§ Section 47, CPC 1908 (in substance)

(1) All questions arising between the parties to the suit in which the decree was passed, or their representatives, and relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree, shall be determined by the Court executing the decree and not by a separate suit.

(3) Where a question arises as to whether any person is or is not the representative of a party, such question shall, for the purposes of this section, be determined by the Court.

Explanation I. For the purposes of this section, a plaintiff whose suit has been dismissed and a defendant against whom a suit has been dismissed are parties to the suit.

Explanation II. (a) For the purposes of this section, a purchaser of property at a sale in execution of a decree shall be deemed to be a party to the suit in which the decree is passed; and (b) all questions relating to the delivery of possession of such property to such purchaser or his representative shall be deemed to be questions relating to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree within the meaning of this section.

§ When Section 47 applies

All three must be satisfied:

• The question must arise between the parties to the suit or their representatives. A question raised by a stranger to the decree is outside the section; his remedies are elsewhere, chiefly Order XXI Rule 58 for claims to attached property and Order XXI Rules 97 to 103 for resistance, obstruction and dispossession.

• It must relate to the execution, discharge or satisfaction of the decree. The subject must be the enforcement of the decree, its discharge by payment or adjustment, or its satisfaction, and not the merits of the decision.

• The decree must be one passed in that suit. The section governs the enforcement of the decree in the proceeding in which it was passed, which is why execution is treated as a continuation of the suit rather than a new proceeding.

Whether the decree has been fully or partly satisfied by payment or adjustment

It relates directly to the discharge and satisfaction of the decree; note Order XXI Rule 2, under which an uncertified payment is not recognised

Whether the decree is capable of execution, or is barred by limitation

It concerns whether the decree can be enforced at all, which is a question of execution

Whether the person sought to be proceeded against is the legal representative of a deceased judgment-debtor

Expressly covered by sub-section (3), which makes the question of representative status one for the executing court

Whether the property attached is covered by the decree, or exceeds it

It concerns the scope of what the decree permits to be realised

Whether an auction purchaser is entitled to delivery of possession

Expressly covered by Explanation II, which deems such questions to relate to execution

Whether the decree is a nullity for want of jurisdiction

It goes to whether there is any decree to execute at all, and is therefore a question of execution

Whether a compromise or adjustment reached after the decree discharges it

It relates to the discharge of the decree, subject to certification under Order XXI Rule 2

§ The bar and its purpose

The words and not by a separate suit are the operative part of the section. A party who is dissatisfied with something done or omitted in execution cannot file a fresh suit about it; he must raise the objection in the execution proceeding itself.

The purpose is to prevent execution from being stalled by collateral litigation. A decree-holder who has succeeded after a full trial should not be met by a second round of suits over each step of enforcement.

The bar is jurisdictional in effect: a suit raising a question that Section 47 assigns to the executing court is not maintainable, and the plaint is liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d) as barred by law.

The bar does not extend to a stranger. A person who is neither a party nor a representative may sue, subject to the specific machinery in Order XXI Rules 58 and 97 to 103, under which the executing court itself decides questions of right, title and interest and its determination has the force of a decree.

§ Why the appellate remedy changed

Before 1976, Section 2(2) included within the definition of a decree the determination of any question within Section 47. A Section 47 order was therefore a decree, and was appealable as one under Section 96, with a second appeal under Section 100.

The Amendment Act 104 of 1976 deleted that limb from Section 2(2). A determination under Section 47 is now an order, not a decree.

The consequence is practical: there is no appeal as of right against a Section 47 determination, and the remedy, where available, lies in revision under Section 115 or under Article 227 of the Constitution. The change was made deliberately, to stop execution proceedings from generating their own appellate ladder and defeating the decree by delay.

This is among the most frequently examined amendment points in the Code, and an answer that states the position both before and after 1976 shows command of it.

§ What the rule permits and forbids

The line is drawn by function:

• Forbidden: holding that the decree is erroneous on the merits; refusing to execute because the evidence did not justify the finding; treating a decree as varied by material outside it; entertaining a defence that was or could have been raised at the trial.

• Permitted: construing the decree to ascertain what it means, since a court cannot execute what it has not understood; refusing to execute a decree that is vague, ambiguous or impossible of execution; refusing to execute a decree that has been satisfied, adjusted or become time-barred; and holding the decree to be a nullity on the single ground below.

📖 Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan, AIR 1954 SC 340

A suit valued at a figure within the Subordinate Judge's jurisdiction was decided by him, the first appeal went to the District Court, and it later appeared that on the true valuation both the suit and the appeal belonged to a higher forum. The appellant contended that the appellate decree was a nullity. The Supreme Court stated the fundamental principle: a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and its invalidity may be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, including at the stage of execution and in collateral proceedings; a defect of jurisdiction strikes at the very authority of the court to pass the decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by the consent of parties. The Court then held that defects of pecuniary and territorial jurisdiction stand on a different footing by the express policy of Section 21, being entertained only where the objection was taken at the earliest opportunity and a consequent failure of justice is shown; no prejudice being established, the decree stood.

Rule: the executing court may refuse to execute a decree that is a nullity for inherent want of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Defects of place and value do not make a decree void and cannot be raised in execution.

§ The limits of the exception

The exception covers inherent lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, that is, a case where the court had no competence to try the class of dispute at all, as where a special statute barred the civil court.

It does not cover defects of territorial or pecuniary jurisdiction, which Section 21 makes curable: such an objection must be taken in the trial court at the earliest opportunity and a consequent failure of justice shown, and it cannot be raised for the first time in execution.

It does not cover an erroneous decree. A court with jurisdiction that decides wrongly passes a valid decree, and the executing court must enforce it.

Stating the exception with these limits is what distinguishes a complete answer: the nullity ground is narrow, and its narrowness is the reason the general rule works.