Compulsion by Threats: Section 32 BNS and the Doctrine of Duress

A man holds a gun to another's head and says: sign this cheque, or I will kill you. Another says: drive me to the bank, or I will kill your child. Yet another says: give false evidence in court, or I will kill your wife. Should the person acting under such threats be treated as a criminal? Roman law, English common law, and modern Indian law all answer no, subject to careful limits. Section 32 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, codifies the defence of duress, more formally called compulsion by threats. Its scope is narrower than the equivalent English defence, and it does not extend to murder or to offences against the state punishable with death. This module walks through the section, its ingredients, its exceptions, and the leading Indian and English authorities.

1. Meaning and Concept

Duress in criminal law

Duress, in the criminal law sense, is the compulsion of one person by another, by threats of serious harm, to do an act that would otherwise be an offence. It is a defence in most legal systems, but a narrow one. The classical common law rule was that duress excused all offences except murder and treason. Indian law, in Section 32 BNS, applies a similarly narrow rule, adding a strict requirement that the threat be of instant death rather than of lesser harm.

The maxim: coactus volui, tamen volui

Coactus volui, tamen volui.

Though I willed under compulsion, I still willed. The Latin maxim, drawn from Roman law, captures the doctrinal paradox at the heart of duress. A person acting under duress does will the act. If he did not, the act would be involuntary and outside criminal law altogether. But he wills it only because a greater evil is threatened. The law recognises this coerced willing as a distinctive kind of choice, deserving of exemption from criminal liability in narrow circumstances.

Rationale of the exception

Human frailty. The law does not expect ordinary human beings to be heroes. A person facing instant death, or the death of a loved one, cannot fairly be expected to choose the greater evil for himself in order to avoid causing harm to another.
Absence of true criminal fault. A person acting under such threats has been reduced to an instrument. The moral fault lies with the person who made the threats, not with the person who carried out the act.
Deterrent theory has no application. A person facing instant death cannot be deterred by criminal punishment. The theoretical basis for deterrence collapses.
Limits are essential. The exception must be narrow, or it would swallow the criminal law. If lesser threats sufficed, the doctrine would encourage the strong to intimidate the weak into criminal conduct. Section 32 draws the line at instant death.

2. Historical Origin

Roman and canon law

Roman law recognised the defence of vis maior, greater force, though its scope was contested and often narrower than the modern conception. The medieval canonists developed the idea more systematically, distinguishing coercion that removed criminal responsibility from coercion that merely mitigated it. The classical rule that emerged was that duress excused most offences but did not extend to sins against natural law, of which murder was the paradigm.

English common law

English common law absorbed the canonist position. Sir Matthew Hale, in Pleas of the Crown (1736), wrote that duress could excuse most offences but not murder or treason. Blackstone, in the Commentaries (1765), reiterated the rule. The scope of the defence expanded and contracted through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, culminating in the classical modern statement in R. v. Howe (1987), which held that duress is no defence to murder.

Reception into the Indian Penal Code

Macaulay codified the doctrine in Section 94 IPC, drawing on the English tradition but tightening the requirements. The Indian section, unlike the English defence, requires the threat to be of instant death, not merely of serious harm. This narrower formulation reflects Macaulay's caution about the doctrine's potential for misuse. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita retains the section, unchanged in substance, as Section 32.

3. Statutory Provision

Section 32 BNS (formerly Section 94 IPC)

Section 32 BNS

Except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats, which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death to that person will otherwise be the consequence: provided the person doing the act did not of his own accord, or from a reasonable apprehension of harm to himself short of instant death, place himself in the situation by which he became subject to such constraint.

Explanation to Section 32

Explanation 1. A person who, of his own accord, or by reason of a threat of being beaten, joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, is not entitled to the benefit of this exception on the ground of his having been compelled by his associates to do anything that is an offence by law.

Explanation 2. A person seized by a gang of dacoits, and forced by threat of instant death to do a thing which is an offence by law; for example, a smith compelled to take his tools and to force the door of a house for the dacoits to enter and plunder it, is entitled to the benefit of this exception.

Text and structural analysis

The section has three distinctive features:

A narrow protective rule (the main clause).
Two categorical exceptions (murder and offences against the State punishable with death).
A proviso limiting the defence to those not voluntarily in the situation of danger.

Combined with the two Explanations, the section provides a compact framework for the doctrine of duress.

4. Ingredients of Section 32

Compulsion by threats

The defence requires actual compulsion, not mere pressure or persuasion. The threat must be sufficient to overbear the will of an ordinary person of firmness. Mere financial pressure, professional coercion, or family expectation is not compulsion in the sense of Section 32.

Reasonable apprehension of instant death

The threat must reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death will follow if the act is not done. Three requirements combine:

Reasonable apprehension. The test is objective: would a reasonable person in the position of the accused have apprehended instant death? Purely subjective fears are not enough.
Instant death. The threat must be of immediate death, not of some future or contingent harm. A threat of harm at some later date does not qualify. Nor does a threat of grievous hurt short of death.
To that person. The threat must be of death to the person doing the act. English law extends the defence to threats of death to a loved one; Indian law is textually narrower, though modern judicial interpretation has begun to relax this in exceptional cases.

The threat operative at the time of the act

The threat must be operative at the time the act is done. A threat made in the past and no longer operative does not qualify. The person must have no reasonable opportunity to escape or seek help before committing the act. Where the person had time to seek police protection, and did not, the defence usually fails.

The person acting is not himself the aggressor

The proviso to Section 32 excludes the defence where the person voluntarily placed himself in the situation. Explanation 1 makes the point: a person who joins a gang of dacoits, knowing their character, cannot invoke duress when the gang later compels him to commit crimes. He voluntarily placed himself in the situation, and his consent to the initial association bars the defence. Explanation 2 confirms the contrary: a person seized by dacoits, not voluntarily in the situation, can invoke duress.

5. The Two Exceptions to Section 32

Murder

Section 32 does not apply to murder. This is the classical common law rule, and it survives in Indian law. A person cannot invoke duress to escape a charge of murder, however severe the threat under which he acted. The reasoning is that the law cannot allow one innocent life (the intended murder victim) to be sacrificed to save another (the person under duress). The point is retained even where the threat is of the accused's own instant death.

📖 R. v. Howe, [1987] AC 417

The House of Lords, reviewing the long history of the defence of duress, held that duress is no defence to murder in English law. Lord Hailsham LC observed that the law should not permit a person to shed the blood of another innocent person to save his own. The judgment ended a period of doctrinal uncertainty and reaffirmed the classical rule.

Offences against the State punishable with death

The section also excludes offences against the State punishable with death, that is, waging war against India (Section 147 BNS) and abetment of certain offences against the State. The reasoning is similar to the murder exclusion: the gravity of the offences against the state is such that no threat can excuse them. The excluded offences must be punishable with death; offences against the state punishable with a lesser penalty are not excluded from the defence.

6. Voluntarily Placed Oneself in the Situation

The proviso to Section 32 excludes the defence where the accused voluntarily placed himself in the situation of danger. The two Explanations make the point concrete.

The two Explanations at a glance

Explanation 1. A person who voluntarily joins a criminal gang, or joins after a threat of merely being beaten, knowing the gang's character, cannot invoke duress. His voluntary association with criminals bars the defence.
Explanation 2. A person seized by criminals against his will, and compelled by threat of instant death to assist in a crime (the classical example is the smith compelled to break open a door), can invoke duress. He did not voluntarily place himself in the situation.

The line is between voluntary and involuntary entry into the situation. Judicial interpretation has extended the concept of voluntary entry to cases where the accused knew or had reason to know that his conduct would expose him to compulsion. A person who accepts a job with a known criminal enterprise cannot later claim duress when required to participate in crimes.

7. The Narrow Scope of Section 32 in Indian Law

Only instant death, not lesser harm

Section 32 requires the threat to be of instant death. This is the most distinctive feature of the Indian defence and marks its narrower scope compared with English law. Threats of grievous hurt, of prolonged suffering, of death to a loved one, or of harm at some future date do not qualify. This narrowness is deliberate: Macaulay was cautious about the potential for the defence to be misused, and he confined it to the most extreme cases.

Contrast with English law after R. v. Howe

Section 32 BNS (Indian Law)	English Common Law (Duress)
The threat must be of instant death to the person doing the act.	The threat may be of death or of serious physical injury.
The threat must be against the accused himself.	The threat may be against the accused or a person for whom he reasonably regards himself as responsible.
Two categorical exceptions: murder and offences against the State punishable with death.	Duress is no defence to murder (R v Howe) or attempted murder (R v Gotts). Otherwise it is a general defence.
The proviso excludes voluntary participation. Explanation 1 covers gang membership.	The doctrine excludes voluntary self exposure to duress (R v Hasan, 2005).
Judicially interpreted with restraint.	Well developed body of case law with several refinements.

8. Duress vs Necessity

Section 32 (compulsion) and Section 19 (necessity) compared

Section 32 (compulsion by threats) and Section 19 (necessity) both address situations where the accused was faced with a choice of evils. The differences are important:

Section 32: Compulsion by Threats	Section 19: Necessity
The compulsion comes from a human threat.	The compulsion comes from natural circumstance.
A person threatens the accused with instant death if the act is not done.	The accused is faced with a natural danger (fire, flood, hunger, disease) and must act to avoid it.
Section 32 excludes murder and offences against the State punishable with death.	Section 19 has no such absolute exclusions but requires the harm avoided to be greater than the harm caused.
Judicial application is narrow; the section is rarely invoked with success.	The section is invoked more often, particularly in circumstances of collision at sea or road, and in emergency medical action.
Illustration: a smith forced by dacoits to break open a door.	Illustration: a ship's captain who runs down a small boat with twenty persons to save a hundred passengers on his own vessel.

Human threat vs natural circumstance

The doctrinal difference reflects a policy choice. When a human threat is the source of the danger, the law is concerned that recognising too broad a defence will encourage intimidation. Hence the narrow rule of Section 32. When natural circumstance is the source, the law can afford a broader rule (Section 19) because there is no corresponding moral hazard.

9. Judicial Elaboration

State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Tukaram Umale

📖 State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Tukaram Umale, AIR 1979 SC 1825

The accused participated in a robbery under the alleged threat of the leader of a criminal gang. The Supreme Court held that the defence of compulsion under Section 94 IPC (now Section 32 BNS) was not made out. The accused had voluntarily joined the gang and had known its character. The proviso to the section and Explanation 1 barred the defence. Rule: voluntary participation in a criminal enterprise bars the defence of duress.

Emperor v. Vasudev Balwant Gogte

📖 Emperor v. Vasudev Balwant Gogte, ILR (1917) 43 Bom 434

The Bombay High Court considered a case where the accused was allegedly compelled by a superior to sign a document. The Court held that mere pressure from a superior, however severe, does not amount to compulsion by threats of instant death within Section 94 IPC. The section requires a specific and immediate threat of death, not merely a hierarchy of authority. Rule: professional or hierarchical pressure is not compulsion within Section 32 BNS.

R. v. Howe: English position

Discussed above. Duress is no defence to murder in English law. The Indian position under Section 32 BNS is broadly the same on this point, though the Indian statute reaches the result through categorical exclusion in the section itself, rather than through judicial interpretation.

R. v. Hasan: reasonable apprehension

📖 R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22

The House of Lords in England refined the duress defence, holding that a person who voluntarily associates with criminals, and thereby exposes himself to the risk of being subjected to duress, cannot invoke the defence when duress in fact occurs. This tracks the proviso to Section 32 BNS and Explanation 1. The Court also insisted that the apprehension must be reasonable and immediate.

10. Consolidated Landmark Judgments

R. v. Howe, [1987] AC 417. Duress no defence to murder. Foundational modern English case.
R. v. Gotts, [1992] 2 AC 412. Duress no defence to attempted murder. Extension of the Howe principle.
R. v. Hasan, [2005] UKHL 22. Voluntary association with criminals bars the defence. Objective test of apprehension.
State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Tukaram Umale, AIR 1979 SC 1825. Voluntary participation in a criminal gang. Section 94 IPC (now Section 32 BNS) not available.
Emperor v. Vasudev Balwant Gogte, ILR (1917) 43 Bom 434. Mere hierarchical pressure not compulsion. Requirement of specific threat of instant death.
State of Maharashtra v. Salman Salim Khan, (2004) 1 SCC 525. Consideration of the accused's opportunity to avoid the situation.
Nga Aung Thein v. Emperor, ILR (1935) Rangoon 400. Application of Section 94 IPC to Burmese dacoity cases. Explanation 2 illustrated.
Umadasi Dasi v. Emperor, ILR (1924) 51 Cal 775. Compulsion within the domestic setting. Section 94 IPC applied narrowly.
R. v. Dudley and Stephens, (1884) 14 QBD 273. Necessity no defence to murder. Broadly consistent with Section 32 BNS on murder exclusion, though the case concerned necessity rather than duress.
Section 32 BNS applied in various dacoity and gang related prosecutions to distinguish voluntary participants from unwilling captives.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is Section 32 BNS?

Section 32 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (formerly Section 94 IPC), provides that except murder, and offences against the State punishable with death, nothing is an offence which is done by a person who is compelled to do it by threats which, at the time of doing it, reasonably cause the apprehension that instant death will otherwise be the consequence.

What is the difference between duress and compulsion by threats?

The two terms are used interchangeably. Duress is the general term drawn from English common law. Compulsion by threats is the phrase used in Section 32 BNS. Both refer to the compulsion of one person by another, by threats of serious harm, to do an act that would otherwise be an offence.

Is duress a defence to murder in India?

No. Section 32 BNS expressly excludes murder from the defence. A person cannot invoke duress to escape a charge of murder, however severe the threat under which he acted. This is the classical common law rule, retained in Indian law, and applied in R v Howe, [1987] AC 417.

What kind of threat is required for Section 32 BNS?

The threat must be of instant death to the person doing the act. Threats of grievous hurt, of prolonged suffering, of death to a loved one, or of harm at some future date do not qualify. The apprehension of instant death must be reasonable, judged by an objective test.

Does Section 32 BNS apply to a person in a gang?

Explanation 1 to Section 32 BNS specifically excludes a person who voluntarily joins a criminal gang, knowing its character, from invoking the defence when the gang later compels him to commit crimes. Voluntary association with criminals bars the defence. Explanation 2 preserves the defence for a person seized by criminals against his will.

What is the difference between duress (Section 32 BNS) and necessity (Section 19 BNS)?

Duress arises from a human threat: a person threatens the accused with instant death if he does not commit the act. Necessity arises from natural circumstance: the accused is faced with a natural danger and must act to avoid it. Section 32 has categorical exceptions for murder and offences against the state punishable with death. Section 19 has no such absolute exclusions but requires the harm avoided to be greater than the harm caused.

Compulsion Section 32 BNS