Law of Torts
Inevitable Accident and Act of God: Two Defences That Look Alike and Operate Differently
Both defences say that what happened could not have been helped, and there the resemblance ends. Inevitable accident is an accident that could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill. It answers a claim founded on fault, and it is in substance a denial that the plaintiff has proved negligence at all. Act of God, or vis major, is narrower and does more work: it requires an operation of natural forces alone, so extraordinary that no human foresight could reasonably anticipate it, and it is one of the five recognised exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, where fault is irrelevant. Neither answers absolute liability under M.C. Mehta, which admits of no exception at all.
The two defences, their essentials, where each works, and where neither does
1. Inevitable Accident
- The definition is an accident that could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care, caution and skill, having regard to all the circumstances.
- The cause may be human or natural. It is the unavoidability that matters, not the source.
- It is in substance a denial and not a true defence. Since the plaintiff must prove negligence, proof that the accident was inevitable is proof that he has failed to discharge his burden.
- The standard is ordinary care, not the utmost care. The defendant is not required to have taken every conceivable precaution, only the precautions a reasonable man would have taken.
- It is no answer where liability does not depend on fault. Under Rylands v. Fletcher and under absolute liability the defendant is liable though he was not negligent at all.
- Nor is it an answer in the torts actionable per se where the act itself was voluntary. A defendant who deliberately walks on to land is a trespasser whether or not he knew it was not his.
📖 Stanley v. Powell [1891] 1 QB 86 Facts The plaintiff was employed to carry cartridges and game for a shooting party. The defendant, a member of the party, fired at a pheasant. A pellet glanced off the bough of a tree at an unusual angle and struck the plaintiff in the eye. There was no negligence on the defendant's part. Held The defendant was not liable. Ratio Where an injury results from an accident that could not have been avoided by the exercise of ordinary care and skill, and the defendant has been guilty of neither intention nor negligence, no action lies. The case also marks the modern position that trespass to the person requires intention or negligence, and is not a wrong of strict liability. |
2. Act of God, or Vis Major
- The first essential is that the event must be due to natural causes without human intervention. An earthquake, a lightning strike, an extraordinary flood or a tempest may qualify; the acts of human beings, however uncontrollable, never do.
- The second essential is that the event must be extraordinary, not merely unusual. It must be so unexpected that no human foresight or prudence could reasonably be expected to anticipate and guard against it.
- An ordinary heavy rainfall is not an act of God, because in most places it is a thing to be provided for. The question is always whether the event was beyond what could reasonably have been anticipated in that place.
- It is a recognised exception to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, and that is where it does most of its work, because there liability does not depend on fault and the defendant has no other answer.
- The burden of establishing it is on the defendant.
📖 Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1 Facts The defendant had made ornamental lakes on her land by damming a natural stream. An extraordinary rainfall, described by the witnesses as greater than any within living memory, caused the embankments to give way. The escaping water swept away four county bridges belonging to the plaintiff. Held The defendant was not liable. The escape was due to an act of God. Ratio A defendant is not liable under Rylands v. Fletcher for an escape caused directly by an act of God, that is, by natural forces of so extraordinary a character that no reasonable foresight or care could have anticipated or guarded against them. |
📖 Greenock Corporation v. Caledonian Railway Co. [1917] AC 556 Facts The Corporation constructed a concrete paddling pool for children in the bed of a stream, altering the stream's natural course and obstructing its flow. An extraordinary rainfall caused the stream to overflow, and the water flooded the plaintiffs' property. Held The Corporation was liable. The defence of act of God failed. Ratio A person who interferes with the natural course of a stream is bound to provide for even an extraordinary rainfall, and cannot escape by calling it an act of God. The decision confines Nichols v. Marsland closely, and it has since been doubted how far that case survives. |
📖 Ramlinga Nadar v. Narayana Reddiar, AIR 1971 Ker 197 Facts Goods entrusted to a carrier were looted by an unruly mob, which the carrier was unable to resist. Held The carrier was liable. The loss was not caused by an act of God. Ratio The criminal acts of a mob, however uncontrollable in fact, are the acts of human beings and not an operation of natural forces. An act of God requires the absence of human intervention altogether, and no amount of practical irresistibility supplies that. |
3. The Two Compared
Inevitable accident | Act of God | |
The source of the event | Human or natural | Natural forces alone, with no human intervention |
The degree required | Unavoidable by ordinary care, caution and skill | Extraordinary, beyond what human foresight could reasonably anticipate |
Its character | In substance a denial of negligence | A true defence, operating even where fault is irrelevant |
Where it answers | Negligence, and the torts founded on fault | The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, and nuisance in some cases |
Where it does not | Rylands v. Fletcher; absolute liability; the torts actionable per se | Absolute liability; the statutory no fault schemes |
The leading case | Stanley v. Powell [1891] 1 QB 86 | Nichols v. Marsland (1876) 2 Ex D 1 |
Its limit | The standard is ordinary care, not the utmost care | Greenock Corporation: a person who interferes with nature must provide for the extraordinary |
4. Where Neither Defence Works
⚠ Absolute liability admits of no exception at all In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1987) 1 SCC 395 the Supreme Court declined to be bound by the nineteenth century rule in Rylands v. Fletcher and the exceptions attached to it. An enterprise engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous activity owes an absolute and non delegable duty, and it is no answer that it took all reasonable care, or that the harm arose without negligence, or that it was caused by an act of God or the act of a stranger. There is no exception. The same is true of the statutory no fault schemes: Section 164 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 and the Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991 fix compensation on proof of the accident, and neither asks whether the event was avoidable. A defendant relying on inevitable accident or act of God must therefore first establish that liability in the case depends on fault or on the Rylands rule at all. |
5. The Position Stated Shortly
1. Inevitable accident is an accident that could not have been avoided by ordinary care, caution and skill.
2. It is in substance a denial that negligence has been proved, and it answers claims founded on fault.
3. Stanley v. Powell is the leading case: a shot that glanced off a tree and struck the plaintiff, without negligence, founded no liability.
4. Act of God requires two things: an operation of natural forces without human intervention, and an event so extraordinary that no human foresight could anticipate it.
5. It is one of the five recognised exceptions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, and that is where it principally operates.
6. Nichols v. Marsland applied it to lakes that burst in an unprecedented rainfall.
7. Greenock Corporation confines it: a person who interferes with the natural course of a stream must provide even for an extraordinary rainfall.
8. Ramlinga Nadar holds that the criminal acts of a mob are human intervention and not an act of God, however uncontrollable.
9. An ordinary heavy rainfall is not an act of God, and the burden of establishing the defence is on the defendant.
10. Neither defence answers absolute liability under M.C. Mehta, which admits of no exception, nor the statutory no fault schemes.