Evidence Law: Indian Evidence Act, 1872 / Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 (BSA)

Questions Lawful in Cross Examination Section 149

Questions Lawful in Cross-Examination under Section 149 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023: Scope, Object and Questions Affecting Credit

Cross-examination in India has a wider reach than in most systems. It is not confined to what the witness said in chief, it may range over anything relevant, and Section 149 adds a further dimension by permitting questions directed not at the facts at all but at the witness himself — his truthfulness, his position in life, and his character. That last permission is the most easily abused in the whole Adhiniyam, and six sections around it exist to restrain it.

1. The Provision

Section 149, BSA — Questions lawful in cross-examination

When a witness is under cross-examination, he may, in addition to the questions hereinbefore referred to, be asked any questions which tend —

(a) to test his veracity;

(b) to discover who he is and what is his position in life; or

(c) to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although the answer to such questions might tend directly or indirectly to criminate him or might expose or tend directly or indirectly to expose him to a penalty or forfeiture.

Provided that in a prosecution for the specified sexual offences, where the question of consent is in issue, it shall not be permissible to adduce evidence or to put questions in the cross-examination of the victim as to her general immoral character, or previous sexual experience with any person, for proving such consent or the quality of consent.

Section 149 corresponds to Section 146 of the Indian Evidence Act, and the proviso to the amendment of 2013, carried forward unchanged.

The opening words — 'in addition to the questions hereinbefore referred to' — are important. Section 149 does not describe the ordinary content of cross-examination; Section 143 does that, by providing that cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but need not be confined to what was said in chief. Section 149 adds a further category: questions that need not relate to any fact in issue at all, and that are directed at the witness.

2. The Two Objects of Cross-Examination

Reading Sections 143 and 149 together produces the classical division.

Cross-examination as to facts

Cross-examination as to credit

Provision

Section 143

Section 149

Directed at

The facts — eliciting material favourable to the cross-examiner, and testing the account given

The witness — his truthfulness, identity and character

Must it be relevant to the issues?

Yes — it must relate to relevant facts

No — the matter may be entirely collateral

Contradiction of the answer

Permitted — the matter is in issue

Barred by the finality rule in Section 156, subject to two exceptions

Court's control

Relevance

Sections 150 to 155 — compulsion, reasonable grounds, indecency, and insult

The classical statement of the object of cross-examination, long adopted in Indian practice, identifies three purposes: to impeach the accuracy, credibility and general value of the evidence given in chief; to sift the facts already stated by the witness; and to detect and expose discrepancies, or to elicit suppressed facts which will support the case of the cross-examining party.

3. The Three Clauses

3.1 Clause (a) — testing veracity

The widest and least controversial. Questions testing whether the witness is telling the truth — about his opportunity to observe, his memory, his consistency, his interest, his relationship with the parties, and the inherent probability of his account.

Much of what falls under this clause would in any event be permissible under Section 143 as relating to relevant facts. The clause matters where the question touches nothing in issue but bears on whether the witness is truthful.

3.2 Clause (b) — who he is and his position in life

Questions establishing the witness's identity, occupation, residence, standing and circumstances. The clause serves two purposes: it enables the court to place the witness, and it exposes a witness who is not who he claims to be.

The clause is also the basis on which a witness's means and circumstances may be explored where they bear on whether he was where he says he was, or on whether he has been procured.

3.3 Clause (c) — shaking credit by injuring character

The most far-reaching and the one requiring restraint. It permits questions whose object is to injure the character of the witness in order to shake his credit — previous convictions, disreputable conduct, dishonesty in other dealings, and matters that would ordinarily be nobody's business.

The closing words remove one objection that would otherwise be fatal: the questions are permissible although the answer might criminate the witness or expose him to a penalty or forfeiture. That is consistent with Section 137, which removes the privilege and substitutes a use immunity.

⚠ Clause (c) is a licence to injure, and is controlled by six sections

The permission to shake credit by injuring character is unusual and is deliberately hedged. Section 150 determines when the witness must answer; Section 151 gives the court the discretion to decide whether he shall be compelled; Section 152 forbids the question without reasonable grounds; Section 153 permits a report to the questioner's professional authority; Section 154 permits indecent and scandalous questions to be forbidden; and Section 155 requires questions intended to insult or annoy to be forbidden. A cross-examiner relying on clause (c) is operating within all six.

4. The Controls — Sections 150 to 155

Section

Provision

Effect

150

If a question relates to a matter relevant to the matter in issue, Section 137 applies and the witness shall be compelled to answer

Where the question touches the issues, there is no discretion

151

The Court shall decide whether a witness shall be compelled to answer a question going only to credit, having regard to whether the imputation, if true, would seriously affect the Court's opinion of his credibility, and whether it relates to matters so remote in time or of such a character that it would not affect that opinion

The court's discretion is the principal filter on clause (c)

152

A question under clause (c) ought not to be asked unless the questioner has reasonable grounds for thinking that the imputation is well founded

Addressed to counsel, and to the court

153

Where such a question is asked without reasonable grounds, the Court may report the circumstances to the authority to which the questioner is professionally subject

The sanction that makes Section 152 enforceable

154

Indecent and scandalous questions — the Court may forbid them, unless they relate to facts in issue or to matters necessary to determine whether the facts in issue existed

A discretion, with a material-question exception

155

Questions intended to insult or annoy, or needlessly offensive in form — the Court shall forbid them

Mandatory; no question is material as an insult

Section 151 is the heart of the scheme and is under-used. The court is required to decide, on two stated criteria, whether a witness must answer a question going only to credit: whether the imputation if true would seriously affect its opinion of his credibility, and whether the matter is so remote in time or of such a character that it would not. A question about dishonesty twenty years ago, or about a matter with no bearing on truthfulness, fails both.

Section 152 imposes a duty on counsel. The imputation must rest on reasonable grounds. Instructions from a client are not by themselves reasonable grounds where the questioner has no material to support the imputation, and the provision is a real professional constraint rather than a formality — which Section 153 makes clear by providing for a report to the disciplinary authority.

5. The Finality Rule — Section 156

Section 156, BSA — Exclusion of evidence to contradict answers to questions testing veracity

When a witness has been asked and has answered any question which is relevant to the enquiry only in so far as it tends to shake his credit by injuring his character, no evidence shall be given to contradict him; but, if he answers falsely, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.

Exception 1. — If a witness is asked whether he has been previously convicted of any crime and denies it, evidence may be given of his previous conviction.

Exception 2. — If a witness is asked any question tending to impeach his impartiality, and answers it by falsely denying the facts suggested, he may be contradicted.

This is the counterpart of Section 149 and the principal limit on it. A cross-examiner may ask anything within clause (c); once the witness has answered, the answer is final and no evidence may be led to contradict it.

The rationale is practical. Without the rule, every collateral imputation would generate its own subsidiary trial, and proceedings would be diverted into enquiries about matters having nothing to do with the issues.

Question

Answer given

May it be contradicted?

'Were you convicted of theft in 2019?'

Denial

Yes — Exception 1

'Have you been paid by the complainant to give evidence?'

False denial

Yes — Exception 2, impartiality

'Are you not known to be a dishonest man?'

Denial

No — collateral, and final

'Did you not quarrel with the accused last year?'

Denial, where it bears on bias

Yes — Exception 2

'Were you present at the place?'

Denial

Yes — but under Section 143; the matter is a fact in issue, not merely credit

⚠ The line is between credit and the issues

Section 156 bars contradiction only where the question is relevant only in so far as it tends to shake credit. A matter that bears on the facts in issue — presence, opportunity, the sequence of events — may always be contradicted, because it is not collateral. The practical test is whether, apart from its effect on the witness's credibility, the matter would have been admissible at all. If it would, contradiction is permitted; if it would not, the answer is final.

6. The Proviso — Protecting the Victim of a Sexual Offence

The proviso to Section 149 is the most important restriction on clause (c) and was introduced because the permission to injure character had been used against the victims of sexual offences as a matter of routine.

In a prosecution for the specified offences, where the question of consent is in issue, it is not permissible to adduce evidence, or to put questions in cross-examination of the victim, as to her general immoral character or her previous sexual experience with any person, for proving consent or the quality of consent.

The proviso operates with two other provisions, and the three should be read together.

Provision

What it does

Section 48

Makes evidence of the character of the victim or of her previous sexual experience with any person irrelevant on the issue of consent or the quality of consent

Proviso to Section 149

Closes the route by which such material would otherwise be extracted in cross-examination

Section 120

Raises a mandatory presumption of absence of consent in the aggravated categories, where intercourse is proved and the woman so deposes

The division of labour is deliberate. Section 48 makes the material irrelevant; the proviso makes the question impermissible; Section 120 shifts the burden. A protection resting on relevance alone would be defeated by cross-examination that extracted the material anyway, and the proviso exists to prevent exactly that.

📖 State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384

Held: The Court deprecated the practice of subjecting a prosecutrix to a cross-examination that puts her on trial, and of disbelieving her on minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies. The testimony of the victim in cases of sexual assault is vital, and unless there are compelling reasons necessitating corroboration, the Court should find no difficulty in acting on it alone.

The Court directed that trials of such offences be conducted in camera, that the identity of the victim be protected, and that the court avoid disclosing her name in its orders and judgments. It observed that the courts must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity.

Ratio: The cross-examination of a victim of a sexual offence is subject to the court's active control, and the practice of humiliating cross-examination is to be deprecated.

Lillu alias Rajesh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 14 SCC 643 completes the protection on the medical side, holding the two-finger test impermissible and its interpretation violative of the survivor's right to privacy and dignity, and holding that a finding that she is habituated to sexual intercourse is of no consequence.

7. The Duty to Put One's Case

A rule not found in the Adhiniyam but observed throughout Indian practice completes the picture of what cross-examination requires.

Where a party intends to contradict a witness, to suggest that his account is untrue, or to rely at trial on a version inconsistent with what the witness has said, the contrary version must be put to him in cross-examination so that he has an opportunity to answer it. The rule is associated with the decision in Browne v. Dunn, (1893) 6 R 67 (HL), and rests on elementary fairness.

Two consequences follow where it is not observed.

The evidence may be treated as unchallenged. A court may proceed on the footing that what was not put was not disputed, and may decline to entertain a challenge raised for the first time in argument.

The alternative version may be treated as an afterthought. A case advanced in final argument, which the witnesses who could have answered it were never asked about, carries correspondingly less weight.

The rule connects with Section 148, which requires a witness's attention to be drawn to the parts of a previous statement used to contradict him. Both rest on the same principle: a witness is entitled to meet what is to be used against him.

8. Practical Points

  1. Distinguish the two objects. Questions as to facts are governed by Section 143; questions as to credit by Section 149, and the consequences differ.
  2. Before a clause (c) question, ask whether you have reasonable grounds — Section 152 requires them and Section 153 supplies the sanction.
  3. Expect Section 151 to be invoked. The court decides whether the witness must answer a credit question, on remoteness and on whether the imputation would seriously affect credibility.
  4. Remember the finality rule. A denial on a collateral matter cannot be contradicted, and obtaining it is the end of that line.
  5. Use the two exceptions where available — a denied previous conviction, and a false denial going to impartiality.
  6. Never put character or sexual history to the victim of a sexual offence on the issue of consent; the proviso forbids the question and Section 48 makes the material irrelevant.
  7. Put your case. A version not put may be treated as unchallenged or as an afterthought.
  8. Object under Section 155 to anything needlessly offensive, where the court is bound to forbid it.

9. The Position Stated Shortly

  1. Section 149 permits questions going to the witness rather than to the facts — veracity, position in life, and credit by injuring character.
  2. It operates in addition to Section 143, under which cross-examination must relate to relevant facts but is not confined to the chief.
  3. Clause (c) questions are permissible although the answer may criminate the witness, consistently with Section 137.
  4. Six sections control the permission — Sections 150 to 155 — and Section 151 gives the court the decisive discretion.
  5. Section 152 requires reasonable grounds, and Section 153 permits a report to the professional authority where there are none.
  6. Section 156 makes the answer final on a matter going only to credit, subject to previous conviction and impartiality.
  7. The proviso bars questions as to the character or previous sexual experience of a victim on the issue of consent, with Section 48 and Section 120.
  8. A party must put his case to the witness, or risk the evidence being treated as unchallenged.

10. Related Topics and Provisions

Topic or provision

Connection

Cross-Examination as to Previous Statements in Writing — Section 148

Contradicting a witness, and the finality rule

Examination-in-Chief, Cross-Examination and Re-Examination

The stage at which Section 149 operates

Examination of Witnesses — Sections 140 to 168

The chapter as a whole

Character Evidence — Sections 46 to 50

Section 48, making character and sexual history irrelevant to consent

Presumption of Absence of Consent — Section 120

The third element of the protection

Witness Not Excused Because the Answer May Incriminate — Section 137

Why clause (c) questions survive the self-incrimination objection

Sections 150 to 156 and 158, BSA

Compulsion, reasonable grounds, indecency, insult, finality and impeaching credit