Law of Torts
Joint and Independent Tortfeasors, Contribution Between Them, and the Survival of Actions on Death
Two people may cause one damage in two quite different ways, and the difference decides how the plaintiff must sue. If they acted in concert, in pursuance of a common design, or if one is vicariously liable for the other, they are joint tortfeasors: there is one tort, one cause of action, and liability is joint and several, so the plaintiff may sue any one of them for the whole. If they acted separately and their independent wrongs happened to produce the same damage, they are independent tortfeasors: there are as many torts as wrongdoers, and each answers for the damage he caused. Separately, the death of a party raises the question whether the action survives at all, which Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 answers.
The two kinds of tortfeasor, contribution between them, and what survives a death
1. Joint Tortfeasors
- They act in concert, in pursuance of a common design, so that the act of one is in law the act of all.
- Or one is vicariously liable for the other: master and servant, principal and agent, partners in a firm.
- Or they owe a common duty that both have broken, as where two occupiers are liable for the same nuisance.
- There is one tort and one cause of action, however many defendants there are.
- Liability is joint and several. Each is liable for the whole of the damage, and the plaintiff may sue any one, some, or all of them.
- One judgment satisfied discharges them all. The plaintiff may have only one satisfaction, though at common law the rule was that judgment against one barred a suit against the others, which the modern position has relaxed.
- A release of one releases all, because there is a single cause of action, though a covenant not to sue one preserves the plaintiff's rights against the rest.
2. Independent Tortfeasors
- They act separately, with no common design and no relationship making one answerable for the other.
- Their independent wrongs happen to produce the same damage. The classic case is two vehicles negligently driven that collide and injure a bystander.
- There are as many torts and as many causes of action as there are wrongdoers.
- Each is liable for the damage he caused, and where the damage is divisible the court apportions it.
- Where the damage is indivisible the practical result approaches that of joint liability, each being liable for the whole, but the causes of action remain separate.
- Separate suits lie, and a judgment against one is no bar to a suit against another, though the plaintiff may not recover more than his loss in total.
- A release of one does not release the others, because the causes of action are distinct.
3. The Two Compared
Joint tortfeasors | Independent tortfeasors | |
How they act | In concert, in pursuance of a common design, or through vicarious liability | Separately, without any common design |
Number of torts | One tort | As many torts as wrongdoers |
Causes of action | One | As many as wrongdoers |
Extent of liability | Each for the whole damage, jointly and severally | Each for the damage he caused |
Suing | Any one, some or all may be sued | Separate suits lie against each |
Judgment against one | Satisfaction discharges all | No bar to proceeding against another |
Release of one | Releases all | Does not release the others |
Typical example | Master and servant; partners; persons acting on a common plan | Two drivers whose separate negligence injures a pedestrian |
4. Contribution Between Tortfeasors
📖 Merryweather v. Nixan (1799) 8 TR 186 Facts Two defendants had been held liable for a tort. One of them satisfied the whole judgment and then sought to recover a contribution from the other. Held No contribution could be recovered. Ratio The rule laid down was that there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors, on the principle that the court will not assist a wrongdoer to distribute the consequences of his own wrong. |
- The rule was abolished in England by the Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, and the position is now governed by the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act, 1978.
- In India the rule has never been applied as an absolute one. The Indian courts have treated it as confined to cases where the wrongdoer knew that he was doing an unlawful act, and have allowed contribution between tortfeasors who were not conscious of any wrongdoing.
- The reasoning is that the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio has no application where the defendant did not know that his act was wrongful, as where liability is vicarious or arises from inadvertence.
- Indemnity is a separate question from contribution. A master held vicariously liable may recover an indemnity from the servant whose tort it was, and a person liable only technically may recover from the person actually at fault.
- Section 69 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 has been invoked in aid, on the footing that a person who pays money which another is bound by law to pay is entitled to be reimbursed.
5. Survival of Actions: Section 306
Section 306, Indian Succession Act, 1925 306. Demands and rights of action of or against deceased survive to and against executor or administrator. All demands whatsoever and all rights to prosecute or defend any action or special proceeding existing in favour of or against a person at the time of his decease, survive to and against his executors or administrators; except causes of action for defamation, assault, as defined in the Indian Penal Code, or other personal injuries not causing the death of the party; and except also cases where, after the death of the party, the relief sought could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory. |
- The maxim behind it is actio personalis moritur cum persona: a personal action dies with the person.
- The section reverses the maxim as a general rule, and then preserves it in three classes of case.
- The reference to the Indian Penal Code must now be read as a reference to the corresponding provision of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, by the ordinary rule of construction as to repealed enactments.
- "Personal injuries not causing the death of the party" is the limb that does most of the work: a claim for personal injury abates on the death of the injured person, unless the death was itself caused by the wrong.
- Claims for damage to property survive, as do claims already reduced to a decree, and claims where the estate of the deceased has been enriched by the wrong.
6. What Survives and What Does Not
Survives | Why | |
Damage to property | Yes | It is not a personal injury; the estate is affected |
Conversion of goods | Yes | The estate is the poorer for it |
Defamation | No | Expressly excepted by Section 306 |
Assault | No | Expressly excepted, as defined in the penal law |
Personal injury not causing death | No | Expressly excepted |
Personal injury causing death | Yes, but through the Fatal Accidents Act, 1855, for the dependants | A separate statutory cause of action, not the deceased's own |
A claim already decreed | Yes | It has become a debt due to or from the estate |
A claim where the relief would be nugatory | No | Expressly excepted by the closing words |
7. The Statutory Exceptions
- The Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 gives an action where death is caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default such as would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the injured person to sue. The action is for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child, and the damages are for the pecuniary loss the dependants have suffered.
- It is not a survival of the deceased's own action, but a fresh cause of action created by statute for the benefit of the dependants. That is why the deceased's own contributory negligence reduces it, and why a settlement by the deceased in his lifetime may bar it.
- The Legal Representatives' Suits Act, 1855 operates on the other side, allowing certain actions to be brought against the executors or administrators of a deceased wrongdoer, within the limits it prescribes.
- Section 140 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provide further routes in their own fields, the latter through the claim for compensation by the legal representatives.
8. A Recent Development on Section 306
⚠ The Supreme Court has referred the section to the Law Commission In Kumud Lall v. Suresh Chandra Roy (dead) through legal representatives, decided on 4 May 2026, a Bench of Justice J.K. Maheshwari and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar observed that it was appropriate to engage policy experts to debate the need and necessity of expanding the scope of Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, and referred the question to the Law Commission of India. The Court noted that the section still rests on the archaic maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona, and pointed to the English position, under which liability for the pecuniary losses caused by a deceased wrongdoer is preserved while purely personal claims lapse. Nothing has changed in the law as a result: Section 306 stands as it is until the reference is acted on and the legislature amends it. The point is worth knowing because the reference is recent and most textbooks do not carry it. |
9. The Position Stated Shortly
1. Joint tortfeasors act in concert in pursuance of a common design, or one is vicariously liable for the other.
2. There is one tort and one cause of action, and liability is joint and several, so each is liable for the whole damage.
3. The plaintiff may sue any one, some or all of them, and one judgment satisfied discharges them all.
4. Independent tortfeasors act separately, and their independent wrongs happen to cause the same damage.
5. There are as many torts and causes of action as wrongdoers, each is liable for the damage he caused, and judgment against one is no bar to a suit against another.
6. Merryweather v. Nixan laid down that there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors; England abolished the rule in 1935.
7. In India the rule has been confined to cases where the wrongdoer knew he was doing an unlawful act, and contribution has been allowed where he did not.
8. Section 306 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 makes demands and rights of action survive to and against executors and administrators, as a general rule.
9. It excepts defamation, assault as defined in the penal law, other personal injuries not causing death, and cases where the relief would be nugatory.
10. The Fatal Accidents Act, 1855 gives the dependants a fresh statutory cause of action where death was caused by a wrongful act, and in May 2026 the Supreme Court referred the scope of Section 306 to the Law Commission of India.