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Domestic Violence Act

Relationship in the Nature of Marriage and Live-In Relationships under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005

The DV Act was one of the first Indian statutes to extend legal protection beyond marriage. By including a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' within the definition of domestic relationship, it allows a woman in a live-in relationship to seek protection, residence, maintenance and compensation. But not every relationship between a man and a woman who live together qualifies. The Supreme Court has drawn the line in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma (2013), and in Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka (2026) it has carried the same concept into the criminal law of cruelty. This note explains what qualifies, what does not, and what remedies follow.

1. Relationship in the Nature of Marriage

Section 2(f) recognises a domestic relationship between two persons who live or have lived together in a shared household when they are related 'through a relationship in the nature of marriage'. The phrase is not defined. The words 'in the nature of' indicate that the relationship need not be a legal marriage, but must resemble one in its essential character: a stable, exclusive, cohabiting partnership in which the parties conduct themselves as spouses. The Act thus protects women who are in marriage-like relationships without the formal status of a wife, a situation that, before 2005, left them without remedy for violence, eviction or abandonment.

2. Live-In Relationships in Indian Law

A live-in relationship is an arrangement in which two adults live together without marriage. Indian law does not treat such a relationship as illegal or immoral. In Lata Singh v. State of U.P., (2006) 5 SCC 475, the Supreme Court held that adults are free to live with whomever they choose; in S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600, it held that a live-in relationship between consenting adults is not an offence; and in Nandakumar v. State of Kerala, (2018) 16 SCC 602, it recognised the right of adults to live together even without marriage. Long cohabitation may also give rise to a presumption of marriage (Badri Prasad v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1978) 3 SCC 527; Tulsa v. Durghatiya, (2008) 4 SCC 520; Kattukandi Edathil Krishnan v. Kattukandi Edathil Valsan (2022)), now under Section 119 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023. But live-in relationships range from casual arrangements to lifelong partnerships, and only some of them are 'in the nature of marriage'.

At the State level, the Uniform Civil Code of Uttarakhand Act, 2024, in force from January 2025, requires registration of live-in relationships in that State, treats children of such relationships as legitimate, and allows a woman deserted by her live-in partner to claim maintenance. It operates only in Uttarakhand and does not alter the DV Act tests.

3. Distinction from Legal Marriage

Basis

Legal marriage

Relationship in the nature of marriage

Formation

Solemnisation according to personal law or Special Marriage Act; registration

Conduct: cohabitation with marital attributes

Status

Husband and wife in law

Partners; not spouses in law

Ending

Divorce or death; court decree

Parting of ways; no decree needed

Succession

Spouse inherits under personal law

No spousal inheritance (children may have rights)

DV Act

Covered as 'marriage'

Covered if Velusamy and Indra Sarma tests are met

Maintenance under Section 144 BNSS

Available to 'wife'

Not settled; wider reading referred to larger Bench (Chanmuniya, 2011)

Section 498A IPC / Sections 85 and 86 BNS

Applies

Applies where relationship is in the nature of marriage with intent to marry (Lokesh B.H., 2026)

The crucial difference is that marriage is a status created by a legal act, while a relationship in the nature of marriage is a fact proved by conduct. That is why proof matters so much in live-in cases.

4. D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal

📖 D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469 (Markandey Katju and T.S. Thakur, JJ.)

Facts: The respondent claimed maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, asserting that she had married the appellant and lived with him for some years. He contended that he was already married to another woman, who had not been heard. The courts below granted maintenance.

Held: The Supreme Court set aside the orders and remanded the matter, since the first wife had not been heard. Discussing the DV Act, it held that a 'relationship in the nature of marriage' is akin to a common law marriage, which requires that: (a) the couple hold themselves out to society as being akin to spouses; (b) they are of legal age to marry; (c) they are otherwise qualified to enter into a legal marriage, including being unmarried; and (d) they have voluntarily cohabited and held themselves out as akin to spouses for a significant period of time. They must also have lived together in a shared household.

Observation: Not all live-in relationships qualify. A man who keeps a woman for sexual purposes or as a servant, or a relationship consisting merely of weekends together or a one-night stand, does not create a domestic relationship.

The judgment's reference to a 'keep' has been criticised as demeaning; the Supreme Court's Handbook on Combating Gender Stereotypes (2023) discourages such language. The substance of the four tests, however, remains the law.

✦ Mnemonic for Velusamy: 'HALT'

Holding out as spouses; Age (legal age to marry); Legal capacity (otherwise qualified, for example unmarried); Time (voluntary cohabitation for a significant period). Coaching analogy: a live-in relationship must HALT at each of these four checkpoints before it enters the DV Act.

5. Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma

📖 Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755 (K.S. Radhakrishnan and Pinaki Chandra Ghose, JJ.)

Facts: The appellant, an unmarried woman, lived with the respondent for about eighteen years, knowing that he was married and had children. After he ended the relationship, she sought maintenance under the DV Act. The Magistrate and the Sessions Court granted relief; the High Court set it aside.

Held: The relationship was not a relationship in the nature of marriage. The appellant knew the respondent was married, and his marriage subsisted; the relationship did not have the essential character of a marriage and she could not be treated as a wife-like partner. Holding otherwise would injure the legally wedded wife and children. The appeal was dismissed.

Guidelines: The Court listed indicative tests: duration of the relationship; shared household; pooling of resources and financial arrangements; domestic arrangements; sexual relationship (for companionship and procreation, not merely pleasure); children; socialisation in public as husband and wife; and the intention and conduct of the parties.

Recommendation: Recognising that women in such relationships are often vulnerable, the Court urged Parliament to consider legislation to protect them and their children.

✦ Mnemonic for Indra Sarma's eight guidelines: 'Dear Sita Please Don't Stay Clever, Stay Intentional'

Duration; Shared household; Pooling of resources; Domestic arrangements; Sexual relationship; Children; Socialisation in public; Intention and conduct. Coaching analogy: Velusamy's four tests are the entry gate; Indra Sarma's eight guidelines are the checklist used to assess the relationship as a whole.

6. Characteristics of a Domestic Partnership

6.1 Duration and stability

There is no fixed minimum period, but the relationship must be reasonably long and continuous to show commitment. A few weeks or months of cohabitation will rarely suffice; several years of stable life together usually will. Stability also implies exclusivity: a relationship in which the man divides his time between several households is less likely to qualify.

6.2 Holding out as spouses

The parties must present themselves to family, neighbours, employers and society as husband and wife or as a committed couple equivalent to spouses. Evidence includes introducing each other as spouses, joint attendance at family events, documents naming the partner as spouse or nominee, and the perception of the community.

6.3 Legal capacity

Both parties must be of legal age to marry and otherwise qualified: neither should be married to someone else, and they should not be within prohibited degrees of relationship. This requirement is what excluded the appellant in Indra Sarma.

6.4 Financial and domestic arrangements

Pooling of resources (joint accounts, jointly acquired property, long-term investments, the man's financial support of the woman and children) and domestic arrangements (running the home together, the woman managing the household) indicate a marriage-like partnership. Mere sharing of rent between flatmates does not.

6.5 Children

Having children together is a strong indication of a long-term, marriage-like relationship. Independently of the DV Act, the Supreme Court has recognised that children born of long cohabitation may inherit, and children of void and voidable marriages have been held entitled to share in their parents' property (Revanasiddappa v. Mallikarjun, 2023).

7. Casual Relationships and Relationships Involving Married Persons

7.1 Casual relationships

Casual relationships, such as dating, occasional cohabitation, weekend arrangements or a purely sexual relationship, are not in the nature of marriage (Velusamy). The woman in such a relationship may have other remedies (criminal law for assault or cheating, civil law for property) but not under the DV Act, because there is no domestic relationship.

7.2 Relationships involving married persons

Where the man is already married and the woman knows it, the relationship does not qualify (Indra Sarma): the parties lack legal capacity, and the law will not treat a second, parallel relationship as marriage-like at the cost of the lawful wife. The position is different where the woman was deceived into believing that the man was unmarried or that she was his lawful wife. In Indra Sarma itself, the Court indicated that such a woman may be protected, and the same distinction was reiterated in Lokesh B.H. (2026). A woman who went through a ceremony of marriage that turns out to be void may likewise rely on the relationship in the nature of marriage, subject to proof of good faith.

⚠ Key point

If a woman knowingly enters a relationship with a married man, it is not a relationship in the nature of marriage (Indra Sarma). If she was deceived about his marital status, protection may attach, and Parliament has been urged to legislate for women in such relationships.

8. Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka (2026): The Criminal Law Dimension

📖 Lokesh B.H. v. State of Karnataka, 2026 INSC 784 (August 2026)

Facts: The complainant alleged cruelty under Section 498A IPC. The appellant denied any valid marriage and argued that Section 498A, which speaks of a 'husband', could not apply. The Karnataka High Court refused to quash the proceedings, finding that the relationship was in the nature of marriage.

Held: Section 498A applies to live-in relationships that qualify as relationships in the nature of marriage between consenting adults with an intent to marry. The word 'husband' must receive a purposive construction to include a partner in a void or voidable marriage and in a relationship in the nature of marriage. Not every live-in relationship qualifies; the Indra Sarma indicators apply, and a woman who knowingly entered a relationship with a married man is not protected.

Significance: The DV Act gives civil remedies; the criminal law of cruelty serves a distinct deterrent purpose. Sections 85 and 86 BNS reproduce Section 498A, so the reasoning is expected to apply to them as well.

9. Available Remedies

Once a relationship in the nature of marriage is established, the woman is an aggrieved person and her partner (and, after Hiral P. Harsora, his relatives who shared the household) a respondent. She can claim all the reliefs available to a wife:

  • Protection orders (Section 18): restraining further violence, contact and alienation of assets.
  • Residence (Sections 17 and 19): the right to reside in the shared household in which she lived with her partner, and residence orders restraining dispossession or directing alternative accommodation or rent.
  • Monetary relief and maintenance (Section 20): expenses, losses and maintenance for herself and the children.
  • Custody (Section 21) of children, and compensation (Section 22) for injuries including mental torture and emotional distress.
  • Interim and ex parte orders (Section 23).

9.1 Residence

The shared household is defined by where she lived with her partner in the relationship, irrespective of who owns it (Section 2(s); Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414). Where the partner has left and the house belongs to him, she may be protected from dispossession; alternatively the Magistrate may direct him to secure alternative accommodation of the same level or to pay rent under Section 19(1)(f).

9.2 Maintenance

The DV Act is often the only route to maintenance for a live-in partner, since Section 125 CrPC (now Section 144 BNSS) speaks of a 'wife'. In Chanmuniya v. Virendra Kumar Singh Kushwaha, (2011) 1 SCC 141, the Supreme Court favoured a broad reading of 'wife' where a man and woman had lived together as husband and wife, and referred the question to a larger Bench. In Lalita Toppo v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 13 SCC 796, a three-Judge Bench observed that even if a woman in a live-in relationship cannot claim under Section 125, she can claim maintenance and other reliefs under the DV Act, which is a more effective remedy. The quantum follows the principles in Rajnesh v. Neha, (2021) 2 SCC 324.

10. Proof of the Relationship

Because a relationship in the nature of marriage is a matter of fact, the woman must prove it by evidence that maps onto the Velusamy and Indra Sarma tests: documents showing a common address over a period; joint accounts, leases or property; photographs and correspondence; the partner naming her as spouse or nominee in official records; children's birth certificates naming both parents; and testimony of neighbours, relatives and colleagues that they lived as husband and wife. Long cohabitation may raise a presumption of marriage under Section 119 BSA, which, even if rebutted as to legal marriage, supports the finding of a marriage-like relationship. On the other side, the respondent will seek to show a subsisting marriage known to her, the casual or intermittent nature of the relationship, or separate households.

✦ Coaching analogy: 'a marriage without the certificate, but with everything else'

A relationship in the nature of marriage is a marriage without the certificate, but with everything else: the shared home, the shared money, the shared life, the public face as a couple, and the freedom of both to marry. Take away any of the big pieces (especially the freedom to marry), and it becomes an ordinary relationship outside the Act.

11. Related Topics and Provisions

Topic or provision

Connection

Domestic relationship and aggrieved person (Topics 3 and 5)

The third base in Section 2(f); live-in partner as aggrieved person

Respondent (Topic 4)

Male partner and his relatives

Sections 17, 19 and 20: residence and monetary relief

Principal remedies for live-in partners

Sections 85 and 86 BNS

Criminal remedy for cruelty after Lokesh B.H.