Time Limits Introduced under the | BNSS 2023

The Time Limits Introduced by the BNSS, 2023: Where They Apply, and the Question That Will Occupy the Courts — Whether They Are Mandatory or Directory

The Sanhita puts a number of days on almost every stage which previously had none. Its organising theme is delay, and its method is arithmetic: a preliminary enquiry within fourteen days, a sanction deemed granted at a hundred and twenty, documents supplied within fourteen, committal within ninety, discharge and charge within sixty, judgment within thirty extendable to forty-five, and not more than two adjournments during a trial.

The periods themselves are easy to learn. The question that will occupy the courts is not what they are but what follows when they are exceeded — and the answer is not the same for all of them.

1. Where the Time Limits Apply

Figure 1: The periods, stage by stage

1.1 Investigation

Section 173(3): a preliminary enquiry, where permitted, within fourteen days.
Section 184: the medical examination report of a victim of rape forwarded to the Magistrate within seven days.
Section 187: the fifteen days of police custody taken within the initial forty or sixty days of the detention period.
Section 193(3): the progress of the investigation communicated to the informant or victim within ninety days.

1.2 Sanction and cognizance

Section 218: sanction for prosecution deemed granted where the Government does not decide within one hundred and twenty days.
Section 230: copies of the documents supplied to the accused and the victim within fourteen days of production or appearance.
Section 232: committal to the Court of Session within ninety days of taking cognizance, extendable for reasons recorded.

1.3 The trial, the judgment and after

Section 250: an application for discharge within sixty days of committal. Section 251: the charge framed within sixty days of the first hearing on charge.
Section 290: an application for plea bargaining within thirty days of the framing of charge.
Section 346: not more than two adjournments to a party during a trial, and each only for reasons recorded.
Section 258: judgment pronounced within thirty days of the completion of arguments, extendable to forty-five for reasons recorded. Section 392: a copy made available to the parties immediately, and uploaded to the Court’s portal within seven days.
Section 472: a mercy petition to the Governor within thirty days, and to the President within sixty days of rejection.

2. Mandatory or Directory?

Figure 2: Where the statute supplies the answer, and where it does not

Some periods carry their own consequence, and there is nothing to construe. Section 218 says the sanction is deemed granted on the expiry of a hundred and twenty days. The proviso to section 187(3) says the accused shall be released on bail on the expiry of sixty or ninety days. Section 479 says he shall be released on completing one-half or one-third, and the third proviso says detention may never exceed the maximum period for the offence. These are mandatory, because the section itself says what happens.

Most of the others say only that something shall be done within a period, and are silent on breach. Documents within fourteen days; committal within ninety; discharge and charge within sixty; judgment within thirty or forty-five; progress within ninety. Here a court must ask what the consequence should be — and the answer is almost never that the proceeding becomes void.

📖 State of Punjab v. Shamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719

Facts: An appeal was liable to be rejected for non-compliance with a requirement of the rules governing the form in which papers were to be filed, and the question was how far a failure to observe a rule of procedure should be permitted to defeat a case on its merits.

Held: The Supreme Court held that processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. It held that procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant and not a resistant, in the administration of justice; and that where a rule of procedure is capable of two constructions, the one which advances the cause of justice is to be preferred to the one which defeats it. The Court held that a breach of a procedural requirement which has caused no prejudice should not be permitted to throw out a case on its merits, and that courts should be astute to distinguish between a requirement which goes to the substance of a right and one which regulates the manner of its exercise. But it emphasised that this is not a licence to ignore the rules: a party in default must explain it, and a court relieving against the consequence does so on terms, not as a matter of course.

Ratio: Processual law is a handmaid and not a mistress. Where a rule of procedure admits of two constructions, the one advancing justice is preferred, and a breach causing no prejudice should not throw out a case on its merits — though the default must be explained.

📖 Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480

Facts: A statutory provision required a written statement to be filed within a stated number of days, and the question was whether that period was mandatory, so that a defence filed later could not be received at all, or directory, so that the court retained a discretion to accept it.

Held: The Supreme Court held that the question whether a provision is mandatory or directory is not answered by the word shall, which is not decisive, but by the object of the provision and the consequence of holding it one way or the other. It held that where the statute prescribes a period but does not state what follows on its expiry, and where treating it as mandatory would visit a party with a penalty disproportionate to the default or would defeat the very object the provision was enacted to serve, the period is ordinarily directory. The Court held that the provision before it was directory, and that the court retained a discretion to extend the time in an appropriate case; but it emphasised that the discretion is not to be exercised routinely: the period represents the legislature’s view of what is reasonable, a departure must be justified on the facts, and the court should record why it is being allowed.

Ratio: Whether a provision is mandatory or directory turns on its object and on the consequence of each construction, not on the word shall. Where the statute prescribes a period but not the consequence of breach, it is ordinarily directory — but the discretion to extend is not routine.

⚠ How the question is approached

Procedure is the handmaid of justice, not its mistress. A rule of procedure is a means of doing justice, and a construction which makes it defeat the case it was meant to advance is ordinarily the wrong one.

The test is the object of the provision and the consequence of non-compliance. Where treating a period as mandatory would punish a party for the court’s delay, or would acquit a guilty man because a document arrived late, that is a strong indication that it is directory.

But directory does not mean optional. A period the statute prescribes must be observed, its breach must be explained, and persistent disregard is a matter for the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under section 529 and Article 227.

And the word “shall” is not decisive. It appears in provisions which are plainly mandatory and in others which cannot sensibly be so read — which is why each period has to be examined on its own terms rather than sorted by its verb.

3. Key Takeaways

The position stated shortly

1. The Sanhita puts a number of days on almost every stage which previously had none, its organising theme being delay.

2. Investigation: preliminary enquiry 14 days; medical report 7 days; police custody within the initial 40 or 60 days; progress to the informant 90 days.

3. Sanction and cognizance: sanction deemed granted at 120 days; documents 14 days; committal 90 days.

4. Trial: discharge 60 days; charge 60 days; plea bargaining 30 days; not more than two adjournments.

5. Judgment and after: judgment 30 days extendable to 45; copy immediately and uploaded within 7 days; mercy petition 30 and 60 days.

6. Some periods carry their own consequence and are therefore mandatory — section 218 (deemed sanction), the proviso to section 187(3) (default bail), and section 479 (release, and the absolute ceiling).

7. Most say only that something shall be done within a period and are silent on breach. There a court must ask what the consequence should be.

8. Processual law is a handmaid and not a mistress, and a construction advancing justice is preferred to one defeating it: Shamlal Murari.

9. Whether a provision is mandatory or directory turns on its object and on the consequence of each construction — not on the word “shall”: Kailash v. Nanhku.

10. But directory does not mean optional: the period must be observed, its breach explained, and persistent disregard is a matter for the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court.

4. Frequently Asked Questions

What is the organising theme of the BNSS time limits?

Delay. The Sanhita addresses investigations that do not finish, sanctions never decided, documents not supplied, trials that do not start and judgments not delivered — by putting a number of days on each stage.

Which periods are clearly mandatory?

Those which carry their own consequence: section 218, where the sanction is deemed granted at a hundred and twenty days; the proviso to section 187(3), where the accused shall be released on bail; and section 479, including the absolute ceiling on detention.

What about the others?

Most prescribe a period but are silent on breach — documents, committal, discharge, charge, judgment, progress to the informant. A court must then ask what consequence the provision requires, and the answer is almost never that the proceeding becomes void.

Does the word “shall” settle it?

No. Whether a provision is mandatory or directory turns on its object and on the consequence of holding it one way or the other, not on the verb used: Kailash v. Nanhku.

Does directory mean optional?

No. A period the statute prescribes must be observed and its breach explained. Persistent disregard is a matter for the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court under section 529 and Article 227, not something a court may overlook.

Why should a court not treat every period as mandatory?

Because processual law is a handmaid and not a mistress. Treating a period as mandatory where the statute does not say so would frequently punish a party for the court’s delay, or acquit a guilty man because a document arrived late — which defeats the object the provision was enacted to serve.

Related Topics

Major Changes Introduced by the BNSS, 2023
The Victim’s Right to Receive Investigation Updates
Undertrial Release under Section 479, BNSS
Police Custody and Remand under the BNSS, 2023: Section 187
Irregular Proceedings: Sections 506 to 512, BNSS
The BNSS and the CrPC: a Comparative Study