' Property is justified by utility: security of expectation encourages labour, saving and investment. The corollary is that property may be regulated or redistributed whenever general utility requires, though Bentham himself valued security highly and was wary of sudden redistribution.
The metaphysical theory: Kant and Hegel
Kant held that rightful possession of external things requires a civil condition: only in a State, under a general will, can one person's claim to a thing bind all others. Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right (1821), made property the first embodiment of freedom: the person puts his will into an external thing and so gives his freedom an objective existence. Property is thus necessary to personality (hence the personality theory). The theory explains why property feels like part of oneself, but it justifies some property for everyone rather than any particular distribution.
The sociological theory: Pound and Duguit
Pound treated property as an interest that law secures, and stated one of his jural postulates: in civilised society people must be able to assume that they may control, for beneficial purposes, what they have discovered and appropriated, what they have created by their own labour, and what they have acquired under the existing social and economic order. The law balances this interest against public and social interests (Note 14). Duguit went further: property is not a right but a social function. The owner holds wealth under a duty to use it to increase social interdependence, and the law may compel him to do so (Note 69).
The Marxist theory and Proudhon
For Marx and Engels, private property in the means of production is the root of class division: it allows the owning class to appropriate the surplus value of others' labour. The Communist Manifesto (1848) declared that the theory of the Communists may be summed up in one sentence: the abolition of private property, meaning bourgeois property in the means of production, not personal possessions (Note 16). The slogan 'property is theft' is not Marx's. It comes from the French anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, in What is Property? (1840); Marx later attacked Proudhon in The Poverty of Philosophy (1847).
Gandhi's trusteeship
Gandhi rejected both unrestricted private property and forcible expropriation. The rich may keep their wealth, but should hold what exceeds their reasonable needs as trustees for society and use it for the common good. The idea influenced the Directive Principles, especially Art. 39(b) and (c), and finds an echo in the corporate social responsibility provisions of the Companies Act 2013.
Theory | Main exponents | Property rests on |
|---|---|---|
Natural rights and labour | Locke (1690) | Self-ownership and the mixing of labour |
Occupancy | Grotius, Pufendorf, Blackstone | First taking of ownerless things |
Historical | Maine (1861) | Evolution from collective to individual ownership |
Psychological (expectation) | Bentham | Law-secured expectation; utility |
Metaphysical (personality) | Kant; Hegel (1821) | The will and freedom of the person |
Sociological | Pound; Duguit | Social interests; social function |
Marxist and anarchist | Marx and Engels (1848); Proudhon (1840) | Class power; property as theft |
Trusteeship | Gandhi | Wealth held in trust for society |
4. The Right to Property in India
The Indian Constitution began with property as a fundamental right (Art. 19(1)(f): to acquire, hold and dispose of property; Art. 31: no deprivation save by authority of law, and compulsory acquisition only for a public purpose with compensation). Land reform and nationalisation brought Parliament and the Supreme Court into a thirty-year struggle, which produced the doctrine of basic structure.
Year | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
1951 | First Amendment: Arts. 31A, 31B and the Ninth Schedule | Shielded zamindari abolition and land reform laws from challenge |
1951 | Shankari Prasad v Union of India | Upheld the First Amendment: an amendment is not 'law' under Art. 13(2) |
1965 | Sajjan Singh v State of Rajasthan | Followed Shankari Prasad; two judges doubted it |
1967 | Golak Nath v State of Punjab (11 judges, 6:5) | Parliament cannot amend fundamental rights; prospective overruling |
1970 | R.C. Cooper v Union of India (11 judges) | Bank nationalisation law struck down; compensation must follow relevant principles; Arts. 19 and 31 not mutually exclusive |
1971 | 24th and 25th Amendments | Restored amending power; 'amount' replaced 'compensation'; Art. 31C inserted |
1973 | Kesavananda Bharati v State of Kerala (13 judges, 7:6) | Basic structure; first part of Art. 31C upheld, clause excluding judicial review struck down |
1978 | 44th Amendment Act | Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31 omitted from 20 June 1979; Art. 300A inserted in Part XII |
1980 | Minerva Mills v Union of India | 42nd Amendment's extension of Art. 31C to all Directive Principles struck down |
2007 | I.R. Coelho v State of Tamil Nadu (9 judges) | Ninth Schedule laws inserted after 24 April 1973 open to basic structure review |
After the 44th Amendment Act, 1978, the right to property survives in Art. 300A, in Chapter IV of Part XII: 'No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.' It is a constitutional right, not a fundamental right, so it cannot be enforced directly under Art. 32, and a law satisfying Art. 300A need only be a valid law. The same amendment inserted Art. 30(1A), requiring that any amount fixed for acquiring the property of a minority educational institution must not restrict its right under Art. 30. Arts. 31A, 31B and 31C remain.
Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v State of Gujarat Supreme Court of India, 1995 The Court held that the right to property under Art. 300A is not a basic feature of the Constitution, that it is a constitutional right but not a fundamental right, and that a right to compensation is not implicit in Art. 300A: the law of deprivation need not provide a just equivalent. Later cases, notably K.T. Plantation (2011), have softened this by insisting on public purpose and a just, fair and reasonable law (Note 31). |
Kolkata Municipal Corporation v Bimal Kumar Shah Supreme Court of India, 2024 The Court read seven procedural sub-rights into Art. 300A, which any law of compulsory acquisition must respect: the right to notice, the right to be heard, the right to a reasoned decision, the duty to acquire only for a public purpose, the right to restitution or fair compensation, the right to an efficient and expeditious process, and the right of conclusion (the proceedings must end in vesting). A power to acquire without such procedure is not 'authority of law'. |
Property Owners Association v State of Maharashtra Supreme Court of India, 2024 (9 judges) The majority held that not every privately owned resource is a 'material resource of the community' under Art. 39(b). Whether it is depends on factors such as the nature of the resource, its scarcity, its effect on the well-being of the community and the consequences of its concentration in private hands. The broad contrary view traced to Krishna Iyer J's opinion in Ranganatha Reddy (1977) was rejected. The Court also held that Art. 31C, in the form upheld in Kesavananda, continues in force. |
The right to property has also been described as a human right. In Vidya Devi v State of Himachal Pradesh (Supreme Court of India, 2020) the Court held that a welfare State cannot claim adverse possession against its own citizen and ordered compensation for land taken without acquisition (Note 31).
5. Evaluation
No single theory is sufficient. Locke explains why effort deserves reward, but not the distribution we inherit. Occupancy explains legal rules about ownerless things, not their justice. Maine explains origins; Bentham explains why property depends on law; Hegel explains why property matters to personality; Pound and Duguit explain why it carries social limits; Marx and Proudhon expose its capacity for domination. The Indian Constitution combines them: it protects property against arbitrary deprivation (Art. 300A and the seven sub-rights) while allowing redistribution for the common good (Arts. 31A, 31C, 39(b)), a settlement close to Pound's balancing and Gandhi's trusteeship.
Memory Aid ▪ Analogy: the mango orchard. The planter (Locke, labour), the first picker (occupancy), the family elders (Maine), the lawyer (Bentham), the panchayat (Duguit, social function), the revolutionary (Marx), the Gandhian trustee. ▪ Theories mnemonic: 'Lazy Owls Hate Big Monkeys, So Mice Take (over)'. Labour (Locke), Occupancy, Historical (Maine), Bentham (psychological), Metaphysical (Kant, Hegel), Sociological (Pound, Duguit), Marxist, Trusteeship (Gandhi). ▪ Bentham's line: property and law are twins; born together, die together. ▪ Constitution dates: '44 in 78, effective 79; 300A in Part XII'. |
Exam Corner: Likely Questions ▪ Explain the concept of property and its kinds. What are Salmond's senses of the term? ▪ Critically examine the theories of property, with reference to Locke, Bentham, Hegel, Maine, Duguit and Marx. ▪ Trace the history of the right to property under the Indian Constitution. What is the present position under Art. 300A? ▪ Is property a natural right or a creation of law? Discuss. |
Exam Corner: MCQ Traps ▪ 'Property is theft' is Proudhon (1840), not Marx. ▪ Art. 300A is in Part XII (Chapter IV), not Part III. ▪ The 44th Amendment is of 1978; Arts. 19(1)(f) and 31 were omitted with effect from 20 June 1979. ▪ 'Property and law are born together and die together' is Bentham. ▪ Trade marks can be renewed indefinitely; patents last twenty years. |
6. Frequently Asked Questions
Q. Is the right to property a fundamental right in India?
A. No. Since the 44th Amendment (1978, effective 20 June 1979) it is a constitutional right under Art. 300A in Part XII. No person can be deprived of property save by authority of law, and the Supreme Court has read seven procedural sub-rights into that guarantee (Bimal Kumar Shah, 2024).
Q. What is Locke's labour theory?
A. Every person owns his own labour; by mixing it with things in the common he makes them his property, provided enough and as good is left for others and nothing is left to spoil.
Q. What is the difference between Bentham's and Locke's views?
A. For Locke, property is a natural right existing before the State, which government must protect. For Bentham, property is a creation of law: a legally secured expectation, justified by utility.
See also: Note 13 (historical school), Note 14 (sociological school), Note 16 (Marxist jurisprudence), Note 30 (possession), Note 31 (ownership), Note 46 (constitutional doctrines), Note 69 (Pound v Duguit).
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