Duties of Police and Other Authorities: Section 5 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005

A right is only as good as the woman's knowledge of it. Most women who suffer domestic violence reach a police station, if they reach anyone at all, without a lawyer and without any idea of what the law offers. Section 5 meets that moment: it commands every official who receives a complaint of domestic violence, police officer, Protection Officer, service provider or Magistrate, to tell the woman, then and there, what she can claim, who can help her, and that legal aid is free. It also preserves, in a crucial proviso, the police officer's ordinary duty to act on a cognizable offence. This note explains the duty, its content, and what follows when it is ignored.

1. The Text of Section 5

The reference to Section 498A IPC is now read as a reference to Sections 85 and 86 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which replace it. The duty is cast in mandatory language, 'shall inform', and it arises in three situations: when a complaint is received, when the official is present at the place of an incident, and when an incident is reported to him.

2. Who Owes the Duty

Four functionaries owe the duty, and each encounters the woman at a different door:

• The police officer, usually the first point of contact, at the police station or at the scene. The duty attaches to any police officer who receives the complaint, whatever its form: an FIR, a general diary entry, a call, or an oral grievance.
• The Protection Officer, the Act's own machinery, to whom complaints come directly or by referral.
• The service provider, a registered voluntary organisation under Section 10, often the first place a frightened woman turns.
• The Magistrate, before whom a complaint or application may land first, for example in a maintenance or criminal proceeding where domestic violence surfaces.

The duty is personal and immediate: it is discharged by informing the woman at the time of contact, not by leaving her to discover her rights later. The Rules reinforce it: Rule 5 requires complaints of domestic violence to be recorded in the domestic incident report, and the forms themselves list the reliefs so that the act of recording educates the complainant.

3. What the Woman Must Be Told

3.1 The five reliefs

Clause (a) requires the official to explain that she may apply for a protection order (Section 18), a residence order (Section 19), monetary relief (Section 20), a custody order (Section 21) and a compensation order (Section 22), or more than one such order. The last words matter: women are often told, wrongly, to choose one remedy. The Act's scheme is cumulative, and interim versions of each order are available under Section 23.

3.2 The support network

Clauses (b) and (c) point her to the service providers and Protection Officers in the district, with whom shelter (Section 6), medical aid (Section 7) and help in drafting and filing the application lie. The Protection Officer must maintain and share the list of service providers, shelter homes and medical facilities (Section 9(1)(e)).

3.3 Free legal services

Clause (d) informs her of her right to free legal services under the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987. Every woman is entitled to legal aid under Section 12(c) of that Act irrespective of income. In We the Women of India v. Union of India (20 May 2025), the Supreme Court directed NALSA and the State, District and Taluka Legal Services Authorities to ensure that free legal aid and advice is actually available to aggrieved persons, and directed wide publicity to the Act's provisions.

3.4 The criminal route

Clause (e) requires her to be told that she may also file a criminal complaint for cruelty (Sections 85 and 86 BNS), 'wherever relevant'. The word 'also' encapsulates Section 36: the civil and criminal remedies are cumulative, and choosing one forfeits nothing.

4. The Proviso: Police Duty on Cognizable Offences

The proviso preserves the ordinary criminal law: nothing in the Act relieves a police officer of the duty to proceed in accordance with law upon receipt of information as to the commission of a cognizable offence. Its consequences:

1. The DV Act is not a diversion. Police cannot tell a woman that her complaint of beating or dowry harassment is 'a DV matter' to be pursued only before the Magistrate. If the facts disclose a cognizable offence, cruelty, hurt, criminal breach of trust of stridhan, sexual offences, the officer must register and investigate under Section 173 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (former Section 154 CrPC), as Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1, mandates for cognizable offences.
2. Arrest safeguards still apply. In cruelty cases, the Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2014) 8 SCC 273 guidelines govern arrest; the duty to act is not a duty to arrest mechanically.
3. Two tracks from one complaint. A single visit to the police station may thus properly generate an FIR on the criminal side and a referral to the Protection Officer on the civil side.

5. The Police Response in Practice

Beyond Section 5, the police interface with the Act at several points: they receive copies of the domestic incident report (Section 9(1)(b)); the Magistrate may direct the officer in charge of the nearest police station to give protection to the woman or to assist in the implementation of orders (Section 19(5) and (7)); breach of a protection order is a cognizable and non-bailable offence (Sections 31 and 32) which the police must register and investigate; and many States have women help desks and special cells that coordinate with Protection Officers. The recurring failures, refusing to record complaints, treating domestic violence as a private matter, counselling 'compromise' instead of informing rights, are precisely what Section 5 legislates against.

6. Consequences of Failure to Inform

Section 5 creates a duty without prescribing a penalty of its own, but a breach is far from toothless:

• Departmental accountability. For police officers, failure to perform a statutory duty is misconduct inviting departmental action; superior officers and State Governments answer for systemic failure, and constitutional courts have entertained petitions over non-implementation.
• Protection Officers act 'under the control and supervision of the Magistrate' (Section 9(2)), and a failure or refusal to discharge duties as directed by the Magistrate is an offence under Section 33, punishable with imprisonment up to one year or fine up to twenty thousand rupees or both (prosecution requiring the State's sanction under Section 34).
• No prejudice to the woman. Her rights do not depend on being informed: an application under Section 12 lies regardless, a domestic incident report is not a precondition (Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90), and no limitation bars her application.
• Judicial supervision. In We the Women of India (2025), the Supreme Court treated the information and support duties as part of the Act's guarantee, directing States to appoint Protection Officers, register service providers, notify shelter homes and publicise the Act, precisely because rights unknown are rights denied.

7. Related Topics and Provisions