Definitions under Section 2 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Complete Note

Section 2 is the dictionary of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. It contains twenty clauses, (a) to (t), and almost every contested DV Act case turns on one of them. Is she an aggrieved person? Is he (or she) a respondent? Was there a domestic relationship? Is the house a shared household? A lawyer who masters Section 2 can draft a maintainable application, and one who masters it for the other side can defeat a defective one. This note groups the definitions by function, explains each with the leading cases, and ends with the rules of interpretation that courts apply to them.

1. Introduction and Interpretive Approach

Section 2 opens with the words 'In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires'. Every definition is therefore a presumptive meaning that yields where the context of a particular section demands otherwise. Some clauses are self-contained (aggrieved person, domestic relationship, shared household); others simply point to an operative section (protection order means an order under Section 18) or to another statute (dowry has the meaning in the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961). Because the Act is beneficial legislation, the Supreme Court reads these definitions liberally and purposively in favour of women, while insisting on the core requirement of a genuine domestic relationship.

2. The People: Aggrieved Person, Respondent and Child

2.1 Aggrieved person: Section 2(a)

The definition has three ingredients: (i) the person must be a woman; (ii) she must be or have been in a domestic relationship with the respondent; and (iii) she must allege that she has been subjected to domestic violence by the respondent. The word 'alleges' is significant: the definition is satisfied by an allegation, and proof is a matter for the hearing. The words 'has been' bring in past relationships, including divorced wives and women who have left the shared household. The concept is examined in full in Topic 3.

2.2 Respondent: Section 2(q)

As enacted, the main part confined respondents to adult males, while the proviso allowed a wife or live-in partner to proceed against relatives of the husband or male partner. In Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, (2011) 3 SCC 650, the Supreme Court held that 'relative' in the proviso is not limited to males, so a mother-in-law or sister-in-law could be a respondent at the instance of a wife. But a mother or sister still could not proceed against a female relative, and anyone could escape the Act by acting through a woman or a minor.

The aggrieved person is still always a woman; only the respondent side was widened. The respondent must also satisfy the domestic relationship test: a person who never shared a household with the aggrieved person in a family relationship cannot be joined merely because he or she is related.

2.3 Child: Section 2(b)

Children are protected through the aggrieved person's application: a protection order may prohibit violence against a child (Section 18), maintenance may be ordered for children (Section 20(1)(d)), and temporary custody may be granted (Section 21). The inclusion of adopted, step and foster children reflects the reality of blended families.

3. The Bond and the Place: Domestic Relationship and Shared Household

3.1 Domestic relationship: Section 2(f)

Two conditions must both be met. First, a living-together condition: the two persons live, or have at any point of time lived, together in a shared household. Second, a relationship condition, satisfied by any one of five bases:

1. Consanguinity: blood relations such as mother and son, brother and sister, father and daughter.
2. Marriage: husband and wife, and relations by marriage such as daughter-in-law and mother-in-law.
3. Relationship in the nature of marriage: a live-in relationship having the attributes of marriage.
4. Adoption: adoptive parents and children.
5. Joint family: family members living together as a joint family, even if the precise relationship does not fall within the other heads.

The phrase 'relationship in the nature of marriage' has been explained in two leading cases. In D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, the Court likened it to a common law marriage and required that the couple (a) hold themselves out to society as akin to spouses, (b) be of legal age to marry, (c) be otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage (for example, both unmarried), and (d) have voluntarily cohabited for a significant period. It added that a 'keep' maintained for sexual purposes or as a servant would not qualify, and that merely spending weekends together or a one-night stand would not create a domestic relationship. In Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755, the Court gave further guidelines: duration of the relationship, shared household, pooling of resources and financial arrangements, domestic arrangements, sexual relationship, children, socialisation in public and the intention and conduct of the parties. It held that a woman who knowingly entered a relationship with a married man was not in a relationship in the nature of marriage, though it urged Parliament to protect such women.

3.2 Shared household: Section 2(s)

This is the most litigated definition, because it fixes the scope of the right to reside under Section 17 and of residence orders under Section 19. Its core is the factual question where the woman lives or has lived in a domestic relationship; ownership is expressly made irrelevant by the concluding words 'irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interest'.

Two further decisions complete the picture. In Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90, the Court held that a woman in a domestic relationship has a right to reside in the shared household even if she has not actually resided there, and that the relationship need not subsist when relief is sought. In S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District, (2021) 15 SCC 730, it held that a summary eviction order under the Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be used to defeat a daughter-in-law's right to reside under the DV Act; the two statutes must be harmonised.

4. The Wrong: Domestic Violence and Dowry

Section 2(g) is a referential definition: the substance lies in Section 3, which treats as domestic violence any act, omission, commission or conduct of the respondent that (a) harms, injures or endangers the health, safety, life, limb or well-being (mental or physical) of the aggrieved person, including physical, sexual, verbal and emotional, and economic abuse; (b) harasses her with a view to coerce her or her relatives to meet an unlawful demand for dowry or other property; (c) threatens her or her relatives by such conduct; or (d) otherwise injures or causes her physical or mental harm. Explanation II directs that the overall facts and circumstances of the case be considered. Section 3 will be studied as a separate topic.

Section 2(h) borrows the definition of dowry from Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961: any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given, directly or indirectly, by one party to a marriage to the other, or by the parents of either party or any other person to either party or any other person, at or before or any time after the marriage, in connection with the marriage, but excluding dower or mahr where the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) applies. The link matters because dowry harassment is an express form of domestic violence under Section 3(b).

5. The Orders: Five Reliefs Defined by Reference

Five definitions describe the reliefs a Magistrate may grant. Each points to an operative section, so that the definition gives the name and the section gives the content:

Two points deserve emphasis. First, monetary relief is defined as 'compensation' to meet expenses and losses, but Section 20(1)(d) expressly includes maintenance for the aggrieved person and her children, which may be in addition to maintenance under Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS). In Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324, the Supreme Court required affidavits of disclosure of assets and liabilities in all maintenance proceedings, including under the DV Act, and directed that amounts awarded in earlier proceedings be taken into account to avoid overlapping awards. Second, monetary relief is claimed against the respondent, who may be a relative: in Ajay Kumar v. Lata alias Sharuti, (2019) 15 SCC 352, the Court upheld an interim direction to a brother-in-law to pay maintenance to his deceased brother's widow, as they had lived in a joint family and shared a family business.

6. The Machinery: Magistrate, Protection Officer and Support Services

6.1 Magistrate: Section 2(i)

The Act deliberately chose the criminal court closest to the people, rather than a civil court or Family Court, because it is accessible and can enforce orders. Since the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 replaced the CrPC from 1 July 2024, references to the CrPC are read as references to the BNSS; as the BNSS does not retain a separate class of Metropolitan Magistrates, the forum is in practice the Judicial Magistrate of the first class. The territorial options in this clause are expanded by Section 27, which adds the place where she carries on business or is employed and where the cause of action arose.

6.2 Protection Officer: Section 2(n)

A Protection Officer is an officer appointed by the State Government under Section 8(1). Section 8 requires the State to appoint such number of Protection Officers in each district as it considers necessary, and provides that they shall as far as possible be women with the qualifications prescribed by the Rules. Their duties under Section 9 include assisting the Magistrate, making the domestic incident report, ensuring legal aid, maintaining lists of service providers and shelter homes, arranging medical examination, and ensuring compliance with monetary orders. Section 30 deems them public servants, and Section 33 penalises a failure or refusal to discharge duties without sufficient cause.

6.3 Domestic incident report: Section 2(e)

The DIR is prepared in Form I under the Rules of 2006 and records the incidents, the persons involved, the assistance needed and the documents attached. Section 12(1) proviso requires the Magistrate, before passing an order, to take into consideration any DIR received from the Protection Officer or service provider. In Prabha Tyagi (2022), the Supreme Court held that the DIR is not a mandatory precondition: the Magistrate must consider it if one has been filed, but may proceed on the application without it.

6.4 Service provider, medical facility and shelter home: Sections 2(r), 2(j) and 2(t)

A service provider is an entity registered under Section 10(1): a voluntary association, company or other body aiming to protect women's rights by lawful means, including legal aid, medical, financial or other assistance. It may record a DIR, get the woman medically examined, and ensure she is given shelter. A medical facility and a shelter home are facilities notified by the State Government for the purposes of the Act. Under Sections 6 and 7, a shelter home must provide shelter, and a medical facility must provide medical aid, when requested on behalf of the aggrieved person; a medical facility cannot refuse aid merely because no DIR has been made.

7. Formal Definitions: Notification and Prescribed

Section 2(l) defines 'notification' as a notification published in the Official Gazette, and Section 2(m) defines 'prescribed' as prescribed by rules made under this Act. The rule-making power is in Section 37, under which the Central Government made the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Rules, 2006. These formal clauses matter in practice: forms for the DIR (Form I), the application (Form II), the affidavit for interim and ex parte orders (Form III), the Protection Officer's qualifications (Rule 3) and the registration of service providers are all 'prescribed' by the Rules.

8. All Twenty Definitions at a Glance

9. Statutory Interpretation of the Definitions

Several interpretive techniques are visible in the case law on Section 2:

• Purposive and beneficial construction: the definitions are read to advance the remedy (V.D. Bhanot, Prabha Tyagi, Satish Chander Ahuja).
• 'Means' versus 'means and includes': 'means' is ordinarily exhaustive, and 'includes' extends. Section 2(s) uses both, and in Satish Chander Ahuja the Court read the definition as exhaustive while giving full effect to its extending words, which expressly make title irrelevant.
• Referential definitions: clauses (c), (d), (g), (h), (n), (o), (p) and (r) import the content of other provisions; the operative section controls.
• Severance and reading down under Article 14: in Hiral Harsora, the Court severed 'adult male' from Section 2(q) instead of striking down the whole definition, applying the doctrine of severability.
• Ordinary meaning of undefined words: 'woman', 'family' and 'lived' are not defined; courts give them their natural meaning in the context of the Act ('lived' implying some permanency, per Satish Chander Ahuja).
• Updating construction: references to the CrPC are read as references to the BNSS by virtue of the General Clauses Act and the repeal and savings clause of the BNSS.
• Harmonious construction across statutes: S. Vanitha harmonised the right of residence with the Senior Citizens Act; Rajnesh v. Neha harmonised maintenance under different statutes.

10. Practical Importance of the Definitions

In practice, the definitions decide maintainability, and maintainability objections are the respondent's first line of defence. The applicant's pleading must therefore establish, with specific facts:

1. that she is a woman in a present or past domestic relationship with each respondent (who lived where, when, and how they are related);
2. the shared household (address, period of residence, ownership if known, and whether it is joint family property);
3. specific acts of domestic violence by each respondent, with dates, since vague and omnibus allegations against distant relatives are frequently struck out;
4. the reliefs sought under the correct sections (18 to 22), and interim relief under Section 23 with an affidavit; and
5. the jurisdiction of the Magistrate under Sections 2(i) and 27.

For the respondent, the usual objections are: no domestic relationship (never lived together, or a casual relationship not in the nature of marriage); the premises are not a shared household (a flying visit, not residence); the respondent is a relative who never shared the household; or the proceedings are an abuse of process. Each of these is a Section 2 argument.

11. Related Topics and Provisions