Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC)
Section 148 CPC: Enlargement of Time
Courts fix time limits constantly: to furnish security, to make up a deficiency, to amend a pleading, to deposit a sum. Section 148 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 allows the court to enlarge such a period, and it does so in words that answer the obvious objection: the extension may be granted even though the period originally fixed has already expired. Since 1999 the power carries a thirty-day ceiling. These notes cover what the section reaches, what it does not, the position after expiry, and the limits on the power.
The period fixed, the extension, and the outer limit of the power
1. Section 148: The Provision
§ Section 148, CPC 1908 Where any period is fixed or granted by the Court for the doing of any act prescribed or allowed by this Code, the Court may, in its discretion, from time to time, enlarge such period, not exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. |
§ Four elements of the section Each limits it: • A period fixed or granted by the court. The section applies to a period the court itself has fixed or granted, not to one fixed by a statute independently of any order. • For an act prescribed or allowed by this Code. The act must be one the Code prescribes or allows. A time limit under another statute is outside the section, even if the court fixed it. • In its discretion, from time to time. The power is discretionary and may be exercised more than once, subject to the overall cap. • Not exceeding thirty days in total. The words in total are important: successive extensions are aggregated, so the court cannot grant three extensions of thirty days each. |
2. Extension After the Period Has Expired
§ Why the closing words matter The section ends with the words even though the period originally fixed or granted may have expired. Without them, a real doubt would arise. Once a period fixed by the court has run out, it might be said that the party's right to do the act is at an end and the court is functus officio as to that direction. The closing words remove the doubt. The practical consequence. A party who has missed the date is not shut out. He applies for enlargement, and the court may grant it, though it will naturally ask why the time was not used and whether the other side has been prejudiced. The discretion is judicial. An extension is not granted as a matter of course. The court considers the reason for the delay, the conduct of the applicant, the prejudice to the opposite party, and whether the original order was made peremptorily. |
3. What the Section Reaches, and What It Does Not
Within Section 148 | Outside Section 148 |
|---|---|
Time to furnish security for costs under Order XXV Rule 1, or security under Order XXXVIII | The period of limitation for instituting a suit, appeal or application under the Limitation Act, 1963, which is governed by Section 5 of that Act |
Time to make up a deficiency in court fee, where the court has fixed a date | A period fixed by a special statute, such as a time limit in a rent or land legislation, unless that statute itself allows extension |
Time to amend a plaint or written statement following an order of amendment | A period the court had no power to fix at all, since there is nothing validly fixed to enlarge |
Time to deposit a sum the court has directed as a condition, as under Order XXXVII Rule 3 or Order XXI Rule 89 | A period that the court has expressly made peremptory, where it has recorded that no further time will be given, though even then the power is not wholly extinguished |
Time to remedy a defect in a plaint or memorandum of appeal under Order VII Rule 11 or Order XLI Rule 3 | Anything not prescribed or allowed by the Code, however convenient an extension would be |
§ Section 148 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act distinguished Section 148 enlarges a period the court fixed, for an act under the Code, up to thirty days in total, in the court's discretion. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 condones delay in filing an appeal or application beyond the period the statute prescribes, on sufficient cause being shown, and carries no ceiling. The two are not interchangeable. A litigant who is late in filing an appeal needs Section 5, not Section 148; a litigant who is late in furnishing security the court ordered needs Section 148, not Section 5. |
4. Limitations on the Power
i. The thirty-day ceiling. Inserted by the Amendment Act of 1999 with effect from 2002, the cap applies to the total of all extensions under the section. Before the amendment the power was unlimited in duration.
ii. It cannot defeat an express provision. Where the Code itself fixes a consequence for non-compliance within a stated period, the court cannot use Section 148 to avoid that consequence.
iii. It cannot extend a statutory limitation period. The section deals with a period the court fixed, not one the Limitation Act prescribes.
iv. Inherent power is not a way round the cap. Section 148 having dealt with the subject and fixed a limit, Section 151 is not used to grant a longer extension of the same kind, since the inherent power does not override an express provision.
v. Prejudice matters. Where the opposite party has altered his position on the footing that the period has expired, an extension may be refused or granted on terms as to costs.
5. Landmark Points
- Section 148. The court may enlarge a period it has fixed or granted for doing an act prescribed or allowed by the Code, not exceeding thirty days in total.
- The closing words. The extension may be granted even though the period originally fixed or granted has expired, so a party who has missed the date is not automatically shut out.
- In total. Successive extensions are aggregated against the thirty-day ceiling, which the Amendment Act of 1999 introduced.
- The section does not touch limitation. A period prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963 is governed by Section 5 of that Act, on sufficient cause, without any ceiling.
- Section 151 is not an alternative route. The inherent power is not used to enlarge time beyond what Section 148 permits, since it cannot override an express provision.
6. Frequently Asked Questions
What does Section 148 allow?
The court, in its discretion, to enlarge from time to time a period it has fixed or granted for the doing of an act prescribed or allowed by the Code, not exceeding thirty days in total, even though the period originally fixed may have expired.
Can time be extended after the period has already expired?
Yes. The closing words of the section say so expressly, which removes any argument that the court becomes functus officio once the period it fixed has run out. The discretion is judicial, and the court will consider the reason for the delay and any prejudice.
Is there a limit on how much time can be granted?
Yes. Since the Amendment Act of 1999, the enlargement must not exceed thirty days in total. Because the cap is on the total, successive extensions are added together and the court cannot grant repeated thirty-day extensions.
Does Section 148 apply to the limitation period for filing an appeal?
No. That period is prescribed by the Limitation Act, 1963, not fixed by the court, and delay in filing is condoned under Section 5 of that Act on sufficient cause, which carries no thirty-day ceiling.
Can the court use its inherent power to give more than thirty days?
No. Section 148 has dealt with the subject and fixed a limit, and Section 151 cannot be used to override an express provision of the Code. The inherent power fills gaps; it does not enlarge what the Code has confined.
Is an extension granted as a matter of course?
No. The power is discretionary, and the court considers why the time was not used, the applicant's conduct, whether the original order was peremptory, and whether the opposite party has been prejudiced, granting the extension on terms as to costs where appropriate.
7. Related Topics in This CPC Series
- Section 149: Deficiency of Court Fee
- Section 151: Inherent Powers of the Court
- Order XXV: Security for Costs
- Order XXXVII: Summary Procedure and Summary Suits