Voluntary and Involuntary Confession under Section 22 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023: Inducement, Threat, Coercion or Promise, Person in Authority and Tests of Voluntariness

Everything in the law of confessions turns on one question asked before any other: was the statement free? A confession is received because a person does not ordinarily accuse himself falsely. Remove the freedom and the assumption collapses, and what remains is a statement made to escape a present pressure rather than to tell the truth. Section 22 is the provision that gives effect to this, and the Adhiniyam has widened it by adding the word coercion to the grounds on which a confession becomes irrelevant.

1. The Provision

Section 22, BSA — Confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise, when irrelevant in criminal proceeding

A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat, coercion or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority, and sufficient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him.

	Section 24, IEA, 1872	Section 22, BSA, 2023
Grounds of exclusion	Inducement, threat or promise	Inducement, threat, coercion or promise
Structure	Section 24, with Sections 28 and 29 standing separately	A single section, with the substance of Sections 28 and 29 carried into provisos
Everything else	—	Carried forward unchanged

⚠ Why the addition of 'coercion' matters

Under the Indian Evidence Act a confession obtained by pressure that fell short of a threat in the strict sense had to be attacked as an inducement, which was not always a comfortable fit. The word coercion covers the application of force or pressure directly, and it removes the need to characterise custodial pressure as a promise of advantage. It is one of the few genuine substantive enlargements the Adhiniyam has made outside the electronic-evidence chapter.

2. The Five Requirements

Requirement	What it means	Where it fails
1. An inducement, threat, coercion or promise	Any one of the four suffices. It may be express or implied, and may be gathered from the circumstances	A general exhortation to tell the truth is neither; a moral or spiritual appeal is outside the section
2. Having reference to the charge	It must relate to the accusation against the maker	A promise or threat about an unrelated matter — a job, a family dispute — does not attract the section
3. Proceeding from a person in authority	One who is, or whom the accused reasonably believes to be, able to influence the course of the proceedings	An inducement offered by a friend or a stranger with no such capacity
4. Sufficient to give reasonable grounds for supposing	Assessed from the standpoint of the accused. The question is what he could reasonably have supposed, not what was intended	The supposed advantage is fanciful, or the accused could not reasonably have believed the person capable of delivering it
5. An advantage or an evil of a temporal nature	A worldly benefit or detriment connected with the proceedings — release, bail, a lighter charge, avoidance of prosecution	A purely spiritual consequence, or a benefit unconnected with the proceedings

2.1 'Appears to the Court'

The threshold is deliberately low. The accused is not required to prove that the confession was induced; it is enough that it appears to the court to have been so caused. Where a real doubt arises about the freedom with which the statement was made, the confession is excluded, because the basis on which the law receives a self-incriminating statement has been removed.

This works together with Section 2(1)(j). A fact is proved when the court believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man would act upon it. Applied to voluntariness, the effect is that the prosecution must place the court in a position to be satisfied that the confession was free; it is not for the accused to establish that it was not.

3. Person in Authority

The expression is not defined. It has been understood to mean a person who has, or whom the accused reasonably believes to have, the capacity to influence the course of the prosecution.

Category	Ordinarily a person in authority?	Reason
Police officer	Yes	The paradigm case. Confessions to a police officer are in any event excluded by Section 23(1)
Magistrate	Yes	Has direct control over the proceedings, which is why the safeguards under Section 183 BNSS exist
Public prosecutor	Yes	Controls the conduct of the prosecution
Complainant or the injured party	Frequently	Where the accused reasonably supposes that the complainant can procure a withdrawal or a compromise
Employer, in relation to an employee	Frequently	Where the offence concerns the employment and the employer can decide whether to prosecute
A person of local standing	Depends	The question is whether the accused could reasonably have believed him able to influence the proceedings
A relative or friend with no such capacity	No	An inducement from such a person does not attract Section 22, though it may affect weight
A doctor, priest or counsellor	No, ordinarily	No capacity to influence the proceedings; an appeal from such a person is ordinarily moral rather than temporal

⚠ The test is what the accused could reasonably suppose

Section 22 does not ask whether the person in fact had authority over the prosecution. It asks whether the inducement was sufficient to give the accused grounds which would appear to him reasonable for supposing that he would gain an advantage. A person with no real influence may still be a person in authority for this purpose if the accused could reasonably have believed otherwise, and the enquiry is therefore into the accused's position and understanding rather than into the formal status of the recipient.

4. The Provisos

Provisos to Section 22, BSA

A confession is not irrelevant merely because —

the impression caused by the inducement, threat, coercion or promise has been fully removed in the opinion of the Court;

it was made under a promise of secrecy;

it was made in consequence of a deception practised on the accused person for the purpose of obtaining it;

it was made when the accused was drunk;

it was made in answer to questions which he need not have answered, whatever may have been the form of those questions; or

the accused was not warned that he was not bound to make such confession and that evidence of it might be given against him.

Proviso	Origin	Effect
Impression fully removed	IEA Section 28	Where the original inducement has ceased to operate on the mind of the accused, a subsequent confession is not excluded on that account
Promise of secrecy	IEA Section 29	Not irrelevant merely on that account
Deception	IEA Section 29	The same
Drunkenness	IEA Section 29	The same
Answers to questions he need not have answered	IEA Section 29	The same, whatever the form of the questions
Absence of a warning	IEA Section 29	The same

⚠ 'Not irrelevant merely because' is not a certificate of reliability

Each proviso removes an automatic bar to relevance; none confers any presumption that the confession is trustworthy. A confession obtained by deception, or from a man who was drunk, or without any warning, remains fully open to attack on the ground that it was not in fact voluntary, and the court weighs it in the ordinary way. In practice these circumstances are the material on which the attack on voluntariness is built, even though none of them is by itself a ground of exclusion.

4.1 When is an impression 'fully removed'?

The first proviso requires the court to be satisfied that the inducement has ceased to operate. The matters ordinarily examined are the interval between the inducement and the confession; whether the accused was removed from the influence of the person who made it; whether he was given time to reflect and access to independent advice; whether he was cautioned afresh; and whether the confession was recorded by a Magistrate under the safeguards in Section 183 of the BNSS. A short interval, continued custody with the same officers, and no fresh caution make the finding very difficult to sustain.

5. Voluntariness and the Custodial Setting

Section 22 does not stand alone. The Adhiniyam supplements it with two categorical exclusions which operate without any enquiry into whether pressure was in fact applied.

Provision	What it excludes	Is proof of compulsion required?
Section 22	A confession caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise from a person in authority	It must appear to the court to have been so caused. Proof is not required, but some material must raise the question
Section 23(1)	Any confession made to a police officer	No. The exclusion is absolute and applies even to a demonstrably voluntary confession
Section 23(2)	Any confession made while in the custody of a police officer, unless in the immediate presence of a Magistrate	No. The exclusion follows from the setting alone

The relationship is one of layers. Section 23 removes two whole categories from consideration without asking any question about voluntariness. Section 22 then operates on everything that survives — judicial confessions, extra-judicial confessions, and confessions made to persons other than the police — and excludes those that were not free.

5.1 Voluntariness and Article 20(3)

Article 20(3), Constitution of India

No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

📖 State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR 1961 SC 1808

Held: An eleven-Judge Bench held that 'to be a witness' means imparting knowledge in respect of relevant facts by an oral statement or a statement in writing. Giving thumb impressions, specimen signatures, handwriting or samples for comparison does not amount to being a witness against oneself, because such material furnishes only a means of comparison and conveys no personal knowledge. The Court also held that mere custody does not by itself amount to compulsion.

Ratio: The protection is confined to testimonial compulsion. Custody alone is not compulsion for constitutional purposes, though it is enough to exclude a confession under Section 23(2).

📖 Nandini Satpathy v. P.L. Dani, (1978) 2 SCC 424

Held: The protection under Article 20(3) is not confined to the trial. It extends to the stage of police interrogation and is available to a person against whom a formal accusation has been made. The right to silence covers not only answers that would directly incriminate but also those that would furnish a link in the chain of evidence.

Ratio: The constitutional protection operates from the investigation stage.

📖 Selvi v. State of Karnataka, (2010) 7 SCC 263

Held: The compulsory administration of narco-analysis, polygraph examination and the Brain Electrical Activation Profile test violates Article 20(3), because the results convey personal knowledge and amount to testimonial compulsion. Such techniques also intrude upon personal liberty under Article 21. No individual may be subjected to them without consent, and where consent is given it must be recorded before a Magistrate with access to a lawyer. Material subsequently discovered with the help of a voluntarily administered test may be admitted, in line with the discovery provision.

Ratio: Involuntary administration of such techniques is unconstitutional; consent must be judicially recorded, and the fruits of a voluntary test are governed by the discovery rule.

⚠ The two protections are not co-extensive

Section 22 and Article 20(3) overlap but neither contains the other. Section 22 excludes a confession induced by a private employer, which raises no constitutional question at all. Article 20(3) protects against compelled testimonial material of every kind, not only confessions, and binds courts and other authorities as well as the police. And Section 23(1) is wider than both, excluding a confession to a police officer even where it was entirely voluntary and no compulsion is alleged.

6. Establishing or Attacking Voluntariness

Factor	Supports voluntariness	Suggests the contrary
Interval before recording	The accused was in judicial custody for a period before the confession was recorded	Produced directly from police custody and the confession recorded at once
Time for reflection	Time was given, and the accused was told he could reconsider	No interval; the confession follows immediately on production
Warning and explanation	Recorded in terms, with the memorandum completed	The memorandum is missing, incomplete or formulaic
Custody during the interval	The accused was not in the custody of the investigating officers	He remained with the same officers throughout
Physical condition	No marks of injury; the medical examination is unremarkable	Injuries recorded on medical examination, or a complaint of ill-treatment
Content of the confession	It contains detail the maker alone could have known, and it fits the other evidence	It follows the prosecution case exactly, in the language of the case diary
Timing of the retraction	No retraction, or a retraction made only at the trial with no particulars	Retracted at the first opportunity, with a specific allegation of pressure
Audio-video record	The recording under the proviso to Section 183(1), BNSS shows the circumstances	Available but not used in a serious case, with no explanation

6.1 The sequence the court follows

Is the statement a confession at all? It must admit the offence or substantially all the facts constituting it. A gravely incriminating statement falling short of that is an admission, and Sections 22 and 23 do not apply to it.
Is it excluded by Section 23? Made to a police officer, or in police custody otherwise than in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. If so, the enquiry ends, save for the proviso.
Does it appear to have been caused by inducement, threat, coercion or promise? If so, it is irrelevant under Section 22 and is not considered at all.
If voluntary, is it true? Voluntariness and truth are separate questions, and a confession may be free and still false.
Has it been retracted, and if so, is there corroboration in material particulars? A rule of prudence, not of law.
Against whom may it be used? Substantive evidence against its maker; against a co-accused, only to be taken into consideration under Section 24.

📖 Palvinder Kaur v. State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 354

Held: A statement must be taken as a whole. Where it contains both inculpatory and exculpatory material, and the exculpatory part, if true, would negative the offence charged, the statement cannot be treated as a confession. A court is not entitled to accept the inculpatory portion and reject the exculpatory portion.

Application: The first question in the sequence. A mixed statement is not a confession at all, and the voluntariness enquiry under Section 22 does not arise in respect of it.

7. Related Topics and Provisions

Topic or provision	Connection
Confession under Sections 22, 23 and 24	The statutory scheme within which Section 22 operates
Judicial and Extra-Judicial Confession	The safeguards under Section 183 BNSS, and the scrutiny of extra-judicial confessions
Confession — Meaning, Nature and Evidentiary Value	The definition of confession and the weight of each kind
Discovery Statement — Proviso to Section 23	The one route by which a custodial statement reaches the record
Section 2(1)(j), BSA	The definition of 'proved', which governs the court's satisfaction as to voluntariness
Section 183, BNSS, 2023	Recording of confessions by a Magistrate, and the audio-video safeguard
Article 20(3) and Article 21, Constitution of India	Protection against testimonial compulsion, and personal liberty