All NotesCorporate LawCompetition Act, 2002

Competition Act, 2002

The Traditional Thresholds and the Deal Value Threshold Compared

Indian merger control now has two gateways. The traditional thresholds in Section 5(a) to (c) measure the parties by what they own and what they earn, taken from audited accounts. The deal value threshold in Section 5(d), notified with effect from 10 September 2024, measures the transaction by what the acquirer is paying, coupled with a test of the target's presence in India. They rest on different assumptions about where competitive significance lies, and a transaction is notifiable if it crosses either.

1. The Comparison

Basis

Asset and turnover thresholds

Deal value threshold

What is measured

Assets and turnover of the parties and their groups, in India and worldwide

The value of the transaction, with every form of consideration included

Source of the figures

Audited financial statements

The transaction documents and the valuation

Assumption

Competitive significance is reflected in the size of the businesses

Competitive significance is reflected in the price the acquirer is willing to pay

Indian nexus

Built into the figures through the Indian leg of each threshold

Supplied separately by the substantial business operations test

Small target exemption

Applies, so a target below four hundred and fifty crore rupees of assets or one thousand two hundred and fifty crore rupees of turnover is exempt

Does not apply

Blind spot

A target with users, data or technology but little revenue or assets

A modest-value transaction that nevertheless removes an important competitor

Ease of application

Objective and mechanical

Requires judgment about deferred, contingent and indirect consideration

2. Why the Second Gateway Was Added

The asset and turnover tests worked well for conventional industries, where a firm of competitive significance has factories, inventory and revenue. They failed for a particular and increasingly common class of transaction: the acquisition of a young digital enterprise whose value lies in users, data and technology, and which has neither assets nor revenue to speak of. Such a target could be the acquirer's most plausible future competitor and yet be exempt from notification twice over, once because the thresholds were not met and again because the small target exemption positively applied. The deal value threshold closes both gaps, and its disapplication of the small target exemption is the essential part of the design.

3. The Two Limbs of the New Threshold

  1. Value exceeding two thousand crore rupees, computed to include direct, indirect, immediate and deferred consideration, contingent amounts, payments for non-compete covenants, and consideration under interconnected arrangements such as licensing, technology assistance or usage rights. Where the value cannot be determined with reasonable certainty, the transaction is treated as crossing the threshold.
  2. Substantial business operations in India, established by any of three alternative tests: for a digital services enterprise, business or end users in India amounting to ten per cent or more of the global total; gross merchandise value in India for the preceding twelve months amounting to ten per cent or more of the global figure and exceeding five hundred crore rupees; or turnover in India amounting to ten per cent or more of global turnover and exceeding five hundred crore rupees.

⚠ The order in which to test a transaction

First, apply the asset and turnover thresholds at both the enterprise and the group level. Second, apply the deal value threshold, remembering that both its limbs must be satisfied. Third, if only the traditional thresholds are crossed, consider the small target exemption and the categories in the exemption rules. Fourth, if the deal value threshold is crossed, stop: the small target exemption is unavailable and the transaction must be notified whatever the target's financial figures. Reversing the third and fourth steps is the commonest error.

4. Assessment

The new threshold brings India into line with jurisdictions that adopted value-based tests for the same reason, and it closes a real gap rather than a theoretical one. Two criticisms deserve mention. It introduces uncertainty, because the computation requires judgments about contingent and indirect consideration that the audited-figures test never did, and a party near the line must choose between an unnecessary filing and a gun-jumping penalty. And it is over-inclusive, since a high valuation often reflects growth prospects rather than any overlap with the acquirer, so filings will be made in respect of transactions raising no competition question. The answers offered are pre-filing consultation, the green channel for transactions with no overlap, and the proportionate design of the substantial business operations test.

5. Related Topics and Provisions

Topic or provision

Connection

The Deal Value Threshold

Section 5(d) in full, including computation of value

Regulation of Combinations: Sections 5 and 6

The thresholds and the notification regime

The Minimum Value of Assets or Turnover Rules, 2024

The small target exemption and its disapplication

Sections 5 and 43A, Competition Act, 2002

Thresholds and the consequence of not notifying