Respondent under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005: Section 2(q) after Hiral P. Harsora

If the aggrieved person is the one who seeks protection, the respondent is the one against whom protection is sought. As enacted in 2005, the Act allowed a woman to proceed only against an adult male, with a limited exception for the husband's or male partner's relatives. That restriction was struck down in Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora (2016). Today, any person, man or woman, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person can be a respondent. This note traces that change and explains who can, and who cannot, be made a respondent.

1. Meaning of Respondent

The respondent is the person against whom the aggrieved person has sought relief under the Act. Every operative relief is framed against the respondent: a protection order prohibits the respondent from committing domestic violence (Section 18), a residence order restrains the respondent from dispossessing her (Section 19), monetary relief is paid by the respondent (Section 20), and compensation is ordered against the respondent (Section 22). Identifying the right respondents is therefore a matter of substance, not form: an order is only as effective as the persons it binds.

2. The Original Statutory Definition

The original definition had three features. First, the main part confined respondents to adult males. Second, it required a present or past domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. Third, the proviso created an exception in favour of only two classes of aggrieved persons, a wife and a female live-in partner, allowing them to proceed against relatives of the husband or male partner. In Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade, (2011) 3 SCC 650, the Supreme Court held that the word 'relative' in the proviso is not confined to male relatives, so a wife could proceed against her mother-in-law and sisters-in-law.

The defects were obvious. A mother ill-treated by her son and daughter-in-law, or a widow harassed by her sisters-in-law, could not proceed against the women involved, because the proviso was available only to a wife or live-in partner. And an abuser could evade the Act entirely by getting a female relative or a minor to do the harm.

3. Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora

3.1 Invalidation of the 'adult male' restriction

The Court reasoned in three steps. First, the object of the Act, gathered from its Statement of Objects and Reasons and its long title, is to protect women from violence 'of any kind' occurring within the family. Second, several provisions of the Act itself assumed that women could be perpetrators: for example, the proviso to Section 19(1) says that no order under clause (b) (removal from the shared household) shall be passed against any person who is a woman, which would be meaningless if women could never be respondents. Third, confining respondents to adult males produced absurd results: a widow thrown out by her mother-in-law, or a mother abused by her daughter-in-law, would be without remedy. Applying the doctrine of severability, the Court deleted only the offending words.

3.2 Present text, read after Hiral Harsora

4. Female Respondents

After Hiral Harsora, a woman may be a respondent in her own right, and not merely as a 'relative' of the husband. The Act nonetheless retains one important protection for female respondents: under the proviso to Section 19(1), a residence order under clause (b), directing the respondent to remove herself from the shared household, cannot be passed against a woman. Other residence orders (restraining dispossession, restraining entry into a portion used by the aggrieved person, restraining alienation) may be passed against her. Protection orders, monetary relief and compensation may also be passed against female respondents where the facts justify them.

5. Particular Categories of Respondents

5.1 Husband

The husband is the principal respondent in most cases. He is related by marriage and ordinarily shares the matrimonial home. He bears the primary obligation to maintain his wife and children, so monetary relief is usually claimed against him.

5.2 Former husband

A former husband remains a respondent for domestic violence committed during the marriage, because Section 2(q), like Section 2(a), uses the words 'is, or has been' in a domestic relationship. In Juveria Abdul Majid Patni v. Atif Iqbal Mansoori, (2014) 10 SCC 736, the Supreme Court held that a subsequent divorce (including by talaq) does not absolve the husband of liability for domestic violence already committed. But a divorced husband cannot be made a respondent for his conduct after the relationship has ended, and proceedings long after a mutual consent divorce may be an abuse of process (Inderjit Singh Grewal v. State of Punjab, (2011) 12 SCC 588).

5.3 Mother-in-law and sister-in-law

The mother-in-law and sister-in-law are the most common female respondents. Even before Hiral Harsora, a wife could proceed against them under the proviso (Sandhya Manoj Wankhade). After Hiral Harsora, they can be respondents at the instance of any aggrieved person with whom they share or shared the household, for example a widowed daughter-in-law or the husband's sister. The key requirement is that they lived in the shared household with the aggrieved person at some point of time; a married sister-in-law living in another city with her own family cannot be joined merely because she is a relative.

5.4 Father-in-law and brother-in-law

The father-in-law and brother-in-law, as adult males, were always capable of being respondents if in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, typically in a joint family. The father-in-law is often the owner of the matrimonial home, so residence orders operate against him; after Satish Chander Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja, (2021) 1 SCC 414, a house owned by in-laws in which the wife lived with her husband is a shared household. A brother-in-law may be liable for monetary relief where the family lived jointly and shared resources: in Ajay Kumar v. Lata alias Sharuti, (2019) 15 SCC 352, the Supreme Court declined to interfere with an interim order directing a deceased husband's brother to pay maintenance to the widow, since they had lived in a joint family and he ran the family business.

5.5 Live-in partner

A male partner in a relationship in the nature of marriage is a respondent, since Section 2(f) includes such relationships. Whether a particular live-in relationship qualifies is decided on the tests in D. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal, (2010) 10 SCC 469, and Indra Sarma v. V.K.V. Sarma, (2013) 15 SCC 755 (see Topic 6). After Hiral Harsora, the partner's relatives who lived in the shared household may also be respondents.

5.6 Blood relatives and others

A son, daughter, brother, sister, father or other blood relative may be a respondent where the aggrieved person (for example a mother, sister or daughter) shares or shared a household with them. In principle, after Hiral Harsora, even a person below eighteen may be a respondent, though courts would rarely proceed against a minor, and the Act's reliefs are designed with adults in mind.

6. Multiple Respondents

An aggrieved person may join several respondents in a single application, and in matrimonial cases this is common. But three principles restrain over-inclusion:

1. Each respondent must independently satisfy Section 2(q): each must be or have been in a domestic relationship with her, which requires having lived together in a shared household at some point of time.
2. Specific allegations against each: the application must attribute particular acts of domestic violence to each respondent. The Supreme Court has repeatedly deprecated general and omnibus allegations against the husband's relatives in matrimonial disputes (for example Kahkashan Kausar v. State of Bihar, (2022) 6 SCC 599, in the context of Section 498A), and the same approach guides courts under the DV Act.
3. Relief tailored to each respondent: a protection order may bind all respondents; a residence order will usually operate against those who control the household; monetary relief primarily lies against the husband, and against other relatives only where the facts (such as a joint family with shared income) justify it.

Where relatives are joined without a real basis, the High Court may intervene. In Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 INSC 734, the Supreme Court held that the High Court's inherent power under Section 482 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS) extends to DV Act proceedings, but must be exercised sparingly, only in cases of gross illegality or abuse of process.

7. Domestic Relationship Requirement

The definition does not reach every relative, only one who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person. Section 2(f) requires that the two persons live or have, at any point of time, lived together in a shared household and are related in one of the five recognised ways. Two consequences follow. First, relatives who never lived with her (for example a brother-in-law settled abroad, or a married sister-in-law living with her own family) are not respondents, however much they are alleged to have instigated the husband. Second, persons outside the family (such as a friend, employer or neighbour) are never respondents, though a protection order may restrain the respondent from acting through others. The domestic relationship requirement is discussed in full in Topic 5.

8. Present Scope of Section 2(q)

The present position can be summarised in six propositions:

1. A respondent may be any person, male or female (Hiral Harsora, 2016).
2. The respondent must be or have been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, which includes past relationships (Juveria; Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi, (2022) 8 SCC 90).
3. The respondent must be a natural person within the family circle; the Act does not provide for reliefs against the State, a company or an outsider as respondent.
4. Specific acts of domestic violence must be alleged against each respondent.
5. No order under Section 19(1)(b) (removal from the shared household) may be passed against a woman.
6. Breach of a protection order by any respondent, male or female, is an offence under Section 31.

9. Related Topics and Provisions