All NotesCivil LawLaw of Torts

Law of Torts

Deceit and Negligent Misstatement: The Dishonest Statement and the Careless One

Both concern a false statement which the plaintiff acted on to his loss, and they part on the state of mind of the maker. Deceit requires fraud: the statement must have been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly careless whether it be true or false. Nothing less will do, and Derry v. Peek established that no degree of carelessness short of that suffices. Negligent misstatement was the law's answer to what Derry v. Peek left unremedied, and Hedley Byrne supplied it seventy four years later: a careless statement is actionable, but only where there was a special relationship between the parties amounting to an assumption of responsibility.

1. The Comparison

Deceit

Negligent misstatement

The state of mind required

Fraud: knowledge of falsity, absence of belief in truth, or recklessness

Carelessness

An honest but careless statement

Not actionable

Actionable, if the relationship exists

Duty of care

Not required. The tort lies against anybody

Essential. There must be a special relationship

To whom liability extends

Anyone the maker intended to act on the statement

Only those within the relationship, and for the purpose for which it was made

Remoteness

All loss directly flowing from the deceit, whether foreseeable or not

Only loss of a foreseeable kind, under The Wagon Mound

Contributory negligence

No defence

Reduces the award

Exclusion of liability

Cannot be excluded by contract

May be excluded or limited, subject to reasonableness

Exemplary damages

Available in a proper case

Not ordinarily

Limitation

Time runs from discovery of the fraud: section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963

Time runs from when the damage occurs

Standard of proof

Higher in practice. Fraud must be strictly pleaded and clearly proved

The ordinary civil standard

2. Deceit

📖 Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 App Cas 337

Facts The directors of a tramway company issued a prospectus stating that the company was entitled to use steam power instead of horses. They honestly believed this, having assumed that the consent of the Board of Trade, which the special Act required, would follow as a matter of course. The consent was refused, the company was wound up, and a shareholder who had subscribed on the faith of the prospectus sued the directors in deceit.

Held The directors were not liable. They had believed the statement to be true.

Ratio Fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation has been made knowingly, or without belief in its truth, or recklessly, careless whether it be true or false. To prevent a false statement from being fraudulent there must always be an honest belief in its truth, and a belief however unreasonable, provided it is honest, negatives fraud. Negligence is not fraud, and a want of reasonable ground for believing the statement is evidence of dishonesty but is not dishonesty itself.

  • The five ingredients are a representation of fact; made with knowledge of its falsity or recklessly; with the intention that the plaintiff should act on it; that the plaintiff did act on it; and that he suffered damage thereby.
  • Silence is not ordinarily a representation, but a half truth is, and so is a statement true when made which the maker learns has become false before it is acted on.
  • A statement of opinion or intention may be a representation of fact, since the state of a man's mind is as much a fact as the state of his digestion.
  • The subject is examined fully in TORT 074.

3. Negligent Misstatement

📖 Hedley Byrne and Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd., [1964] AC 465

Facts Advertising agents, before committing themselves to credit on behalf of a client, asked their bank to enquire into the client's financial position. The client's bank gave favourable references, expressed to be "without responsibility". The client went into liquidation and the agents lost some seventeen thousand pounds.

Held The disclaimer protected the bank, but the House of Lords held that a duty of care would otherwise have arisen.

Ratio Where a party seeking information from another, possessed of a special skill, trusts him to exercise due care, and that party knows or ought to know that reliance is being placed on his skill and judgment, a duty of care arises. The relationship must be equivalent to contract, and the maker must have assumed responsibility for the accuracy of what he said. Derry v. Peek was explained as deciding only what fraud requires, and not as denying a duty of care in a proper relationship.

  • The duty does not arise on every occasion when advice is given. Words said on a social or informal occasion, or by a person not professing any special skill, do not attract it.
  • Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman, [1990] 2 AC 605 confined it further. Auditors preparing a statutory audit owe a duty to the company and to the body of shareholders as a whole for the purpose of exercising control, and not to an investor who relies on the accounts in deciding to buy shares. The maker answers only for the purpose for which the statement was made and to the class he knew would rely on it.
  • Henderson v. Merrett Syndicates Ltd., [1995] 2 AC 145 rests the duty squarely on the assumption of responsibility, and holds that such a duty may exist concurrently with a contractual one: TORT 100.
  • A disclaimer may negative the assumption of responsibility, as it did in Hedley Byrne itself, subject to any statutory control of unfair terms.
  • The subject is examined fully in TORT 075.

4. The Four Practical Differences

Why it matters

Remoteness

In deceit the defendant answers for all loss directly flowing from the fraud, foreseeable or not. In negligent misstatement The Wagon Mound applies and unforeseeable kinds of loss are excluded. The difference can be very large in a commercial case

Contributory negligence

No defence to deceit, because a fraudster cannot complain that his victim was gullible. It reduces a claim in negligent misstatement, sometimes substantially, since a commercial plaintiff who made no enquiries of his own is at fault

Exclusion clauses

Liability for fraud cannot be excluded by contract at all. Liability for negligence may be, and a well drafted disclaimer is often a complete answer, as Hedley Byrne itself shows

Limitation

Under section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963, where the suit is based on fraud, time does not begin to run until the plaintiff has discovered it or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it. There is no such extension for negligence, where time runs from the damage

5. Which to Plead

  • Plead both in the alternative wherever the facts admit of it, because the state of mind is the hardest thing in the case to predict and a claim resting on fraud alone falls entirely if the court finds honest carelessness.
  • Fraud must be pleaded specifically and with particulars. A general allegation will be struck out, and an advocate should not put his name to an allegation of fraud without material to support it.
  • The evidential standard is higher in practice, and although fraud is proved on the balance of probabilities, courts require the probabilities to be commensurate with the gravity of the allegation.
  • Plead the special relationship in detail for the negligence claim: the skill professed, the purpose for which the statement was sought, the maker's knowledge that reliance would be placed, and the absence of any effective disclaimer.
  • Check for a contract. Where one exists, a claim for misrepresentation under the contract law may be simpler than either tort, and the remedies of rescission and restitution may be more useful than damages: TORT 100.

⚠ Why the law waited seventy four years to fill the gap Derry v. Peek left

Derry v. Peek did not decide that a careless statement causing loss should go unremedied. It decided only what the tort of deceit requires, which is dishonesty, and the House of Lords in Hedley Byrne said so expressly. But the practical effect of the decision for three quarters of a century was that there was no remedy at all, because the law of negligence as it then stood did not extend to words or to purely economic loss, and Donoghue v. Stevenson in 1932 was about a defective product and a physical injury. What made the gap tolerable for so long, and what explains the caution with which it was eventually closed, is that statements travel in a way that acts do not. A manufacturer's carelessness harms whoever consumes the product, and that class is naturally limited. A carelessly worded reference, valuation or set of accounts may be passed from hand to hand and relied on by people the maker never heard of, for purposes he never contemplated, years later, and each of them may lose a fortune. That is the danger Cardozo C.J. described as liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class, and the requirements the courts have built around the duty, the special relationship, the assumption of responsibility, the purpose for which the statement was made and the class known to be relying, are all devices for holding that danger in check. They are why Caparo decided that an auditor owes nothing to an investor, and why a disclaimer remains, as it was in Hedley Byrne itself, the simplest and most effective answer of all.

6. The Position Stated Shortly

1. Deceit requires fraud; negligent misstatement requires only carelessness within a special relationship.

2. Derry v. Peek: fraud is proved where a false representation is made knowingly, without belief in its truth, or recklessly careless whether it be true or false.

3. An honest belief, however unreasonable, negatives fraud, and negligence is not fraud.

4. Hedley Byrne established the duty of care for statements, resting on a special relationship equivalent to contract and an assumption of responsibility.

5. Caparo confines it to the purpose for which the statement was made and the class known to be relying, so an auditor owes no duty to an investor.

6. A disclaimer may negative the assumption of responsibility, as it did in Hedley Byrne itself.

7. In deceit the defendant answers for all loss directly flowing, foreseeable or not; in negligence The Wagon Mound applies.

8. Contributory negligence is no defence to deceit and reduces a claim in negligent misstatement.

9. Liability for fraud cannot be excluded by contract; liability for negligence may be.

10. Under section 17 of the Limitation Act, 1963 time runs from the discovery of fraud, and there is no such extension for negligence.