Application to the Magistrate: Section 12 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005

Section 12 is the doorway to every relief in the Act. Through one application, filed by the woman herself, by a Protection Officer, or by any other person on her behalf, the Magistrate can be asked for protection, residence, money, custody and compensation, singly or together, finally or at once by interim order. The section also sets the Act's tempo: first hearing ordinarily within three days, disposal endeavoured within sixty days. This note walks through who may file, what may be claimed, the role of the domestic incident report, the procedural questions, limitation, amendment, withdrawal, and the evidence that should accompany the application.

1. The Text of Section 12

2. Who May File

Three doors into the same section:

• The aggrieved person herself, with or without a lawyer; the prescribed Form II is supplied free of cost by the Protection Officer.
• The Protection Officer, if the aggrieved person so desires (Section 9(1)(c)).
• 'Any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person': a parent, sibling, relative, friend, social worker or NGO. This third door matters for women who are confined, injured, illiterate or too afraid to come forward, and for minors, on whose behalf an adult files.

The application is presented to the Magistrate with territorial jurisdiction under Section 27: where the aggrieved person permanently or temporarily resides or carries on business or is employed, where the respondent resides or carries on business or is employed, or where the cause of action arose. A woman who has fled to her parents' town may therefore file there.

3. What May Be Claimed

The application may seek one or more reliefs: protection orders (Section 18), residence orders (Section 19), monetary relief (Section 20), custody orders (Section 21) and compensation (Section 22), together with interim and ex parte orders under Section 23 supported by an affidavit in Form III. Sub-section (2) adds two refinements about compensation: claiming it before the Magistrate is without prejudice to a civil suit for damages for the same injuries; and if a civil decree is later passed, amounts paid under the Magistrate's order are set off against the decree, which is executable only for the balance, so the woman is never compensated twice, and never barred from the fuller civil remedy. Under Section 26, the same reliefs may alternatively be sought in any pending civil, family or criminal proceeding.

4. The Domestic Incident Report

The proviso to sub-section (1) obliges the Magistrate, before passing any order, to take into consideration any domestic incident report received from the Protection Officer or a service provider. Its correct reading was settled in Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90: the DIR is mandatory to consider if it exists, but it is not a precondition to entertaining the application or granting relief. A woman who files directly, without ever approaching a Protection Officer, is fully within her rights; the Magistrate may, where useful, call for a DIR or a report under the Rules, but cannot dismiss the application for want of one.

5. Form, Contents and Accompanying Evidence

Sub-section (3) requires the application to follow the prescribed form, Form II, 'or as nearly as possible thereto', a deliberately forgiving standard. A well-drafted application states: the parties and their domestic relationship (with the shared household identified); the specific incidents of domestic violence with dates and particulars, attributed respondent by respondent; the reliefs sought under each section, including interim relief; and the basis of jurisdiction. It should be accompanied by:

6. Tempo: First Hearing and Disposal

Sub-section (4) fixes the first hearing ordinarily not beyond three days from receipt; sub-section (5) directs the Magistrate to endeavour to dispose of the application within sixty days of the first hearing. The words 'ordinarily' and 'endeavour' make the timelines directory rather than mandatory, but they set the statutory expectation: this is emergency jurisdiction, and interim protection under Section 23 is designed to issue at or near the first hearing. Notice of the hearing goes to the respondent under Section 13 within two days of its issue.

7. Proceedings after Separation or Divorce, and Limitation

Because the definitions reach past relationships, the application survives changes in the relationship. A woman separated in fact or judicially remains an aggrieved person (Krishna Bhattacharjee v. Sarathi Choudhury, (2016) 2 SCC 705); a divorced woman may seek relief for violence during the marriage (Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori, (2014) 10 SCC 736), though the Act cannot be used to reopen a settled mutual consent divorce (Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588); and conduct before the Act's commencement may be considered (V.D. Bhanot v. Savita Bhanot, (2012) 3 SCC 183).

8. Amendment, Withdrawal and Challenge

• Amendment. In Kunapareddy v. Kunapareddy Swarna Kumari, (2016) 11 SCC 774, the Supreme Court held that the Magistrate may permit amendment of the application: the proceedings are predominantly civil, the reliefs are civil, and Section 28(2) lets the court lay down its own procedure. Amendments that bring the real controversy before the court, added incidents, corrected particulars, further reliefs, are allowed on the usual principles.
• Withdrawal. The application is the woman's civil claim; she may withdraw it, wholly or against particular respondents, and settlements are common, often after counselling under Section 14. Orders already passed may be altered or revoked on a change of circumstances under Section 25(2) (prospectively: S. Vijikumari v. Mowneshwarachari C., 2024).
• Challenge by the respondent. The respondent's remedies are an appeal under Section 29 against orders of the Magistrate and, exceptionally, a petition under Section 528 BNSS (former Section 482 CrPC): in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 INSC 734, the Supreme Court confirmed that the High Court's inherent power extends to quashing Section 12 proceedings, but only for gross illegality or abuse of process, given the welfare character of the Act.

9. Related Topics and Provisions