Suspension Remission and Commutation Compared

📖 Gopal Vinayak Godse v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 600 (Constitution Bench)

Facts: A convict serving a sentence of imprisonment for life contended that, with the remissions earned under the prison rules added to the period actually served, he had completed the equivalent of twenty years, and was therefore entitled to be released.

Held: The Constitution Bench held that a sentence of imprisonment for life is a sentence of imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of the convicted person’s natural life, and that there is no provision of law whereby it is automatically treated as one for a definite period. Remissions earned under the prison rules have the effect of reducing the period of actual detention for administrative purposes, but they do not by themselves entitle the prisoner to release: they become effective only where an order under the appropriate statutory provision is passed by the appropriate Government remitting the remainder of the sentence. It followed that a life convict cannot claim release as of right on the footing that the aggregate of the period served and the remissions earned equals a term of years. The Court added that unless the sentence is commuted or remitted by the appropriate authority, the prisoner is bound in law to serve the life term.

Ratio: Imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of natural life. Remissions earned under prison rules do not by themselves entitle a prisoner to release; an order of the appropriate Government is required.

📖 Maru Ram v. Union of India, (1981) 1 SCC 107 (five Judges)

Facts: The validity and effect of the restriction requiring a minimum period of fourteen years to be served in certain cases was challenged, and the Constitution Bench was required to examine how the statutory powers of remission and commutation stand with the constitutional power of clemency.

Held: The Constitution Bench upheld the restriction and explained the relationship between the two sets of powers. It held that the statutory power of remission and commutation and the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161 are distinct: the statutory restriction binds the appropriate Government in the exercise of the statutory power, but it cannot and does not fetter the constitutional power, which is untouched by ordinary legislation. The Court held that the constitutional power is exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and that it should be guided by published, rational and non-arbitrary guidelines, so that clemency does not become a matter of caprice or favour. It emphasised that the restriction operates prospectively, and that a convict to whom it applies cannot be released before serving the prescribed period in exercise of the statutory power, whatever remissions he may have earned.

Ratio: The statutory restriction binds the appropriate Government in exercising the statutory power but cannot fetter the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161, which is untouched by ordinary legislation and should be guided by published, rational guidelines.

⚠ The four propositions that follow

A life sentence is for life. There is no rule of law converting it into a term of years, and no arithmetical addition of remissions produces a right to release.

Remission earned is not remission granted. Remission under prison rules reduces actual detention for administrative purposes; it operates as a release only when the appropriate Government passes an order under section 473.

Section 475 binds the Government, not the Constitution. It restricts the statutory power, and cannot fetter the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161.

And none of the three reaches the conviction. A person whose sentence has been suspended, remitted or commuted remains a convicted person, with every consequence that attaches to a conviction. Only a pardon alters that.

The position stated shortly

1. Suspension stops the clock; remission shortens the sentence; commutation changes its kind. That single sentence holds the three apart.

2. None of the three touches the conviction, which survives all of them. Only a pardon under Article 72 or 161 can reach it.

3. Suspension: the sentence survives in full and only its execution stops. It is revocable on breach of a condition, and the convict then serves the unexpired portion.

4. Remission: the remitted part of the sentence is wiped out, but the sentence keeps its character — a remitted life sentence is still a life sentence. It too is revocable.

5. Commutation: the original sentence is replaced. It requires no consent, and once substituted the new sentence stands.

6. Imprisonment for life means imprisonment for the whole of the remaining period of natural life. There is no provision treating it as a definite term: Gopal Vinayak Godse.

7. Remissions earned under prison rules do not by themselves entitle a prisoner to release. They operate only when the appropriate Government passes an order under section 473.

8. Section 475 requires fourteen years to be served where life imprisonment was imposed for an offence carrying death, or where a death sentence has been commuted.

9. That restriction binds the appropriate Government in exercising the statutory power, but cannot fetter the constitutional power under Articles 72 and 161: Maru Ram.

10. The constitutional power is exercised on the advice of the Council of Ministers, and should be guided by published, rational and non-arbitrary guidelines.