Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996
Section 34 and Section 37 Compared
Section 34 is the only recourse against an arbitral award. Section 37 is the only appeal within the Act, and it lies from a short list of orders, including an order setting aside or refusing to set aside an award. The relationship between them is easily stated and often misstated: an appeal under Section 37 is an appeal from the order made under Section 34, not a fresh examination of the award. Its scope is therefore measured by the scope of Section 34, and is narrower still.
The ladder above the award, and the orders from which an appeal lies
1. What Each Provision Does
Section 34 confers a supervisory jurisdiction. The court examines whether a ground stated in the section is made out, and if it is, the award may be set aside wholly or in part, remitted under Section 34(4), or corrected within the narrow limits recognised in 2025. Section 37 confers an appellate jurisdiction over specified orders. In relation to an award, the appellate court asks whether the court below was right to find, or not to find, a ground under Section 34. It does not ask whether the tribunal decided the dispute correctly, because no court at any stage asks that question.
2. The Comparison
Basis | Section 34 | Section 37 |
|---|---|---|
Nature | An application invoking a supervisory jurisdiction over the award | An appeal from an order, listed exhaustively in the section |
What is examined | The award, against the grounds in Section 34(2) and 34(2A) | The order of the court below, and whether it stayed within those grounds |
Orders covered | Not applicable; the subject is the award | Sections 37(1)(a) to (c) and 37(2)(a) and (b) |
Evidence | The record of the arbitration and affidavits; oral evidence only exceptionally | The record before the court below |
Relief | Dismissal, setting aside wholly or in part, remission, or narrow correction | Confirmation, reversal or modification of the order under appeal |
Time | Three months, and thirty days more on sufficient cause, but not thereafter | Sixty days for a commercial appeal under Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015; delay condoned only exceptionally |
Further recourse | An appeal under Section 37(1)(c) | No second appeal; only special leave under Article 136 |
3. The Orders from Which an Appeal Lies
- Section 37(1)(a). Refusing to refer the parties to arbitration under Section 8. There is no appeal from an order referring them.
- Section 37(1)(b). Granting or refusing to grant any measure under Section 9.
- Section 37(1)(c). Setting aside or refusing to set aside an award under Section 34.
- Section 37(2)(a). An order of the tribunal accepting a plea under Section 16(2) or (3). There is no appeal where the plea is rejected.
- Section 37(2)(b). An order of the tribunal granting or refusing an interim measure under Section 17.
- Section 37(3). No second appeal lies from an order passed in appeal, though the right to appeal to the Supreme Court is unaffected.
⚠ Two orders that are conspicuously absent No appeal lies from an order appointing an arbitrator under Section 11, and none from an order referring the parties to arbitration under Section 8. Both omissions serve the same purpose: an order that sends the dispute to the forum the parties chose should not be capable of being held up. The only recourse against either is special leave under Article 136, which is granted sparingly. |
4. The Narrowing of Scope
📖 MMTC Ltd. v. Vedanta Ltd., (2019) 4 SCC 163 Held: The scope of interference under Section 37 is more restricted than under Section 34. Where the court of first instance has refused to set aside an award, the appellate court does not reconsider the award afresh; it examines whether the court below exceeded the limits of Section 34. As long as the view taken by the arbitrator is a possible one, interference is not warranted at either stage. Significance: This is the standard authority for the proposition that Section 37 adds a layer of review over the order and not over the award. |
Two consequences follow in practice. A party that lost before the tribunal and again under Section 34 must show an error in the application of Section 34 itself, and not merely repeat its criticism of the award. And a party that succeeded under Section 34 defends the order on the ground that the court below correctly identified a statutory ground, which is a narrower and more manageable case than defending the award on the merits.
5. Time and Condonation
Section 34(3) fixes three months from receipt of the award with a further thirty days on sufficient cause, and the words but not thereafter exclude Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Section 37 contains no period of its own; where the subject matter is a commercial dispute of the specified value, Section 13(1A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 prescribes sixty days. The Supreme Court has held that delay in an appeal under Section 37 may be condoned only by way of exception and for short periods, since a liberal approach would defeat the object of speedy resolution. A delay of a few days may be excused on sufficient cause; a delay of months ordinarily will not.
6. Related Topics and Provisions
Topic or provision | Connection |
|---|---|
Challenge to the Arbitral Award: Section 34 | The grounds, limitation and outcomes |
Section 34 and an Appeal Compared | Why neither stage is a rehearing on the merits |
Appeals, Jurisdiction and Miscellaneous Provisions: Sections 37 to 43 | Section 37 among the closing provisions |
Sections 8, 9, 16, 17 and 34, A&C Act, 1996 | The orders from which an appeal lies |
Section 13(1A), Commercial Courts Act, 2015 | The period for a commercial appeal |