Section 3(1)(r): Intentional Insult or Intimidation in Public View

Caste humiliation has always needed an audience. The point of a public insult is to lower a person in the eyes of the village, to remind everyone watching where he is supposed to stand. Clause (r) of Section 3(1) punishes exactly that: an intentional insult or intimidation of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe member, meant to humiliate, in a place within public view. It is among the most litigated clauses of the Act, because each of its words carries weight. This note takes the clause apart word by word, explains the settled meaning of 'public view', traces the line from Swaran Singh to Hitesh Verma, Shajan Skaria and Karuppudayar, and ends with online statements, where the law is still being written.

Figure 1: Section 3(1)(r): the five-gate test

1. The Statutory Text

The wording is identical to clause (x) of the original 1989 Act. The 2015 Amendment Act renumbered it as (r) and placed a separate offence of abuse by caste name beside it as clause (s). Judgments on old clause (x), such as Swaran Singh (2008), therefore apply directly to clause (r), and later cases such as Hitesh Verma (2020) apply the same tests to the renumbered clause.

2. The Ingredients, Word by Word

• Accused not a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The opening words of Section 3(1) apply. A member of either group who insults another member is outside the clause, though the general law still applies.
• Victim a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. The complaint must say so, and the prosecution must prove it by a caste certificate or other reliable evidence. A complaint that does not plead the basic ingredients fails at the threshold: in Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. (2008), the complaint did not even say that the accused was outside these communities or that he acted with intent to humiliate in public view.
• Intentional insult. An insult is conduct or words that lower the dignity or self-respect of a person. The word 'intentionally' excludes accidental, careless or thoughtless remarks.
• Intentional intimidation. The Act does not define intimidation. It carries its ordinary meaning of putting a person in fear, by threat or show of power, to cow him down. Whether it must amount to a threat of injury in the sense of BNS Section 351 is not settled; what is clear is that the conduct must be deliberate.
• With intent to humiliate. A second mental element, over and above the intention to insult or intimidate. The purpose must be to humiliate the victim, and the Supreme Court has tied that humiliation to caste identity (Part 3 below).
• In any place within public view. The act must happen where members of the public can see or hear it. This is a separate ingredient, and its absence alone defeats the charge (Part 4 below).

3. Intent to Humiliate and the Caste Link

Is mere insult sufficient?

No. An insult, even a coarse one, becomes an atrocity only when it is directed at the victim because of caste. The Supreme Court put it plainly in Hitesh Verma: 'All insults or intimidations to a person will not be an offence under the Act unless such insult or intimidation is on account of victim belonging to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.' In Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v. State of U.P. (2023) the Court added that calling someone an idiot, a fool or a thief in public 'may not be sufficient ... unless such words are laced with casteist remarks'.

Must the insult be because of caste?

• Yes, after Shajan Skaria (2024). The Court held that the phrase 'intent to humiliate' is inextricably linked to the caste identity of the victim. Mere knowledge that the victim is a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe member is not enough.
• What caste-based humiliation looks like. An insult or intimidation that springs from untouchability, or that reinforces historically entrenched ideas of the superiority of some castes over others. Telling a Dalit to leave a common well because of who he is, or publicly mocking a tribal woman's origins, fits. A heated exchange over a water pipe, in which caste plays no part, does not.
• A caste name is not a textual requirement of (r). Unlike clause (s), clause (r) does not require the use of a caste name. But in practice, the words, gestures or context must show that the victim's caste was the target.
• Proof of intent. Intent is inferred from the words used, the setting, the audience, the history between the parties, and whether caste was mentioned or implied. A prior civil dispute does not rule out caste intent, but it makes the court look harder for it.

4. Place within Public View

Figure 2: Public place and public view are different questions

Public view is not the same as public place

Parliament chose the words 'place within public view', not 'public place'. In Swaran Singh v. State (2008) the Supreme Court drew the distinction that governs every case since. A public place ordinarily means a place owned or leased by the Government or a municipality, or otherwise open to the public. A place within public view is one where the public can see or hear what happens, and, as the Court put it, a place can be private and yet within public view. It follows from this reasoning that what matters is the presence of the public, so even an open road may not suffice if no one else is there to see or hear.

Private place capable of being within public view

• The lawn and the gate. A courtyard, verandah, gate or lawn visible from the road or lane is within public view, even though it is private property (Swaran Singh).
• A room with outsiders present. A house, shop or office becomes a place within public view if independent members of the public are present and can see or hear.
• Numbers do not matter. A small number of independent persons suffices. In Daya Bhatnagar v. State (Delhi High Court, 2004), the court held that the public persons may be few, 'howsoever small' their number, but they must be independent and impartial, not interested in or closely related to either party.

Incidents inside a house or office

• House. Abuse inside the complainant's or the accused's house, heard only by the parties and their families, is not within public view (Hitesh Verma, 2020; Sohanvir v. State of U.P., 2025). In Gunjan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2026 INSC 468, the Court said a residential house does not become a place within public view unless it is within the public gaze.
• Office chamber. Words spoken inside a closed office chamber before any colleague or visitor arrives are not within public view (Karuppudayar, 2025).
• Open office or counter. An office hall or public counter where visitors are present is different; if they can hear, the place is within public view. The question is always factual.

Friends and relatives versus members of the public

The phrase 'not merely relatives or friends' in Swaran Singh has become the working rule. Family members of the complainant, his friends and his companions are not the public for this purpose, because the clause is about humiliation before the community at large, and because such witnesses are interested. Independent neighbours, passers-by, customers, other villagers and co-workers who are not aligned with either side are the public. The FIR or at least the charge-sheet should name them.

5. Quashing Where an Ingredient Is Absent

• Pleading. The FIR need not be an encyclopaedia, but the utterances made in public view should be outlined at least in the charge-sheet (Ramesh Chandra Vaishya, 2023). A bare recital that the accused 'abused by caste' does not suffice.
• The Section 18 bar gives way. If the complaint, read as it stands, does not disclose the ingredients of (r), the bar on anticipatory bail does not apply (Shajan Skaria, 2024, following Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India, 2020). The court may look at the material itself, such as a video transcript.
• Often, partial quashing. Where public view or caste intent is missing, courts often quash only the atrocity limb and let the general charges proceed (Hitesh Verma, 2020; Sohanvir, 2025). Where the general charges also lack foundation, the whole case goes, as in Karuppudayar (2025) and Gunjan (2026).
• No mini-trial. Where the FIR does disclose all ingredients, disputed facts are for trial. Courts will not weigh the credibility of public witnesses at the quashing or bail stage.

6. Clause (r) versus Ordinary Criminal Intimidation

Figure 3: Section 3(1)(r) and the ordinary offences of intimidation and insult

BNS Section 351 (formerly Sections 503 and 506 IPC) punishes a threat of injury to person, reputation or property made to cause alarm or to force a person to act. BNS Section 352 (formerly Section 504 IPC) punishes an intentional insult meant to provoke a breach of the peace. Clause (r) differs on four points: it protects only Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe members from outsiders; it requires an intent to humiliate on caste lines; it requires public view; and it carries a minimum of six months with trial by a Special Court. The general offences need none of those, which is why they often survive when the atrocity charge falls.

7. Online Statements and Clause (r)

• The Supreme Court has left the question open. In Shajan Skaria the Court noted that the video was in the public domain on social media and that such cases are likely to become more frequent, but decided the case on the caste-intent ingredient.
• Delhi High Court, Gayatri v. State (2017). Posts on a Facebook wall were held to be within public view, whatever the privacy setting, since public persons, however few, could see them. On the facts, however, the posts were general and did not target the complainant.
• Kerala High Court, Sooraj V. Sukumar v. State of Kerala (2022). Insulting remarks about a Scheduled Tribe woman in a YouTube interview: when the victim accesses uploaded content, she becomes directly and constructively present, and the content is within public view.
• Private messages. A one-to-one call or message seen by no one else is hard to fit within public view on the reasoning of Hitesh Verma. A post in a group or a public feed is closer to the village square.

8. Quick Revision and Memory Aids

• 'I-I-C-P'. Intentional act, Intent to humiliate, Caste identity targeted, Public view.
• 'Audience, not address'. Public view turns on who could see or hear, not on who owns the place (Swaran Singh, 2008).
• 'Four walls, no outsider'. Hitesh Verma (2020), Karuppudayar (2025), Sohanvir (2025), Gunjan (2026).
• 'Knowledge is not intent'. Shajan Skaria (2024): knowing the victim's caste does not prove caste humiliation.
• 'Not merely relatives or friends'. The public must be independent.
• '1989 (x) = 2016 (r)'. Same words, same case law.

9. Frequently Asked Questions

Is abuse inside the victim’s own house ever within public view?

Yes, if independent outsiders were present and heard it, or if it happened at the door, verandah or courtyard in sight of the road. Without such persons, it is not.

Can co-workers be members of the public?

In principle, yes, if they are independent of the parties and were present at the time; no decision excludes them as a class. Karuppudayar did not decide the point: the charge failed because colleagues arrived only after the words were spoken.

Does clause (r) require the use of a caste name?

No. That is the domain of clause (s). But the insult or intimidation under (r) must still be aimed at the victim's caste identity.

If the atrocity charge is quashed, does the accused go free?

Not necessarily. The general charges, such as BNS Sections 351 and 352 or hurt, often continue before the regular court (Hitesh Verma; Sohanvir). Where they too lack foundation, the whole case may be quashed (Karuppudayar; Gunjan).

Is a statement in a political debate about an SC/ST leader covered?

Only if it is meant to humiliate him on account of caste. Criticism of his conduct, however harsh, is not an atrocity (Shajan Skaria, 2024), though it may be defamation.

10. Related Topics and Provisions

• Topic 13: Basic Requirements of Section 3. Knowledge, caste nexus and private disputes.
• Topic 14: Degrading Acts under (a) to (e). Public humiliation by other means.
• Topic 20: Section 3(1)(s). Abuse by caste name, the twin of clause (r).
• Section 3(1)(r), (s); Section 18; BNS ss.351, 352, 356. The provisions discussed